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ABSTRACT 
 
Benjamin Bagley: Improvisational Agency 
 (Under the direction of Susan Wolf) 
 
Consider three puzzles in ethics. 
• Love should affirm something special about you, and so be a selective response to certain 
of your qualities. But it should also appreciate you as a particular individual, not as a 
member of the class of people with the qualities in question. 
• A central species of blame is essentially addressed to the agent of a bad action. Yet while 
it is not aptly directed toward agents who cannot be reasoned into acting better (who can 
only be written off), it is not plausibly limited to merely procedural failings, like ignorance, 
confusion, or weakness of will. 
• There seems something right about the incompatibilist thought that real freedom requires 
a radical ability to create yourself, by making choices undetermined by your given past. 
But, as Hume and many others have argued, choices must be explained by facts about 
who you are to be meaningfully attributed to you. 
Overwhelmingly, philosophers have responded to each puzzle by rejecting one of the 
propositions that generate it. This, I argue, is a mistake. It reflects an unduly narrow conception 
of rational agency. Drawing on the phenomenology of improvisation, I show how it is possible to 
act according to norms you make up as you go, whose content depends both epistemically and 
ontologically on the particular actions they govern. This enables new solutions to all three 
puzzles, each a substantial improvement over its predecessors. 
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1 
How I stopped worrying and learned to love rational indeterminacy 
1 Introduction 
According to a plausible and influential family of views, autonomy (or at least a central form of it) 
is a matter of governing yourself according to certain norms. The thought is that certain norms—
principles, commitments, or, as I’ll put it, values—constitute standards of agency to which we 
ultimately and essentially aspire. They define the perspective from which we assess our actions, 
and the attitudes and patterns of practical reasoning from which our actions arise, when we step 
back and ask ourselves whether we really should act, feel, or reason as we do. In this, they define 
who we essentially are, our real or deep selves. To the extent to which our agency embodies or 
tracks the values with which we identify in the right way, then, it is up to us. We are active, rather 
than passive, with respect it. It is we who determine its course, rather than some potentially alien 
forces working within us, which we could intelligibly disavow. 
Call this the normative view of autonomy. I am interested in a question that arises within the 
context of the normative view, which I do not think has received enough attention. What 
happens when the values with which you identify are indeterminate, such that there is no fact of the 
matter, in principle accessible in deliberation, whether they call for you to perform or refrain 
from a certain action? Can, under these circumstances, you act autonomously? It may seem that 
the answer must be “no.” If you cannot settle the question whether or not you should do 
something, all things considered—
 2 
well-informed, could possibly enable you to do so—it would seem that you could not, in good 
faith, take whatever you do end up doing to embody or track your values. And to the extent that 
defenders of the normative view have considered this question, or formulated their theories in 
terms that would entail an answer to it, this is indeed the answer they have given. Below, 
however, I will argue that it is not the answer they have to give. 
This is important, for one thing, because it follows from some fairly modest assumptions 
about the nature of our values that they really are indeterminate in this way, much of the time. In 
particular, they are often indeterminate in this way in relation to many of the most significant 
decisions we are called upon to make, ones that play basic roles in shaping our characters and the 
courses of our lives. If these decisions cannot qualify as autonomous, they would call into 
question why autonomy, as conceived by the normative view, should really be as important as it 
would seem, pretheoretically, to be. 
I will begin, therefore, by setting out the normative view in a bit more detail and showing 
why the contents of what it counts as the values with which we identify can often expected to be 
indeterminate. I will then consider and reject two ways in which defenders of the normative view 
might respond to the phenomenon, either by denying that it is a problem, or by claiming that we 
can resolve indeterminacy within ourselves, when it occurs, through primitive acts of will. Finally 
I will offer my own solution, which is to conceive the contents of the relevant values as things we 
are essentially in an ongoing process of determining. This, I will argue, not only saves the 
normative view from having to count certain fundamental, formative choices as non-
autonomous, but illuminates a central aspect of their significance. 
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2 Indeterminacy, ambivalence, and autonomy 
It will help to start with an example. The canonical one is Sartre’s, of a student who must choose 
between staying with his mother, who needs him, and leaving her to fight with the Free French 
(and thereby, perhaps, avenge his brother). Sartre describes this student as anguished. He is torn 
between competing systems of value, and more basically—it is natural to suppose—between 
competing conceptions of his identity, or the description under which he values himself. Does his 
relationship to his mother give him reasons to stay with her that override the value of the 
contributions he might make if he leaves? Is the honorable thing—in the sense of “honorable” 
that really matters—to care for someone who loves and relies on him, or to resist an oppressor? 
Would he be able to respect himself if he left her? If he stayed? Is he, at heart, a compassionate 
and dutiful son, or an adventurer and patriot? 
Obviously, these are difficult questions. But the nature of their difficulty, and its relation 
to the question of the student’s autonomy, depends on how the normative view of autonomy is 
understood. The view comes in subjective and objective versions. Both versions identify 
autonomy with a capacity for rationality. This is the essential claim of the normative view, full 
stop: that your practical reasoning and conduct is truly up to you—it is free, under your active 
control, a manifestation of your self-governance, something for which you are responsible in a 
certain privileged sense—just in case it is responsive to a certain class of reasons, defined relative 
to a certain class of values. (I’ll call these, accordingly, the values with which you identify.) But they 
differ concerning the nature of these values. According to subjective versions—as defended, for 
instance, by Harry Frankfurt and Michael Bratman—the fundamental values with which you 
identify are subjective in the sense that their content is a function of facts about you that need not 
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obtain of other fully reasonable or rational agents.1 Thus autonomy consists in responsiveness to 
internal reasons, in roughly the sense defended by Bernard Williams.2 But according to objective 
versions—as defended, for instance, by Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, Joseph Raz, and (at one 
point) Susan Wolf—that is not so.3 Rather, autonomy with the name requires the ability to 
respond to reasons external to your subjective values or commitments—or, as Wolf puts it the 
“ability cognitively and normatively to recognize and appreciate the world for what it is.”4 
On an extreme version of the objective view, the student’s difficulty is purely epistemic. In 
asking himself what he should do, he is asking himself what the right thing to do is, all things 
considered, where this is independent of his individual personality and character. Similarly, in 
asking himself whether certain of his motives are worth acting on, or whether to value himself as 
one kind of person or another, he is trying to bring his judgments and self-conception into 
alignment with how they ought to be—how they would be, that is, if he were ideally rational, 
informed, and virtuous. The values with which he identifies, according to this view, are 
exhausted by the values that any ideally rational, informed, and virtuous person necessarily 
would have. His reasoning and conduct would be autonomous, therefore, only to the extent that 
they tracked these values in the right way—to the extent that they were suitably “reason-
                                                 
1. For the most recent statements of Frankfurt’s and Bratman’s views, see Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting it 
Right and Structures of Agency, respectively. Naturally, different subjective theorists differ the regarding the facts that fix 
the content of an agent’s values. For Frankfurt they are facts about a subset of the agent’s desires; for Bratman, they 
are facts about a subset of the agent’s plans. 
Note that the improvisational model I will eventually defend is meant to be as neutral as possible with respect to 
these and other subjective theories. It advances a thesis about how some of the agent’s values get their content; if it is 
possible for Frankfurtian desires or Bratmanian plans to get their content in that way, the improvisational model is 
compatible with Frankfurt’s and Bratman’s views. (I see no reason to deny this possibility with respect to Bratmanian 
plans; I am less sure about desires. Certainly Frankfurt understood desires in a way that precluded it, which is why I 
do not find it unfair to introduce my view in opposition to his.) 
 
2. See “Internal and External Reasons.” 
 
3. See e.g. “Freedom in Belief and Desire,” Engaging Reason, and “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility,” 
respectively. Note that so long as objective views allow that an agent’s values may have irreducibly subjective elements, 
my view should be compatible with them, too.  
 
4. “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility,” p. 381. 
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responsive,” as it were. (There is no need to broach the vexed question of what counts as 
“suitably” here.) 
If it were indeterminate what an ideally rational, estimable, and virtuous person would do 
in the student’s position, this may preclude him from acting autonomously. I do not know what it 
would be for this to be indeterminate, however. Perhaps it might be indeterminate if the student 
had categorical reason to do each thing—if his predicament were a dilemma in the strict, classical 
sense—in which case the conclusion that he could not act autonomously would be plausible. But 
I think the student’s predicament is most interesting if it is imagined not to be a dilemma in this 
sense, and in this case, again, I find it hard to imagine what genuine rational indeterminacy 
would amount to. More plausibly, if the student were reasoning from the perspective of his 
ideally rational, estimable, and virtuous self, he would either recognize himself to have most 
reason, all things considered, to do one thing rather than another—in which case he would be 
acting autonomously if he did that thing—or he would recognize the reasons favoring each 
alternative to be roughly equal or on a par—in which case he would be acting autonomously if 
he did either. (Of course, the student’s actual normative uncertainty may itself raise interesting 
questions about his autonomy, but these are irrelevant here.) 
In any case, I do not think the extreme version of the objective view is very plausible, and 
I will assume—if only to explore what follows—that it is false. It is normal to care about what an 
ideally rational, estimable, and virtuous person necessarily would care about, but it is normal to 
care about other things, too. The values with which Sartre’s student identifies may be 
“underdetermined,” as Bratman observes, “by his intersubjectively accountable value 
judgments.”5 There is room for pluralism, for the recognition that some of one’s personal values 
are at bottom just that. I may value certain projects or ideals as essential components of my 
                                                 
5. “Autonomy and Hierarchy,” p. 166. 
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identity, without supposing it unreasonable that anyone relevantly similar to me should value 
different ones, or the same ones differently conceived. This need not require rejecting the 
objective view, of course—just its extreme version. The values with which an autonomous agent 
identifies may be constrained by what is objectively worth valuing without being exhausted by it. 
Once it is accepted that the values with which we identify normally include irreducibly 
subjective elements, the possibility that the student’s anguish may reflect a genuine indeterminacy 
in his reasons, rather than the mere obscurity of them, becomes more plausible and relevant. 
This is because our working conceptions of our values tend to be vague. Without the assumption 
that these conceptions aim to represent objective normative facts, it is dubious that there should 
always be a privileged specification of them, on which practical questions would have 
determinate answers. 
It is easiest to see this by considering Sartre’s student in more depth. As I am inclined to 
imagine him, he sincerely and sensibly loves his mother. We are told enough about her to make it 
understandable that he should not only feel protective of her (she is bereaved, lonely, and 
strained), but also admire her (it is implied that she was estranged from her husband partly 
because of his willingness to collaborate). He is also, on the other hand, a curious and humane 
young man in wartime Paris. He is probably very attached to ideals of forbearance, 
individualism, and adventure as well as ones of social justice and democracy, and thus powerfully 
drawn to the heroism of the Resistance on both moral and non-moral grounds. There is no 
reason to assume, however, that the content of his attitudes about all of these things—consciously 
represented or no—should have been any more structured or specific than was necessary for him 
to answer the concrete practical questions that confronted him.6 Since, up to the point of his 
quandary, these questions may safely be supposed to have been by and large undemanding—
                                                 
6. Cf. Henry Richardson, “Specifying Norms as a Way to Resolve Concrete Ethical Problems.” 
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shall he buy maman the hat for her birthday, shall he go to the protest—one would expect their 
corresponding content to have been very unstructured and unspecific indeed. 
Here it is useful to compare the probable character of Sartre’s student’s values with the 
way many philosophers of language conceive of indeterminacy in their analyses of vague 
predicates, like “bald.”7 “Bald,” they argue, admits of multiple interpretations, or “sharpenings,” 
each entailing a precise set of necessary and sufficient conditions for when a person is bald. When 
a claim is true on each sharpening—like “Jean-Luc Picard is bald”—we can say it’s 
determinately true, or “supertrue.” When a claim is false on each sharpening—like “James T. 
Kirk is bald”—we can say it’s determinately false, or “superfalse.” When it’s true on some and 
false on others—like “Joe Biden is bald”—we can say its truth value is indeterminate. 
Similarly, the student’s values may be imagined to admit of multiple, mutually 
incompatible specifications, each constituting an interpretation of precisely what would be 
important to him in staying with his mother and going off to fight, and how the considerations in 
favor of each alternative are to be weighed. Sartre himself mentions some of these competing 
interpretations—the welfare of others may be important to him, but is it important to him in a 
sense that favors promoting the welfare of the concrete individual who depends on him, or the 
abstract but potentially much larger group he might aid by leaving her? To what extent is his 
inclination to stay with his mother to be endorsed as a manifestation of his real love for her, 
rather than rejected as mushy sentiment, or a shallowly conventional feeling of filial obligation? 
Sartre claims these questions can’t be answered—at least not in abstraction from what the 
student actually does. I am inclined to agree. Certainly, some specifications are better and more 
accurate than others—there may well be no admissible specification of the student’s values on 
                                                 
7. Cf. e.g. Kit Fine, “Vagueness, Truth, and Logic.” 
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which he has most reason to do anything other than one of the two alternatives in question.8 And 
if the student’s values were assumed to track some independent set of normative facts, it would be 
reasonable to think there would always be a uniquely best specification of them—the one that 
perfectly corresponded to those facts. But this, again, is just the assumption we are not making. 
Without it, it just seems unrealistic to me that the constraints on admissible specifications, 
whatever they are, should be robust enough to preclude the possibility, in the student’s case, that 
there should be some admissible specifications of his values on which he has most (internal) 
reason, all things considered, to stay with his mother, some on which he has most reason to fight, 
and some (conceivably) on which his reasons for each are roughly equal on a par. If this is right, 
however, the student’s reasons are indeterminate in the same way that the extensions of vague 
predicates are argued to be.  
With the conspicuous exception of Harry Frankfurt, exponents of the normative view of 
autonomy have generally not considered the possibility and implications of such indeterminacy in 
depth. For his part, Frankfurt viewed it as ambivalence, which he understood as a kind of volitional 
fragmentation, a “disease of the will” incompatible with autonomous agency. “A person is 
ambivalent,” he wrote, “only if he is indecisive concerning whether to be for or against a certain 
psychic position.” That is: 
To the extent that a person is ambivalent, he really does not know what he wants. The ignorance 
or uncertainty differs from straightforwardly cognitive deficiency. There may be no information 
concerning his will that the ambivalent person lacks. He is volitionally inchoate and indeterminate. 
This is why ambivalence, like self-deception, is an enemy of truth. The ambivalent person 
does not hide from some truth or conceal it from himself; he does not prevent the truth from being 
known. Instead, his ambivalence stands in the way of there being a certain truth about him at all. 
He is inclined in one direction, and he is inclined in a contrary direction as well, and his attitude 
toward these inclinations is unsettled. Thus, it is true of him neither that he prefers one of the 
alternatives, nor that he prefers the other, nor that he likes them equally.9 
                                                 
8. For a plausible set of constraints on admissible specification, see Richardson, op. cit. 
 
9. “The Faintest Passion,” pp. 99-100. 
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It does not take much imagination to see how the ambivalence Frankfurt describes would be 
instantiated in the student’s case. In asking himself what to do, the student asks, naturally 
enough, what is really important to him—how it is really important to him to live, and who it is 
really important to him to be. Also naturally enough, he finds himself completely unable to 
answer this question authoritatively. Again, this inability does not result from insufficient 
information. It also does not result (it’s worth restating) from the kind of desire for some ultimate, 
independent vindication of one’s personal values that Frankfurt and other subjective theorists 
reject as misguided. The student may aim at nothing more than being true to himself. (Objective 
theorists are free to stipulate that he already made sure that each alternative is morally 
permissible.) His problem is that there seems to be no fact of the matter as to what being true to 
himself would amount to. We can imagine the student coming up with different specifications of 
his values, given his initial jumble of inclinations and inchoate sense of self, and seeing no decisive 
grounds to favor any of them over the others. Each may be basically coherent, accurate to the 
data, and reasonably compelling. By what further standard is he to decide between them? I can 
think of no plausible answer. 
Importantly, the absence of such a standard is not, in itself, a problem for Frankfurt’s 
view. He is not committed to the claim that when you identify with a particular specification of 
an initially unstructured set of values, you are rationally committed to the specification you 
arrived at having been uniquely privileged.10 In order to identify with one specification rather 
than another, it is enough for you to be wholeheartedly satisfied with it—that is, simply to desire 
to reason and act according to it, rather than any other candidate specification, and to have no 
                                                 
10. In fact it is not clear whether anything in Frankfurt’s view implies that, when you identify with a more 
specific set of values than you did at an earlier time, you are rationally committed to the later set of values even 
counting as an admissible specification of the earlier set (such that the rational demands implied by the later one are 
consistent with those implied by the former, and so on), as opposed to a completely different set of values entirely. 
But since more sophisticated subjectivist theories (such as Bratman’s) do not share this problem, I will ignore it.  
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desires to the contrary. In order for Sartre’s student to be capable of acting autonomously, then, 
he must, on Frankfurt’s view, come to have such a desire. His ambivalence issues from his not 
having it. But note the psychological change the student would undergo in coming to have it 
would not be a rational change. By this, I do not mean that the student would just have to 
arbitrarily plump among the admissible specifications in deliberation, but rather that his coming 
to identify with one specification rather than another, or none at all, is not, for Frankfurt, 
distinctively a matter of deliberation and choice at all. “A person cannot make himself 
volitionally determinate,” he writes, “and thereby create a truth where there was none before, 
merely by an act of will.”11 To be sure, it is possible that, upon entertaining a given candidate 
specification in deliberation, the student might become inexorably drawn to it, and inexorably 
satisfied with being so drawn. But the fact that this change should happen to occur in 
deliberation would be pure accident. It would not be under his deliberative or voluntary control, 
and it could have had all sorts of other causes. 
For Frankfurt, then, no less than for objective theorists, autonomous agency is a matter of 
discovery, rather than invention. Our individual values are, for him, no more up to us to choose 
for ourselves than is the universal normative reality to which objective theorists advert. We take 
active control over our agency by finding out what the values with which we identify are and 
acceding to their demands, and if there is no prior truth about what those values are, then we 
cannot act autonomously. Needless to say, Sartre viewed the matter differently. It is indeed the 
case, he held, that our choices are not rationally determined in advance, either subjectively or 
objectively. Yet it would be in bad faith if we took the absence of such determination to excuse us 
from taking full responsibility for our actions, as in some deep and distinctive sense our own. We 
must invent the values with which we identify, not discover them. 
                                                 
11. “The Faintest Passion,” p. 100. 
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Though I hardly want to invoke Sartre’s full-blown metaphysics of agency and value, I 
am inclined to agree with him here, at least with regard to his student’s case. The indeterminacy 
I have attributed to the student is probably very common, and similarly exhibited in many of our 
most important and formative choices. To be fair, Frankfurt does not dispute its pervasiveness: 
he is clear that ambivalence, to some degree or other, is something we all have to live with. But I 
think his view of its consequences for our agency is too extreme. When we make choices under 
conditions of indeterminacy, we generally feel unsettled and unsure of ourselves—and sometimes 
even anguished—if we make them reflectively or self-consciously. (It is probably worth keeping in 
mind that we often do not make them reflectively or self-consciously, however.) In many cases we 
feel it to be impossible to fully explain our reasons for making them. But for all that we tend to 
regard ourselves as more than just bumbling about. Certainly we see our choices as things for 
which we can and should take an important kind of responsibility, closely linked to the 
significance they have in our lives. I do not want to try to say much about this kind of 
responsibility until I have my alternative view in place, but to get the ball rolling, we might look 
more closely at the student’s anguish. 
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre writes that in committing to a temporally extended project, 
“I await myself in the future, … I ‘make an appointment with myself on the other side of that 
hour, of that day, or of that month.’ Anguish is the fear of not finding myself at that appointment, 
of no longer even wishing to bring myself there.”12 In the vocabulary of Anglophone practical 
philosophy, the student sees himself as answerable to his future self, normatively speaking: he’s 
concerned about the prospect of his future regret. Crucially, however, he isn’t—or shouldn’t 
be—concerned about this unconditionally. He might well come to regret his choice if he undergoes 
                                                 
12. Being and Nothingness, p. 73. Note the difference between these remarks and Sartre’s discussion of anguish in 
“Existentialism is a Humanism,” wherein it is conceived, much less plausibly, as a sense of answerability to all of 
humanity. 
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a fundamental change in values. But while this would be unfortunate, its possibility should not 
check his resolve. In Jonathan Franzen’s novel Freedom, a character named Lalitha describes her 
intention to have her Fallopian tubes tied, out of both her political beliefs regarding 
overpopulation and her personal desire to live without children. When it is observed that her 
future self might not share these attitudes, Lalitha replies, surely rightly: “Then fuck my future 
self. If it wants to reproduce, I already have no respect for it.”13 (Much the same can be said on 
behalf of the young nobleman Derek Parfit describes, to take the example better known to 
philosophers.) This implies that Sartre’s student holds himself answerable not for adhering to 
whatever values he might eventually come to have, but only for adhering to values relevantly 
similar to his present ones. But how could he sensibly do this in the course of making his choice, 
unless, despite his present condition of rational indeterminacy, he could nevertheless regard that 
choice as putatively embodying his values? 
This should not be confused with an argument for voluntarism. Voluntarists claim that 
we can indeed invent our values: when our existing reasons fail to determine what we ought to 
do, we can create new ones through rationally undetermined, self-justifying acts of will.14 If it is 
indeterminate whether it is most important to Sartre’s student to stay with his mother or to fight, 
he can simply will himself to be someone to whom one is more important than the other, and ipso 
facto become such a person. But self-creation cannot be so easy. In claiming that Sartre’s student 
can determine his reasons just by willing—at the moment of his choice, as if stipulating—that 
                                                 
13. Freedom, p. 308. Note that Lalitha’s case differs from Parfit’s nobleman’s in that the former does not support 
the view—which some have defended with respect to the latter—that it is appropriate or sensible to disregard the 
values of a future self only if those values are objectively defective (or if you justifiably believe them to be so). (See e.g. 
Christine Korsgaard’s treatment of the case, in Self-Constitution.) Lalitha may quite sensibly reject such attitudes in her 
future self without supposing other people who have them to be equally unworthy of respect. 
 
14. See e.g. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, and Ruth Chang, “Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of 
Normativity.” 
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they be thus and so, the voluntarist is, if anything, even less able to account for his anguished 
sense of responsibility than Frankfurt is. As Frankfurt himself explains: 
The concept of reality is fundamentally the concept of something which is independent of our 
wishes and by which we are therefore constrained. Thus, reality cannot be under our absolute and 
unmediated voluntary control. The existence and character of what is real are necessarily 
indifferent to mere acts of our will. 
Now this must hold for the reality of the will itself. A person’s will is real only if its character is 
not absolutely up to him. It cannot be unconditionally within his power to determine what his will 
is to be, as it is within the unconstrained power of an author of fiction to render determinate—in 
whatever way he likes—the volitional characteristics of the people in his stories.15 
If Sartre’s student takes himself to have most reason to fight, it is essential to his choice—as it is to 
all species of norm-governed activity—that it admit of the conceptual possibility of error. This is 
not a merely technical point. The specter of the student’s regret makes it vivid. It implies the 
belief that his present choice might turn out to be mistaken, that it might fail to conform to his 
values. This belief would be unwarranted if his choice could not thus fail. And it necessarily could 
not thus fail if, as voluntarism implies, the student’s choice conformed to his values only because 
his values automatically conformed to his choice. 
*     *     * 
At the end of the day, I think Frankfurt and the voluntarists have the same problem—a problem 
shared by every major version of the normative view of autonomy I know of.16 They implicitly 
view the values with which we identify, and to which we hold ourselves answerable for adhering, 
as fixed, static things. This isn’t to say they think, crazily, that you can’t change the values with 
which you identify while remaining the same person. But they view the content of those values, at a 
given time, as exclusively a function of facts that obtain of you at that time, or prior to it. To 
know all there is to know about your values, that is, all we would need is a snapshot of the 
                                                 
15. “The Faintest Passion,” pp. 100-101. 
 
16. Or, more exactly, no major version of the normative view I know of actually rejects the view I claim as 
problematic. (To be fair, not all explicitly accept it, or are even committed to doing so.) 
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relevant facts—facts about your attitudes and their relations to one another, for Frankfurt; facts 
about your acts of will, for the voluntarists. I now want to argue that we can understand Sartre’s 
student’s sense of responsibility to himself—and why that sense of responsibility is something 
normative views of autonomy should countenance—if we took a different view of his values. On 
this view, Sartre’s student identifies with, and sees his choice as to be justified in terms of, a set of 
values whose content is still in the process of being determined, and so depends on future facts as 
much as present and past ones. To make this possibility understandable, it will help to draw an 
analogy to musical improvisation. 
3 Improvisation as a model of self-creation 
Improvisation differs from other species of rational agency in that improvisers refine the ends 
they pursue—that is, the norms they are committed to—as they go. When you improvise, you act 
in the ways you take to be appropriate without necessarily being able to explain why. Yet you 
don’t see your actions as random, but rather as parts of a process of working out an expressive 
musical performance, say—or an overall way of life—that explains why each of the actions that 
constitutes it is appropriate in relation to the whole. To see how this might go in the music case, 
consider how Keith Richards recalls the improvisation that went into Exile on Main Street: 
We were prolific. We felt then that it was impossible that we couldn’t come up with something 
every day or every two days. That was what we did, and even if it was the bare bones of a riff, it 
was something to go on, and then while they were trying to get the sound on it or we were trying 
to shape the riff, the song would fall into place of its own volition. Once you’re on a roll with the 
first few chords, the first idea of the rhythm, you can figure out other things, like does it need a 
bridge in the middle, later. It was living on a knife edge as far as that’s concerned. There was no 
preparation. But that’s not the point; that’s rock and roll. The idea was to make the bare bones of 
a riff, snap the drums in, and see what happens. And it was the immediacy of it that in retrospect 
made it even more interesting. There was no time for much reflection, for plowing the field twice. 
It was “It goes like this” and see what comes out. And this is when you realize that with a good 
band, you only really need a little sparkle of an idea, and before the evening’s over it will be a 
beautiful thing.17 
                                                 
17. Life, p. 306. 
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Think of a spontaneous decision to play a riff because it strikes you, right then, as especially 
expressive. Decisions like this seem to occupy an intermediate position between rationally 
determined conclusions of deliberation and one-off random acts. On the one hand, you make 
them because they feel like the way to go at the time, not because anything in your performance 
demands them. Relative to everything you’ve played up to that point, any number of other riffs 
may have been equally musically good, or better; you might no less reasonably have played any 
of them. (The qualification “up to that point” is critical here, as we’ll see in a moment.) On the 
other hand, you make them because they feel like the way to go at the time—the particular riff you 
pick feels right in some way, as more than just a matter of indifference. 
We can plausibly capture this middle ground by recognizing how a riff can strike you as 
especially expressive of something without your being able to say what it’s expressive of. It’s not 
necessary for you to be in the possession, or suppose yourself to be in the possession, of any facts 
that would explain why that specific riff was the right thing to do, given your end. The causal 
explanation of your decision to play it, as opposed to anything else you might equally well have 
played, would cite all sorts of totally incidental features of your psychology and circumstances. 
(Imagining a causal explanation of Keith Richards’s decisions, the mind boggles.) Yet the whole 
point of improvisation is that in such a case you’re not treating your decision as incidental. Parts 
of a musical performance aren’t expressive in isolation. The feel of a riff is colored by the past 
playing that anticipates it and the future playing that integrates and elaborates on it; on its own, it 
would fall flat. When you take your riff to be expressive, you’re implicitly situating it, normatively 
speaking, into a larger context. You see it as part of a process of expressing a specific musical 
idea. As you work out the contours of that idea, you’re simultaneously working out what the riff 
you took to be expressive actually helps express. 
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This lets us give substance to the idea of making up your ends as you go along. It’s 
plausible—as a general thesis about rational agency—that when you act for a reason, rather than 
arbitrarily, you necessarily presuppose that there is an explanation why the action you perform is 
appropriate.18 What makes improvisation different from other species of norm-governed activity 
is that when you improvise, the requisite justifying explanation essentially depends on the 
particular judgments and actions you perform over the course of the improvisation. 
How can a justifying explanation for a particular response essentially depend on a set of 
others? The question arises, I think, because it can be tempting to assume that to give a justifying 
explanation for a response is to subsume it under some general rule or principle: I can explain 
why it is appropriate to say “10” after “8” in a simple counting game by citing a rule of adding 
two. But it is a mistake to think that all justifying explanations must be like this.19 Some perfectly 
good ones simply cite other cases, thereby making the appropriateness of the response at hand 
intelligible as part of a natural pattern. In the counting game, for instance, we can say: “Look, we 
know ‘6’ called for ‘8,’ ‘4’ for ‘6,’ and ‘2’ for ‘4.’ So it’s only natural that ‘8’ should call for ‘10.’” 
In this context, of course, it’s obvious what the general rule in force would be, but in others—
including, prominently, aesthetic ones—it may not be. When you explain why a painter’s 
decision to represent a face in a certain way helped communicate a vivid sense of the subject’s 
personality, it’s not always necessary to give an explicit interpretation of the personality the 
subject was represented to have. Sometimes it’s even impossible. (“If you could say it in words,” 
Hopper said, “there would be no reason to paint.”) But you can still provide an illuminating 
                                                 
18. For an influential presentation of the concept of an “explanation why” in the sense I have in mind, see John 
Broome, “Reasons.”. There, Broome argues that this concept is prior to the concept of a normative reason, but it is 
obviously unnecessary to accept Broome’s conclusion in order to admit a necessary relation between the two. 
 
19. Arguably, at least some justifying explanations cannot be like this, in light of the puzzle about rule-following 
Kripke famously attributed to Wittgenstein in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cf. John McDowell, “Non-
cognitivism and Rule-Following,” and Hannah Ginsborg, “Primitive Normativity and Skepticism About Rules,” the 
latter of whom likewise takes inspiration from aesthetics. 
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explanation of the painter’s decision by referring to other parts of the portrait, in the context of 
which the decision in question just worked. 
So when you take a certain riff to be expressive, you likewise presuppose that your 
decision will admit of a justifying explanation in terms of its significance to your performance as a 
whole, as the cogent expression of a unified musical idea. But the key point is that you needn’t 
have that explanation at the time, because the nature of the riff’s significance has yet to be determined. 
It depends on how what you’re playing now coheres with what you’ll play in the future. There 
are lots of ways in which you might go on to elaborate on the riff and integrate it with everything 
else. What it ends up expressing depends on the musical idea it ends up being a partial expression 
of, and which in turn depends on the direction you end up take your improvisation in. It’s even 
possible that if you go on to ignore the riff completely, or end up with a total mess, it won’t turn 
out to express anything at all. In such a case, the presupposition you made in deciding on the 
riff—that you’d end up with an explanation of its having been appropriate—will be falsified, and 
your decision to play it will therefore turn out to be a mistake.20 
Thus when you improvise, you pursue an end whose content depends, epistemically and 
ontologically, on the actions you actually take over the course of pursuing it: relative to your end, 
you have reason to do something just to the extent that it admits of justifying explanation in 
terms of the other actions you perform that are likewise explicable themselves. As such the vague 
feeling that a certain riff is somehow the way to go at the time doesn’t register your conformity to 
an existing obligation, but rather your acceptance of a commitment. You could, after all, have 
played something else, and thereby gone on to express a musical idea of which it—rather than 
what you actually played—was a necessary constituent. Yet precisely because you regard yourself 
                                                 
20. So randomly plunking at piano keys isn’t improvising, because barring some monkey-writing-Shakespeare 
sort of accident, you could only produce a disorderly jumble of notes. There will be no explanation why any of them 
shouldn’t have been different, and you won’t have expressed anything. 
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as aiming to express a specific musical idea—though one still in the process of being shaped—
you don’t regard the decision you’ve actually made as rationally on a par with the one you could 
have made but didn’t. You rather treat it as justified relative to the end you’re thereby 
determining for yourself, and hence to be taken into account in your ongoing practical reasoning 
as bearing on what you have reason to do in other cases (in virtue of its explanatory 
interdependence with it). So it makes perfect sense for you to take yourself to have reason to play 
the specific riff you do, as partly constitutive of expressing your musical idea. It’s just that because 
your musical idea is essentially something you’re in the process of working out, so are your 
reasons. 
4 Deep improvisation, or, Sartre’s student and Williams’s Gauguin 
It’s now time to return to Sartre’s student. Let’s review. In §2, I used the case of the student to 
raise a puzzle for normative views of autonomy. These views claim that to take responsibility for 
a choice as autonomous is to take yourself to have sufficient reason to make it, given the values 
you identify with. This may seem to imply, as Frankfurt supposed, that autonomy is impossible 
under conditions of rational indeterminacy. It is important, I claimed, for agents like Sartre’s 
student to take themselves to be choosing autonomously under such conditions and in full 
recognition of them, and to be potentially correct in doing so. The question was how this was 
possible. Voluntarists answer this question by arguing that taking yourself to have most reason to 
do something, under conditions of prior indeterminacy, makes it so. While it should now be clear 
that voluntarism has an element of truth to it, I claimed, following Frankfurt, that it makes self-
creation too easy. Normative standards are meaningful as such only insofar as it is possible to get 
them wrong. 
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Conceiving the student’s values on the model of musical ideas being improvised gives us a 
better answer.21 (For the sake of a name, call this deep improvisation.)22 Rational indeterminacy 
prevents you from being warranted in taking yourself to have sufficient reason to do something 
only if taking yourself to have sufficient reason to do something necessarily involves making a 
judgment about the state of those reasons as they stand—namely, the judgment that it is (now) true 
that you have sufficient reason to do that thing. (For since your reasons are indeterminate, it 
cannot be thus true.) But the possibility of improvising shows that taking yourself to have 
sufficient reason to do something does not necessarily involve this. If your reasons are ones you 
are making up as you go, it rather involves accepting a commitment to treating what you do as to 
be taken into account in your ongoing practical reason and conduct, as something that is to help 
explain, and be explained by, what you likewise have reason to do on other occasions. Insofar as 
your present choice actually turns out to stand in this mutual explanatory relation with your past 
and future choices, you turn out to be warranted in taking yourself to have sufficient had reason 
to make it.23 But it might not stand in this mutual explanatory relation. Whether it does depends 
on your own efforts in taking your choices over time seriously, as partially embodying the values 
you are now trying to live by, and on your luck in having the opportunity to choose in ways that 
allow this. Frankfurt writes, against voluntarism, that we “are not fictitious characters, who have 
                                                 
21. Importantly, I’m not arguing that the contents of all the values with which a person can identify are 
necessarily up to that person to improvise. In fact, it is plausible that the contents of at least some such values (such as 
specifically moral values) necessarily are not. 
 
22. This terminology registers a debt to Charles Taylor, who has used the phrase “deep reflection” to refer to a 
process through which one simultaneously articulates and shapes the values with which one identifies by critically 
interpreting one’s evaluations in light of one’s “deepest unstructured sense of what is important.” (“Responsibility for 
Self,” p. 41) 
 
23. This doesn’t mean deep improvisers are forever bound to their pasts. The requirement that improvisers act 
in ways that mutually explain each other only holds among actions they in fact have reason to perform. So you may 
sometimes be justified in rejecting some of your past (or even predictable future) actions, and hence in ceasing to 
treat them as explanatory and to be explained. But nor are deep improvisers free to be entirely capricious: in 
rejecting some subset of your actions, you commit to having an explanation (from the perspective you thereby come 
to inhabit) why the rejection itself was called for, and such an explanation may be difficult to come by. 
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sovereign authors; nor are we gods, who can be authors of more than fiction. Therefore we 
cannot be authors of ourselves.”24 If I am right, Frankfurt’s premises are true but his conclusion is 
false. We can be authors of ourselves, but not sovereign ones. Our ability to create ourselves is 
constrained by the real and demanding requirement that the selves we create be recognizable as 
particular selves persisting over time, where this means being embodied in coherent patterns of 
agency. 
Now, the idea of deep improvisation might be resisted on two basic grounds. First, 
someone might reject the premise the whole puzzle began with: that rational indeterminacy 
should be compatible with autonomy, as conceived by the normative view. What would be lost—
what significant feature of our agency would be neglected—if all we could do was throw up our 
hands, deal with the consequences of our choices as best we could, and hope to become less 
ambivalent later on? Second, even assuming an answer to this question, it might be asked 
whether the substance of my view is motivated. I have claimed that what makes improvisation 
intelligible as a form of norm-governed activity is the formal requirement that choices over time 
cohere. This requirement is plausible enough in the aesthetic case, since musical performances 
can’t express anything if they don’t cohere. But most of us don’t value everything we do as a form of 
self-expression. So why think the coherence requirement generalizes?  
I will tackle the last question first. My answer is that while you certainly needn’t care 
about self-expression, you can’t meaningfully identify with values that couldn’t support a kind of 
self-recognition, as a particular self persisting over time. Now, I’m not saying that you have to value 
self-recognition more than anything else, or even that it can’t be perfectly rational to identify with 
values that make it very unlikely, in point of empirical fact, that you actually will be able to 
recognize yourself. I’m just saying that, as a condition on the possibility of identification, it must 
                                                 
24. “The Faintest Passion,” p. 101. 
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be the case that if (perhaps per impossible) you did manage to reason and act in all the ways your 
values required of you, your conduct would be recognizable as embodying a unified set of values. 
And any values that meet this condition, at least if they can support autonomy under conditions 
of rational indeterminacy, must meet the coherence requirement. 
Here’s why. We’ve seen that in order to choose autonomously under conditions of 
rational indeterminacy, you need to identify with values you’re making up as you go—ones 
whose content is epistemically and ontologically prior to the choices they govern. But in order to 
meaningfully identify with a value, you need to have some principled means of determining what 
it requires in particular situations. Recall Lalitha’s case, from Freedom. It is, again, central to her 
integrity that she be able to reject, as a kind of self-betrayal, any possible future desire to have 
children. Any plausible conception of identification must be able to countenance this. But on 
what grounds could she reject this desire, as opposed to any other one? I can only see two 
possibilities. First, if the content of her values were accessible to her prior to her choices in 
particular cases, she could deduce what her values required from it. But if she is still working out 
what her values are, she cannot per hypothesis have such access. This leaves the second possibility: 
she could infer what her values require in the present case from what they require in others. But 
that possibility requires that her values meet the coherence requirement. For how could her 
present history enable her to reject her possible future desire, if not its clear lack of fit with any 
coherent trajectory by which her values might evolve? More generally, recall that all I mean by 
coherence here is that a set of choices be intelligible as falling under a unified norm, such that the 
appropriateness of each relative to the norm is naturally inferable from that of the others. And in 
this light, the idea of identifying with values that don’t meet the coherence requirement should 
seem pretty bizarre. It would amount to identifying with values that call for you to choose in 
ways that aren’t intelligible as embodying any particular set of values at all. What could possibly 
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be the point? Such values would leave people like Lalitha with no ways of thinking of themselves 
as having particular characters, identified with some patterns of desire and not others, that were 
not unaccountably ad hoc. They would not support any sense of thematic unity or larger 
meaning in one’s activities, any means of making oneself of oneself as a particular sort of person 
persisting over time.25 Critical reflection would be otiose, and identification would be an empty 
concept. 
The first question is harder. The best answer I can think of appeals to the value of 
throwing yourself into a project—of investing your whole self in it, indeterminacy and 
contingency be damned. This may be much of what Sartre had in mind in upholding 
authenticity as an existentialist ideal. It is also a value conspicuous in art, especially jazz.26 But its 
best illustration, at least in the present context, may be in Bernard Williams’s fictionalized 
Gauguin. 
Williams introduced Gauguin in order “to explore and uphold the claim that in such a 
situation [viz., his abandoning his family in order to pursue his art] the only thing that will justify 
his choice will be success itself.” That is: 
The justification, if there is to be one, will be essentially retrospective. Gauguin could not do 
something which is thought to be essential to rationality and to the notion of justification itself, 
which is that one should be in a position to apply the justifying consideration at the time of the 
choice and in advance of knowing whether one was right (in the sense of coming out right).27 
One reason why Williams’s thesis has, for all its notoriety, found little acceptance among its 
readers may be that Williams is frustratingly opaque about the kind of justification he has in 
                                                 
25. Cf. David Wiggins, “Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life,” in his Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the 
Philosophy of Value (third edition, Oxford, 2003), in which the mutual explanatory support I identify with coherence is 
upheld as characteristic of a meaningful life. 
 
26. This seems not to have been lost on Sartre. At the end of Nausea, the protagonist realizes that a certain kind 
of serious, authentic life is possible even in the absence of authoritative normative standards only upon listening to a 
blues record. 
 
27. “Moral Luck,” pp. 23 and 24, respectively. 
 23 
mind. He wisely refrains from describing it as a species of moral justification when he introduces 
it, but when he returns to the case at the end of the essay, he argues (against Thomas Nagel) that 
if the justification in question is not strictly speaking moral, it is at least closely akin to it. But that 
is unconvincing. Presumably it is a rotten thing to abandon people who justifiably depend on 
you. If you manage to realize your dreams by doing it, this might make it good for you, but it 
does not make it any less rotten. (If realizing your dreams means producing great art, it might 
also make it good for the world, but this cannot be germane to the justification at issue. If 
nobody, or only a few people, ever saw Gauguin’s paintings, this would not make his choice 
unjustified in the manner his failure would.) But if we viewed the question of Gauguin’s 
justification as instead turning on the personal values with which he identified, Williams’s claim 
starts to look a lot more plausible. 
That Williams’s Gauguin should exhibit to the same kind of rational indeterminacy as 
Sartre’s student may come as a surprise. Unlike the student, Gauguin seems to know what he 
wants. He seems like a paragon of Frankfurtian wholeheartedness. But this reading is superficial. 
If Gauguin does not feel unsure of himself, he should. For consider what his relations to art on 
the one hand, and his family on the other, must have been like at the time of his choice. He was 
not, as Williams imagines him, in any sense entitled to then regard himself as a great artist. This 
does not only bear on his evidence that his project will succeed, but on the significance he could 
reasonably attribute to it. However intensely he might want to paint, he may reasonably believe 
that desires like his are usually not to be acted on. Many other men relevantly similar to him may 
well have wanted to remark on similarly romantic endeavors no less intensely, and most of 
them—we may allow Gauguin to think—turned out to be pathetic failures who should have 
known better. In this spirit, Williams considers and rejects the possibility that Gauguin should 
decide what to do by reference to rules: 
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[The rule that ‘one is justified in deciding to neglect other claims for art…’] ‘…if one is convinced 
that one is a great creative artist’ will serve to make obstinacy and self-delusion conditions of 
justification, while ‘if one is reasonably convinced that one is a great creative artist’ is, if anything, 
worse. What is reasonable conviction supposed to be in such a case? Should Gauguin consult 
professors of art? The absurdity of such riders surely expresses the absurdity in the whole 
enterprise of trying to find a place for such cases within the rules.28 
Williams is talking about moral rules here, but it seems to me that his point applies to prudential 
rules, too, and more broadly to any general principles or policies by which a sane person might 
deliberate. I can think of no such principle, moral or otherwise, on which the intensity and 
insistence of Gauguin’s desire to give up everything for painting could count as a sufficient reason 
to do it, given the gravity of the risks associated with the project and the paucity of the evidence 
that it will succeed. Consider, for instance, the following candidate. On one reading of 
Frankfurt’s view of practical rationality—although perhaps not an entirely fair one—Gauguin 
would be justified in acting on his desire to paint if he wanted to be moved by it more than he 
wanted to be moved by any other desire, and he couldn’t help feeling this way. But this is no 
more plausible as a source of antecedently applicable justifying conditions than any of the rules 
Williams considers. If Gauguin’s project turns out to be a failure, wouldn’t it be understandable 
for him instead to think he should have found some way to eliminate or weaken this desire (by 
going to a psychologist, say)? 
If this is right, it follows that if Gauguin is indeed going to take himself to have sufficient 
reason to paint, it can only be by taking a leap of faith. And I cannot imagine him adopting this 
project, or being motivated to pursue it to the fullest, without taking himself to have sufficient 
reason to paint. One reason why Williams’s example works so well is that the historical 
Gauguin’s biography and body of work, taken together, really do constitute a strikingly unified 
picture of a complicated and provocative worldview manifested in a career of artistic genius. But 
it’s doubtful that he could have developed this worldview except by improvising. Yet it’s neither 
                                                 
28. “Moral Luck,” p. 24. 
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plausible nor relevant to suppose that Gauguin had anything like the specific ideals he turned out 
to embody in mind, however subconsciously or implicitly, when he first decided to throw himself 
into his project. There’s no reason why, for instance, had Gauguin not gone to Tahiti, he would 
necessarily have become quite the sort of person who would have opposed (some of) the injustices 
of French colonialism to the extent that he did, or would have developed his interest in 
primitivism and mysticism into a consuming preoccupation with certain fundamental questions 
of human existence—even though these turned out to be essential to the importance a life of art 
turned out to have for him. He might have gone to Siberia, or stayed in Paris, and became a 
artist with a different sensibility, albeit perhaps an equally profound and unified one. But—
crucially—it’s doubtful that he could have developed a profound and unified artistic sensibility in 
any of these situations if he was not propelled forward by the inchoate, unstructured, not-
determinately-justified conviction that a life of art really was—somehow—profoundly important 
to him, and if he didn’t interpret and develop his responses to whatever circumstances he was 
presented with through its lens. What he has to ask himself, at each stage of the process, is how 
the various activities he finds himself engaged in, in light of how he’s taken it to be important to 
him to act so far, can be fit together into a life so richly and fully animated by the significance of 
painting to him as to make his initial, momentous decision understandable. Since such a life 
could only be that of a great creative artist, Williams’s claim that Gauguin’s choice could only be 
justified by its success turns out to be right. 
5 Conclusion 
Let’s review. I began with the question of autonomous agency under conditions of rational 
indeterminacy. Normative views say that autonomous agency is rational agency: acting 
autonomously requires doing what you have, or take yourself to have, sufficient reason to do, all 
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things considered, given the values with which you ultimately identify. It may therefore seem as 
though autonomous agency is impossible if it’s indeterminate what you have sufficient reason to 
do, and this is exactly the conclusion that Frankfurt drew. But this conclusion is false. Rational 
indeterminacy doesn’t mean you can’t act autonomously. It may mean you just have to 
improvise—which means taking a leap of faith, making up your reasons you go, and trusting that 
you will be able to make sense of your action as embodying the identity you’re creating for 
yourself. 
But what turns on this? Why is improvising something we find ourselves having to do? 
Why does the possibility of it matter? In the following chapters, I’ll offer the beginning of an 
answer.  
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2 
Loving someone in particular 
1 A somewhat dubious case study 
Let me begin with a scene from one of the most famous—if problematic—novels about love ever 
written. In Wuthering Heights, Catherine Earnshaw consents to marry Edgar Linton, a perfectly 
eligible match. But she is ambivalent about it. So she asks Ellen Dean, her longtime servant and 
confidante, whether she ought to have done so. The following conversation (related from Ellen’s 
perspective) ensues. 
“There are many things to be considered before that question can be answered properly,” I 
said sententiously. “First and foremost, do you love Mr. Edgar?” 
“Who can help it? Of course I do,” she answered. 
Then I put her through the following catechism: for a girl of twenty-two, it was not 
injudicious. 
“Why do you love him, Miss Cathy?” 
“Nonsense, I do—that’s sufficient.” 
“By no means; you must say why.” 
“Well, because he is handsome, and pleasant to be with.” 
“Bad!” was my commentary. 
“And because he is young and cheerful.” 
“Bad, still.” 
“And because he loves me.” 
“Indifferent, coming there.” 
“And he will be rich, and I shall like to be the greatest woman of the neighborhood, and I 
shall be proud of having such a husband.” 
“Worst of all! And now, say how you love him.” 
“As everybody loves—You’re silly, Nelly.” 
“Not at all—Answer.” 
“I love the ground under his feet, and the air over his head, and everything he touches, and 
every word he says—I love all his looks, and all his actions, and him entirely, and altogether. 
There now!” 
“And why?” 
“Nay—you are making a jest of it; it is exceedingly ill-natured! It’s no jest to me!” said the 
young lady, scowling, and turning her face to the fire. 
“I’m very far from jesting, Miss Catherine,” I replied. “You love Mr. Edgar, because he is 
handsome, and young, and cheerful, and rich, and loves you. The last, however, goes for nothing: 
you would love him without that, probably, and with it you wouldn’t, unless he possessed the four 
former attractions.” 
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“No, to be sure not—I should only pity him—hate him, perhaps, if he were ugly, and a 
clown.” 
“But there are several other handsome, rich young men in the world; handsomer, possibly, 
and richer than he is. What should hinder you from loving them?” 
“If there be any, they are out of my way—I’ve seen none like Edgar.” 
“You may see some; and he won’t always be handsome, and young, and may not always be 
rich.” 
“He is now; and I have only to do with the present—I wish you would speak rationally.” 
“Well, that settles it—if you have only to do with the present, marry Mr. Linton.” 
Ellen’s “catechism” strikingly anticipates the issues on which contemporary philosophical 
discussions of love focus, and the features that leading accounts defend as necessary conditions 
for loving someone as a particular individual.1 Harry Frankfurt, for instance, insists that someone 
loved in the best sense is valued as irreplaceable: if Catherine really loved Linton, it would not be a 
matter of indifference to her that she love him in particular, as opposed to anyone else with the 
same attractions. J. David Velleman stresses that love should involve a special openness to beloveds 
as they are in themselves, not just insofar as they serve your independent purposes or meet some 
prior standard. Catherine shouldn’t love Linton just because he pleased her, or satisfied her 
vanity, and it’s impossible to see her claim to love him indiscriminately and in total as other than 
a sarcastic parody of really loving attention. And Niko Kolodny emphasizes that love should be 
constant: it should endure through a very wide range of possible changes in a beloved. It shouldn’t 
lapse, as Catherine’s would, when beloveds lose their looks, youth, cheer, or wealth.2 
Even more strikingly, however, the ideal of love the novel presents in opposition to the 
defective view represented in Catherine’s initial responses is one that none of these philosophers 
can explain or even accommodate. For the real source of Catherine’s ambivalence is that, as she 
                                                 
1. As the word is used in contemporary English, many things other than persons can be loved: animals, 
inanimate objects, institutions, activities, abstract ideas, deities, and so on. Though my discussion touches on love for 
some of these things at points, I assume as a working hypothesis that there is a distinct, philosophically interesting 
species of love essentially focused on particular persons. It is with this species of love that the following is concerned. 
 
2. Frankfurt gives his theory its signature statement in “On Caring,” and its most refined one in Taking Ourselves 
Seriously and Getting It Right. Velleman presents his view in “Love as a Moral Emotion” and elaborates it in “Beyond 
Price.” Kolodny’s proposal is in “Love as Valuing a Relationship.” 
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well knows, she doesn’t really love Linton at all. She really loves Heathcliff, the darkly romantic 
foundling. And she loves him for a very different kind of reason: 
“...not because he’s handsome, Nelly, but because he’s more myself than I am. Whatever our souls 
are made of, his and mine are the same, and Linton’s is as different as a moonbeam from 
lightning, or frost from fire.” 
Catherine’s answer raises a puzzle. Why should qualities of Heathcliff’s soul—or, less 
metaphorically, of his identity or character—do any better by the standards of Ellen’s catechism 
than any of the qualities Catherine cited in Linton’s case? Aren’t the values with which Heathcliff 
identifies just as repeatable, in principle, as Linton’s handsomeness or wealth, and just as liable to 
undergo changes that real love should survive? Isn’t their significance to Catherine just as 
circumscribed by her private interests and criteria, if not more so? Perhaps impressed by such 
questions, Frankfurt, Velleman, and Kolodny all defend theories on which the qualities of one’s 
character and values are indeed no more suited to serve as reasons for love than any other quality 
of one’s person. In this, they represent a broad consensus among analytic philosophers on love. 
But I will argue below that these philosophers are wrong, and Catherine is right. 
My defense of Catherine’s kind of love will proceed in two stages. In the first, I argue, 
against Frankfurt, Velleman, and Kolodny, for the possibility and importance of a species of 
interpersonal love evaluatively grounded in attractive qualities of the beloved. Thus, Frankfurt 
denies that love is a rational response to value to begin with, Velleman argues that it is a 
rationally optional response to a value that all persons (by definition) share equally, and Kolodny 
argues that it is a response to the value of the relationship you have to your beloved. But I argue, 
first, that there must be reasons for love; second, that these reasons must (at least in some cases) 
be selective; and, finally, that these reasons must ultimately derive (again, at least in some cases) 
not from the types of relationships you have to beloveds, but from what beloveds themselves are 
like. These theories, then, leave a void that the ideal of Catherine’s love promises to fill. 
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Still, I think each theory gets something important right. Taken together, they show that 
the irreplaceability, openness, and constancy on which Ellen implicitly insists really are necessary 
to the best kind of love. Thus, Catherine’s answer can fulfill its promise only if the puzzle it raises 
can be solved. In the second half of the chapter, I argue that it can.  It’s possible, and plausible, to 
conceive of one’s identity as an agent as having special structural features that enable it, 
distinctively, to support a form of love that fully satisfies Ellen’s catechism. In a way, this turn to 
basic features of agency and valuing should be unsurprising: the philosophical questions raised by 
the phenomenon of loving someone as an individual turn out to be questions about the nature of 
individuality itself. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that we work out our identities by improvising, the way 
musicians work out the ideas they’re trying to express. Lovers improvise together, as partners: 
when Catherine says she loves Heathcliff for a soul like hers, she’s saying the same kind of thing 
that musicians might, when they take one another to want to express the same things. More 
specifically, I propose, to love someone in particular is to view that person as creating an identity 
that is somehow importantly like your own, in a way that makes your beloved someone 
appropriate for you to create yourself together with. But because your reasons for love are 
grounded in features of your and your beloved’s identities that are in the process of being 
determined, those reasons persist throughout that process, and call for essentially open-ended 
forms of interested attention and emotional vulnerability. Further, they make you and your 
beloved irreplaceably valuable to one another, since someone you are creating your values 
together with can share those values in a way that nobody else can. 
 31 
2 Loving someone for no reason 
Perhaps the most glaring problem with Catherine’s reasons for loving Linton is that they make 
him too easy to replace. What qualifies him as a suitable beloved is simply that he is a member of 
the general class of handsome, cheerful, rich young men. Anyone other member of that class 
would have done just as well. “With regard to what we love,” however, Harry Frankfurt observes 
that “that sort of indifference to the identity of the object of concern is out of the question. 
Substituting some other object for the beloved is not an acceptable and perhaps not even an 
intelligible option. The significance to the lover of what he loves is not that of an exemplar; its 
importance to him is not generic, but ineluctably particular.”3 If you love someone as a particular 
individual, then, you value your beloved as irreplaceable. 
This means, at a minimum, that it must be important to you that you love the particular 
person you do. Now, the simplest way to account for this importance would be to hold that 
reasons for love are perfectly particular themselves. Following a direct (if flat-footed) 
interpretation of Montaigne’s famous non-explanation of his love—“because it was he, because it 
was I”—Catherine would thus have reason to love Heathcliff but not Linton, but that reason 
would be primitive and hence inexplicable. But this is a non-starter. “The beloved’s bare 
identity,” as Kolodny neatly explains, “cannot serve as a reason for loving her. To say ‘She is 
Jane’ is simply to identify a particular with itself. It is to say nothing about that particular that 
might explain why a specific response to it is called for.”4 We might as well say love has no 
reasons at all. 
Such is Frankfurt’s view. Love, he argues, “is a particular mode of caring. It is an 
involuntary, nonutilitarian, rigidly focused, and—as is any mode of caring—self-affirming 
                                                 
3. “On Caring,” p. 166. 
 
4. “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” p. 142. 
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concern for the existence and the good of what is loved.” Since the “lover’s concern is rigidly 
focused in that there can be no equivalent substitute for its object, which he loves in its sheer 
particularity and not as an exemplar of some more general type,” loving cannot be “the 
rationally determined outcome of even an implicit deliberative or evaluative process.”5 But this 
account of irreplaceability comes at an unpalatably high cost. Ellen’s catechism illustrates how 
natural it is to give and ask for reasons for love. Catherine’s initial refusal to give a reason feels 
like a dodge. The problem with her later answers is that the reasons she gives are bad ones, not 
that she is making a category mistake in giving them at all. 
Two established lines of criticism underscore this point. First, it is simply not plausible 
that love consists in the attitudes Frankfurt claims it does. There is a difference between loving 
someone and assuming, for no further reason, the project of being the agent of someone’s 
interest. Velleman observes that at “the thought of a close friend, my heart doesn’t fill with an 
urge to do something for him, though it may fill with love.”6 I care about my close friends, and 
would do a lot for them if they asked me (and in some cases even if they didn’t). But there are a 
lot of helpful things I could do for my friends that I feel absolutely no desire to do: their laundry, 
for instance, or their grocery shopping. It’s not that such desires are overridden by others, or that 
my friends would find it off-putting if I acted on them. (Even if they insisted that they would not 
feel infantilized if I did their laundry for them, this would not incline me to do it.) It’s rather that 
these sorts of things just aren’t what friendship is about. 
Second, there are some things it just doesn’t make sense to love.7 Suppose you were 
gripped by an involuntary, nonutilitarian, rigidly focused, and self-affirming concern for the 
                                                 
5. Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting it Right, pp. 40-41. 
 
6. “Love as a Moral Emotion,” p. 353. 
 
7. This point comes from Troy Jollimore, in Love’s Vision, p. 22-23. 
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existence and the good of a random picnic table.8 One weekend you eat a hot dog there, but on 
the drive home your thoughts keep returning to it, a vague fondness rising in your breast. So 
every weekend thereafter you go back to Table 7-G to clean it off, protect it from the elements, 
replace rotting beams, and so on. This attitude is not just unusual. It’s positively perverse. Love 
for a random picnic table is either irrational or unintelligible. We need to explain why, and we 
need reasons for love to do it. 
3 Loving someone as a rational agent 
While Velleman agrees with Frankfurt about the “ineluctably particular” nature of a beloved’s 
importance, he denies that it prevents love from being a rational response to a generally-held 
valuable property. In fact, he argues, it’s a response to a valuable property that all persons share 
by definition: one’s bare rational nature—a property whose value must be appreciated in ways 
particular to each instance of it. 
In the Kantian framework Velleman assumes, your rational nature is what makes you 
worthy of being valued as you are in yourself. The responses it warrants come in two varieties: 
respect and love, “the required minimum and optional maximum responses to one and the same 
value.”9 Velleman attributes the special character of each of these attitudes to the fact that the 
value of one’s rational nature is independent of, because prior to, the value of any properties that 
not all persons share equally—and hence which distinguish particular persons from one another. 
This is why respect is equally owed to everyone, and why it consists, roughly, in according each 
individual the basic regard to which one’s dignity as a person entitles one. The same rational 
independence explains the special openness appropriate to the individual value of a beloved. 
                                                 
8. The reader who doubts that a picnic table can have a good may substitute a patch of grass, or small animal. 
 
9. “Love as a Moral Emotion,” p. 366. 
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Whereas the demands of respect are predominantly negative—they consist, primarily, in 
prohibitions against treating people in ways that ignore their value as persons (for example, by 
manipulating or exploiting them)—love involves a positive, arresting awareness of that value. 
More specifically, love “arrests our tendencies toward emotional self-protection from 
another person, tendencies to draw ourselves in and close ourselves off from being affected by 
him. Love disarms our emotional defenses; it makes us vulnerable to the other.”10 This means 
that it isn’t to be identified with any specific motives or emotions, but rather with a heightened 
sensitivity to the significance of whatever specific characteristics, attitudes, or interests a beloved 
manifests: for Velleman, “a sense of wonder at the vividly perceived reality of another person”11 
is the closest thing to a constitutive feeling of love there is. Thus, love exposes you to a very wide 
range of emotional responses—not all favorable—corresponding to the wide range of features a 
beloved might exhibit on a given occasion. You might be thrilled by the admiration of your 
beloveds, hurt by their insults, and solicitous of their needs, even when the same admiration, 
insults, or needs would barely register if observed in casual acquaintances. 
Though Velleman sometimes motivates this feature of love on phenomenological 
grounds, he recognizes that its importance goes deeper. It captures, he argues, the way people 
value their beloveds as special. Being valued as special “doesn’t entail being compared favorably 
with others; it rather entails being seen to have a value that forbids comparison. Your singular 
value as a person is not a value that you are singular in possessing; it’s rather a value that entitles 
you to be appreciated singularly, in and by yourself.”12 This implies, minimally, that if you really 
love someone, you must be open to unanticipated developments in your own ends in light of 
                                                 
10. ibid., p. 361. 
 
11. “Beyond Price,” p. 199. 
 
12.  “Love as a Moral Emotion,” p. 370. For another forceful defense of this requirement, also on Kantian 
grounds, see Rae Langton, “Love and Solipsism.” 
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what that person has to show you. Loving people means taking them as they come. Your 
attentiveness and vulnerability to them can’t be contingent on how well they serve your existing 
ends or conform to your prior ideals, and hence you can’t suppose yourself to need any special 
reason for your heightened sensitivity to whatever is significant to or about them. As an 
illustration, Velleman describes watching his sons grow up: 
In a quick succession of years I became deeply interested in lacrosse and Morris dancing, poetry 
slams and photography, and specifically in the accomplishments of a particular midfielder, Morris 
dancer, poet, or photographer, because these were the directions that my children had set for 
themselves. Of course, I eventually learned to appreciate some of these accomplishments 
intrinsically: I would realize with amazement that I was cheering as my son walloped a schoolmate 
with a metal stick or that I was applauding choreography that previously would have struck me as 
no more than quaint. But I learned to appreciate these accomplishments, to begin with, because 
they were the ones that my children had chosen to cultivate.13 
But while Velleman is correct to stress the characteristic openness of love, I think he gets its 
details wrong, because he misconceives the kind of value to which love for an individual is 
responsive. People value their beloveds as incomparable, but only up to a point. They still take 
themselves to have reason to love some people and not others. 
On Velleman’s gloss Catherine would be perfectly correct to love Heathcliff for his 
similarly-constituted soul. Their “souls” are their bare rational natures, and these are indeed 
exactly alike. Her mistake is just in viewing Linton’s soul as any different. Catherine’s disposition 
to be vulnerable to Heathcliff’s rational nature (which presumably constitutes her love for him)14 
is a strictly causal matter, an incidental quirk of her psychology. But clearly that’s not how she 
loves Heathcliff, or how she should. Catherine doesn’t see him as someone she just happens to be 
                                                 
13. “Beyond Price,” pp. 205-206. 
 
14. Velleman is not explicit about the kind of psychological state in which love consists, and much in his 
presentation can instead suggest a view of it as an occurent state of arresting awareness. The latter interpretation, 
however, should be rejected on grounds of charity. You no more cease to love someone when you are vexed or 
preoccupied than you forget what they look like when you close your eyes. If this weren’t so, then either most people 
would love much less than they think they do, or love would be even more of a headache than it already is. (This 
point comes from Susan Wolf’s first Phi Beta Kappa Romanell lecture.) 
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arrestingly aware of, like someone you happen to be standing next to at a party and might as well 
make small talk with. She endorses her love for him, specifically. 
Consider that the moral and prudential considerations in favor of Catherine’s loving 
Linton instead are substantial. If she could somehow replace her disposition to arresting 
awareness of Heathcliff with one directed toward Linton, it would help her keep a promise, ease 
her into a life of comfort and prominence, and orient her toward safer, more socially acceptable, 
and morally improving pursuits. Given that, on Velleman’s view, Catherine has no special reason 
to love Heathcliff, why shouldn’t she regard her disposition to arresting awareness of him as other 
than a mere inconvenience? Of course, people don’t regard their loves as dispositions to be 
managed at their moral and prudential convenience. For Catherine, suddenly ceasing to love 
Heathcliff is unthinkable. The prospect would appear as a disturbing failure to appreciate his 
profound significance to her. In short, it is essential to her love that she experience it as more 
than merely optional.15 
One might, therefore, ask why Velleman shouldn’t just jettison his claim that love is 
rationally optional. It will be instructive to consider this possibility. So modified, Velleman’s view 
would place love on the same level with respect, as a rationally required response to rational 
nature as such. Just as you have reason to respect everyone, it would hold, so too do you have 
reason to love them. It’s just that it’s generally much harder to love people than it is to merely 
respect them, and nobody is in a position to blame you for failing.16 So those of us who fail to 
love as we rationally ought, even those of us who fail radically—presumably, more or less all of 
us—do so forgivably. Velleman clearly aims to avoid this view, and it is easy to see why. It 
                                                 
15. Or, as Catherine herself puts it: “My love for Linton is like the foliage in the woods. Time will change it, I’m 
well aware, as winter changes the trees—my love for Heathcliff resembles the eternal rocks beneath—a source of 
little visible delight, but necessary.” 
 
16. Or at least, on the religious version of this view, nobody on earth. 
 37 
completely abandons the idea that love may be unapologetically selective in any but the most 
superficial sense. But I have just argued that the degree of selectivity Velleman is actually entitled 
to is pretty superficial anyway. The difference is just that on the present modification one is to 
regard one’s psychological inability to perfectly love everyone as a genuine rational imperfection, 
one we have reason to work to overcome.17 
This answer is very honest in its way, and should not be dismissed out of hand. The idea 
that we are all to love one another unconditionally is historically important and very powerful. It 
is fundamental to the Christian ethical tradition, and may, not unrelatedly, be truest to the 
Kantian spirit. So perhaps it should not be surprising if this is really where Velleman’s theory 
leads him. (I suspect it is also the only coherent conception of love as a truly moral emotion.) But 
the resulting ideal of love is not only demanding, but strangely impersonal. It collapses, or at least 
trivializes, the distinction between love for particular persons and love for humanity as such. 
4 Loving someone as a relative 
Love for particular persons, therefore, must be a selective rational response to valuable properties of 
the beloved. But not just any sort of property will do. Linton’s attractive qualities, remember, 
would make him too replaceable. Here, Niko Kolodny’s appeal to relational properties represents 
an important advance. 
Kolodny argues that reasons for love are grounded in the value of one’s ongoing historical 
relationships to one’s beloveds. I love my brother, for instance, because he’s my brother. We have 
the same parents and we grew up together. This makes it easy to explain irreplaceability: it is 
important to me that I love my brother, in particular, because he is the particular person to 
                                                 
17. Perhaps Velleman feels the influence of this point in his suggestion that we are not equally inclined to love 
everyone in part because the “human body and human behavior are imperfect expressions of personhood, and we 
are imperfect interpreters.” (“Love as a Moral Emotion,” p. 372) 
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whom I stand in the fraternal relation. Other people might stand in the fraternal relation to 
someone—they might be other people’s brothers—but that doesn’t give me reason to love them. 
They don’t stand in the fraternal relation to me. (Now, it so happens that I have two brothers. 
Kolodny’s view implies that I therefore have just as much reason to love the one as the other. But 
this is just as it should be. I do have reason to love both equally.) 
More specifically, Kolodny argues that relationships of certain types are finally (that is, 
non-derivatively) valuable, and so constitute sources of reasons for love. For him, loving someone 
consists in (i) believing your relationship to that person to be an instance of a valuable type, and 
thus (ii) taking it to be a reason both for being emotionally vulnerable to, and for acting in the 
interest of, both your beloved and the relationship itself, in ways appropriate to relationships of 
that type, and (iii) believing that others in relationships of the same type would have similar 
reasons for similar attitudes concerning their own beloveds.18 When you love someone, then, you 
value both your beloved and your relationship itself—but it’s the relationship, in virtue of its 
general type, that you see as the source of your reasons to accord special value to each. This isn’t 
to say, of course, that lovers don’t have reason to be interested in whatever valuable qualities 
their beloveds might have. On the contrary, my love for my brothers involves, in part, my taking 
a special interest in all kinds of great things about them. But on Kolodny’s theory, my reasons for 
doing so aren’t grounded in the value of the qualities themselves—those reasons would apply to 
anyone—but in the value of my relationships to their particular bearers. 
It’s technically conceivable that my fraternal relationships could have provided me with 
special reason to care about my brothers even if they were only derivatively valuable, since I still 
wouldn’t have them to anyone else. But by construing their value as final, Kolodny elegantly 
accounts for the thought that love should be constant: its reasons should endure through a suitably 
                                                 
18. This is a compressed version of Kolodny’s formulation in “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” pp. 150-151. 
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wide range of changes in a beloved. I leave “suitably wide” vague on purpose, but the basic idea 
should be intuitive. If my brothers came to have very different valuable qualities, I’d have equally 
good reason to take a special interest in those. I’d even have reason to care about my brothers in 
the (distant!) possible world where they didn’t have much going for them at all. For Kolodny, the 
explanation for this is simple: so long as your beloved remains such that your relationship can 
somehow endure as a valuable instance of its type, your reasons for love endure as well.19 
Like Velleman’s, Kolodny’s theory captures a genuine and valuable form of love. We’ve 
already seen how plausibly it describes familial love; it likewise accounts for the possibility of 
loving attachment to things other than persons, like pets, gardens, cars, or institutions.20 Further, 
I think Kolodny is right that our histories with our beloveds are ultimately what make them 
irreplaceable to us. But they can’t always do so in the way he thinks. For some of the deepest 
loving relationships can’t be finally valuable: the value of your beloved must come first, and your 
relationship must be valuable to you only as a relationship to the particular person in question. 
As a first effort at bringing out what Kolodny’s view misses, observe that a surprisingly 
wide range of relationships count as loving by his criteria. One example is teaching. It goes 
without saying that teachers who value their pedagogical relationships take them to be reasons 
for acting in the interests of their students in pedagogically appropriate ways. And while good 
teaching probably does not require overbearing, Dead Poets Society-style sentimentalism, it is 
plausible that the best teachers, and the ones who get the most out of it, further take their 
pedagogical relationships to be reasons for certain forms of emotional vulnerability to their 
students—for taking pleasure in their students’ progress, for instance, and being troubled by their 
                                                 
19. Of course, relationships can end. Waning sexual attraction generally ends romantic relationships, or turns 
them into friendships; even familial relationships may fail to survive sufficiently gross betrayals (as numerous movies 
and television shows about mobsters memorably attest). 
 
20. While Kolodny explicitly defines “relationships” in his sense as essentially interpersonal, I see no reason to 
view this limitation as more than stipulative. 
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unnecessary confusion—and for corresponding actions and attitudes toward their pedagogical 
relationships themselves. For example, they are unsatisfied with pedagogical relationships that 
are going badly or that end prematurely—for example, with their students dropping out—and 
when appropriate they act to prevent these things. 
Now, it is arguably possible to love someone specifically as a student. But it would be a 
stretch to say that if you value your pedagogical relationships in this way, you necessarily love 
every student with whom you have one. What you love in this case is teaching. The students you 
love, if any, are the special ones, who “make it all worthwhile.” They are the ones with whom 
you value your pedagogical relationships not just as instances of a generally valuable class, but 
additionally as pedagogical relationships that are especially valuable because of specific characteristics 
of the student in question. Thus, Minerva might spend an extra hour helping Neville, who is pleasant 
enough and tries hard, out of her love for teaching, and yet do the same for Hermione, who is 
brilliant and delightful, additionally out of pedagogical love for her. It will be a matter of 
indifference to her that her pedagogical relationship is to Neville, as opposed to any of the many 
other adequate Hogwarts students whom she might have taught but happened not to. But not so 
with Hermione. Yet it is exactly this distinction that Kolodny’s view lacks the resources to draw. 
It might be offered on Kolodny’s behalf that while Minerva may indeed have a special 
relationship to Hermione, that relationship could be a finally valuable relationship of a different 
type. Minerva could, for instance, simply be Hermione’s friend.21 But once we see how the 
distinction between finally valuable relationships and those whose value depends on the specific 
person in question pertains to teaching, its relevance to more intimate cases becomes apparent. 
                                                 
21. It might also be suggested that the difference in value is merely one of degree. Hermione’s virtues might 
make a difference simply by enabling an especially valuable instance of the same type of relationship Minerva has to 
Neville, not (as I have supposed) by adding an extra dimension of value specific to Minerva’s relationship to Hermione. 
But whether or not this is plausible for teaching, it is not for marriage. 
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It’s possible to value a marriage—even deeply and for its own sake—to someone you don’t love. 
This may be how Alexei Karenin viewed his marriage, for instance, at least before he learned of 
Anna’s infidelity. As Anna’s husband, Karenin would indeed have reason to take a special 
interest in Anna’s attractive qualities, like her sensitivity and verve—but only because those were 
the qualities that happened to be instantiated in his wife. There’d be nothing about Anna’s 
sensitivity and verve as such, much less about Anna herself, that gave those particular qualities a 
special claim on Karenin’s attention. Had Karenin been married to someone else, her qualities 
would have been just as lovable to him; Anna’s would have been merely attractive. 
Kolodny claims, in response, that “it doesn’t seem like a distortion to say…that a wife 
wants to be loved by her husband, at the deepest level, because she is the woman with whom he 
fell in love and made his life. […] Let us suppose that they had never met and had made their 
lives with other people. Imagining herself in that situation, would she still want him to love her? 
Would it make sense to her if he did?”22 At first glance, this reply seems right. But I think this is 
only because it subtly trades on exactly the point Kolodny’s critic should press against him. If 
love is indeed grounded in the value that certain characteristics of your beloved have for you, it is 
plausible that the identity of those characteristics depends on the sort of person you are. But love 
changes you. Had the spouses in Kolodny’s example married different people, they would have 
become different sorts of people themselves. Of course they would have found different 
characteristics lovable. 
In order for Kolodny’s example to vindicate his theory, therefore, we need to hold fixed23 
the nonrelational properties of all parties concerned. Suppose you are married to a person named 
                                                 
22. “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” p. 157. 
 
23. Or, at least, as fixed as possible. It can be hard to draw a sharp distinction between putatively nonrelational 
properties of someone's personality and character from relational ones like memories and ongoing concrete projects. 
This theme will turn out to be important later, but bracket it for now. 
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Smith. Your marriage is a happy one; you and Smith delight in and admire all kinds of things 
about each other. You also happen to have a colleague, Jones, whom you dated for a semester 
back in college. If you gave the matter much thought, you’d admit to yourself that you’d likely 
have grown to love each other if you stayed together, and even that you still find her fairly 
attractive. But you really don’t give the matter much thought. Jones is nice enough, but you can’t 
imagine how anything about her could grip you the way so much about Smith does. As far as 
you're concerned there’s no contest. It’s crazy to think that, married to Jones while remaining 
exactly the sort of person you are now, and knowing as much about the two as you do, Jones 
would be just as lovable to you as Smith now is, and Smith’s radiance would be dimmed to that 
of a moderately attractive acquaintance. But that implies that your reasons for loving Smith do 
not derive, ultimately, from valuable properties of your marriage to him. Rather, they derive 
from valuable properties of Smith himself. 
5 Loving someone for a self like yours 
Let me stress again that the fond attachment Kolodny describes, like the unconditional loving 
awareness Velleman does, really does constitute a legitimate and admirable form of love. But the 
shortcomings of both their views show that we also need a third form, grounded in a selective 
appreciation of a beloved’s distinguishing features. This, I will argue, is the kind of love 
Catherine has for Heathcliff. 
When Catherine says she loves Heathcliff for what his soul is made of, I assume that she is 
referring to his identity or character (I’ll use these terms interchangeably), as defined by the values by 
which he finds it fundamentally worthwhile to live. Now, I haven’t yet done anything to show 
why the properties that constitute selective reasons for love must, specifically, be the beloved’s 
values. In fact, it might seem perfectly normal to love someone for other things. Wealth might be 
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mercenary, and handsomeness superficial, but what’s wrong with loving people for their 
cheerfulness—or, for that matter, for their intelligence, sensitivity, or senses of humor? 
The enduring popularity of Wuthering Heights itself suggests, however, that there is 
something about Catherine’s kind of love that many people find compelling. At least in rough 
outline, it’s easy to see why. To begin with, it seems on reflection that whether someone finds 
your other qualities lovable (rather than just interesting, sexy, or otherwise pleasing) normally does 
depend, a great deal, on what those qualities say about your values—on the interests or drives 
animating your intelligence, say, or the outlook on life embodied by your jokes, or even the 
sensibility exhibited in how you dress or walk.24 Further, and more basically, someone who loves 
you selectively, for the specific values you identify with, sees you for who you distinctively are—
and finds you distinctively valuable as such. There’s something wonderfully affirming and 
empowering about this—especially when you love the other person in the same way—though it’s 
hard to explain what. (I’ll offer more of an explanation below, once I’ve said more about what 
Catherine’s kind of love involves.)25 
Once we’ve seen how essential irreplaceability, openness, and constancy are to love, 
however, it can seem strange—if not paradoxical—that the idea of being loved for your values 
could be so appealing. For while these features pose a challenge to any conception of love as a 
form of selective appreciation, the challenge seems especially severe in the present case. Start 
with irreplaceability: while the values Catherine loves in Heathcliff might be unusual, there’s no 
reason to think they’re essentially unique to him, as would seem necessary for it to be important to 
her that she love him in particular. On the contrary, they can’t be, if Catherine is correct in 
                                                 
24. Martha Nussbaum makes the same observation, in defense of a similar thesis, in “Love and the Individual: 
Romantic Rightness and Platonic Aspiration,” in her Love’s Knowledge, p. 327. 
 
25. For another attempt at an explanation, to which I am substantially indebted, see C. S. Lewis’s beautiful and 
trenchant discussion of friendship in The Four Loves, ch. 4. 
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taking herself to share them. And it’s with respect to the beloved’s values that openness and 
constancy seem most important. Think of lovers who aren’t open to their beloveds as they are in 
themselves—who respond to any deviations in their beloveds’ values from their own with 
disappointment, rather than welcoming their beloveds’ novel concerns as potential enlargements 
of their own perspectives. Such love—if it’s intelligible as such at all—seems narcissistic on the 
part of the lover, and insulting to the beloved. And if these putative lovers further saw the 
continuation of their relationships as rationally contingent on ongoing adherence to the party line, 
their interest would go from a distressing narcissism to a downright sinister possessiveness. 
What I want to argue now, however, is that the idea of loving people for values they share 
with you only faces these problems if we think of the values in question themselves as fixed, static 
things. I don’t think values are like this—not all of them, at any rate. I think instead that a 
beloved’s values are loved as things that are essentially in the process of being determined, 
through an ongoing sequence of judgments and actions. To that end, I’ll defend this conception 
of agency in the remaining sections, showing how it yields an account of the nature and value of 
love for persons as particular individuals that vindicates both Ellen’s catechism and Catherine’s 
ultimate answer to it. 
6 Improvising with a partner 
In the last chapter, I appealed to musical improvisation to model how agents can act for reasons 
they’re making up as they go, just as musicians can literally work out the musical ideas they are 
trying to express through the processes of expressing them.26 Now we can extend the model to 
multiple agents. To do so, let’s go back to Keith Richards. He reports: 
                                                 
26. In The Retrieval of Ethics, Talbot Brewer makes a similar appeal to musical improvisation as a paradigm of 
what he calls “dialectical activity,” which he likewise conceives as a process through which agents refine their 
conceptions of their ends through their efforts at achieving them. However, Brewer’s theory differs from mine in that 
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There’s something beautifully friendly and elevating about playing music with people. This 
wonderful little world is unassailable. It’s really teamwork, one guy supporting the other, and it’s 
all for one purpose, and there’s no flies in the ointment, for a while. And nobody conducting, it’s 
all up to you. It’s really jazz—that’s the big secret. Rock and roll ain’t nothing but jazz with a hard 
backbeat.27 
What makes this so great, Richards insists, is the experience of pursuing a shared end: 
You’re sitting with some guys and you’re playing and you go “Ooh, yeah!” That feeling is worth 
more than anything. There’s a certain moment where you realize you just left the planet for a bit 
and that nobody can touch you. You’re elevated because you’re with a bunch of guys that want to 
do the same thing as you. And when it works, baby, you’ve got wings. You know you’ve been 
somewhere most people will never get; you’ve been to a special place. And then you want to keep 
going back and keep landing again, and when you land you get busted. But you always want to get 
back there. It’s flying without a license.28 
Contrast these remarks with Richards’s account of improvisation in the first person from the 
previous chapter. There, he plainly did not have a determinate end in view. Yet here he is 
elevated precisely because he views his bandmates as playing with a deep sense of common 
purpose—as sharing his end. This may seem paradoxical. In what sense could it be intelligible for 
Richards to take his bandmates to have the same end as he, without implicitly presupposing there 
to be a determinate fact of the matter as to what the contents of their respective ends are? 
The answer is that when you take other improvisers to share your end, just as when you 
take your own end to call for a certain action, you aren’t making a judgment about the content of 
your end as it stands. Richards’s sense of his bandmates as “wanting to do the same thing as 
[he]” is best interpreted, I think, as analogous to the feeling, in the context of individual 
improvisation, that a certain riff is somehow the way to go at the time. It registers the acceptance 
                                                 
it is explicitly and unapologetically Platonic. Whereas I use improvisation to model a process through which agents 
freely create their ends for themselves, Brewer argues that agents gradually acquaint themselves with the ideal forms 
in which activities of certain types are to be pursued. This leads to some strange results. Jazz turns out to be an effort 
to apprehend and instantiate objective aesthetic ideals, rather than an act of personal expression. And while persons 
are properly loved for their developing evaluative outlooks, an “evaluative outlook is properly loved only because 
and to the extent that it exemplifies the zeal for adherence to objective truths about the good that is the proper telos 
of the human capacity for practical reason.” (p. 256) So much for Catherine and Heathcliff. 
 
27. Life, p. 105. 
 
28. ibid., p. 97. Richards makes this observation while recounting an early gig that included Mick Jagger and 
Brian Jones, but neither Bill Wyman nor Charlie Watts. For this reason I hesitate to refer to “Keith Richards and his 
bandmates” by the obvious proper noun. 
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of a commitment, rather than a judgment about what, normatively speaking, is already 
determinately the case. Here, however, Richards’s commitment doesn’t concern something he 
takes himself to have reason to do on a single occasion, but rather the things his bandmates take 
themselves to have reason to do over time. He commits, that is, to treating what they take 
themselves to have reason to play, given what they’re trying to express, as standing in the same 
mutual explanatory relation to what he has reason to do that his own responses do—they’re 
things he’d have reason to play himself, had he been in their position. Thus, Richards’s attitude is 
analogous to that someone who is trying to adhere to a certain set of standards, and who, while 
partially ignorant of the content of those standards himself, does know of someone who is also 
trying to adhere to them, and doing so more or less successfully. In effect, then, he accords his 
bandmates a presumption of default authority with respect to his end. 
This presumption of normative authority is, I think, crucial to the nature and value of 
loving relationships.29 Its significance, however, is analogously reflected in attitudes among 
musical improvisers, as Richards’s case illustrates. This is manifested, most basically, in the 
complex attitude of open-ended receptivity and sense of individual purpose Richards might 
plausibly be viewed as taking toward his bandmates. So interpreted, what Richards and his 
bandmates all want to do is express the musical ideas they’re vaguely reaching for; in playing 
together, they recognize their respective ideas to be the same. So when Richards hears what his 
bandmates are playing, and he’s moved by the feeling behind it, he’s moved specifically by 
something that feels expressive of precisely what he’s reaching for himself. It’s easy to see how 
that could be “beautifully friendly and elevating.” If you’re improvising with someone, and your 
partner responds with something that complements your playing so well it feels like a fuller 
                                                 
29. Versions of this claim are not unfamiliar in the literature. For two notable recent ones, see Elijah Millgram, 
Practical Induction, ch. 7, and Kyla Ebels-Duggan, “Against Beneficence,” esp. pp. 158-159. 
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expression of the musical idea behind it, it feels affirming, and enhancing. The thought is 
something like: “So that’s how to do it!—that’s what was cool about where I’ve been going. And 
better still, now I know to play this”—and you respond reciprocally to your partner. Yet when 
you do respond by trying to play in a way that coheres with your partner’s playing, you’re not 
just returning the favor. You’re doing exactly what feels like the natural next stage in your own 
musical project. The result is a feedback loop of mutual, spontaneous exchange: you express 
what feels right to you; your partners are spontaneously moved by what they feel in your playing 
to play what feels right to them; you experience their responses as an apt development of what 
you’re playing and delightedly reply to it as such; you’re off to the races. 
7 Loving someone as a partner in deep improvisation 
When Richards and his bandmates recognize and respond to each other as pursuing the same 
end, we can say that they value one another as improvisational partners. In this, they share a 
relationship with the same general structure as relationships between lovers. To love someone in 
particular, I submit, is to value that person as a partner in deep improvisation. 
An improvisational partnership is a type of ongoing relationship grounded in the 
partners’ mutual recognition of one another as sharing an end with respect to a given activity.30 
In principle, any improvisational activity can be done with a partner: partners in musical 
improvisation explore a common musical idea in their playing; students may improvise with each 
other as partners in working out an interpretive approach to a text; spouses may improvise with 
each other as partners in working out the terms of a marriage. None of these relationships 
necessarily involve partnership in deep improvisation (in which the partners would work out 
together the basic significance that their activities of musical expression, textual interpretation, or 
                                                 
30. Or, equivalently, with respect to a cluster of interlocking activities (which need not be clearly delineated). 
 48 
marriage had in their lives), but all of them can. As a special case, partnership in deep 
improvisation can also be global, as it is for Catherine and Heathcliff, such that the partners work 
out their entire approach to life together. But it need not be. I love my grad school officemate for 
much of what he sees in philosophy, but not all of it, and while we have a very satisfying 
friendship, we each think the other’s political views are pretty awful. 
Like relatives in Kolodny’s sense, improvisational partners value their partnership itself as 
well as one another. But unlike relatives in Kolodny’s sense, they do not value their partnership 
finally. Rather, they value it only because and insofar as they recognize one another as warranting 
a presumption of authority in judgment with respect to the relevant activity—that is, only 
because they are justified in taking one another to share their respective ends. 
It follows that there are selective reasons for love (and for improvisational partnerships in 
general), but reasons of a special kind. Here, again, taking yourself to have reason to value 
someone as an improvisational partner is analogous to taking yourself, in the individual case, to 
have reason to perform a certain action. In neither case does it imply that the action or attitude 
in question was rationally determined in advance: had you not taken yourself to have reason to 
value someone as a partner you probably would have been right, since you’d have developed 
your ends in a different direction. This, I think, is why the thought that love is arational or 
rationally optional can seem so natural: it’s deceptively close to the truth. But, as I argued above, 
there’s a crucial difference between recognizing that a response wasn’t rationally determined in 
advance, and regarding it as arational or rationally optional having actually made it. When you 
improvise, you do the former, but not the latter: you regard your decision to respond in one way 
rather than another as something that admits of and requires—and might not get—rational 
justification, in terms of the end you’re thereby determining yourself.  This is, again, compatible 
with the thought that had you done the other thing, you might, too, have had reason to do it—
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just reason relative to a different end. This makes the authority that Richards accords his 
bandmates more than just epistemic. For, having accorded his bandmates this authority, the 
ways he takes himself to have reason to play will depend on the ways his bandmates do—and so, 
therefore, will the content of his end itself. This in itself is crucial for love, because it is what 
explains how people who love each other for identifying with the same values do not just mirror 
each other’s values but shape them. 
So valuing someone as an improvisational partner is, if things go well, a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. That’s why it’s perfectly intelligible to do so without supposing it to be possible—even 
in principle—to provide a justifying explanation for this decision at first, in light of the similarity 
of your respective ends. For you may rather suppose yourself to be in the process of working out 
that explanation, by improvising with that person and seeing what the two of you turn out to be 
like, and what, in light it is, just what it is about the other person that so resonates with you. (Of 
course, things might not go well: you might fail to find anything in your partner that helps you 
make sense of your initial attraction. If this happens, your attitude will turn out in retrospect to 
have been unjustified.) 
This may seem strange, but in connection to love it’s really the most obvious thing in the 
world. The language of love is full of terms for inexplicable but warranted attraction: there’s 
electricity, that twinkle in his eye, that special something, that je ne sais quoi. (The language of 
music is not dissimilar in this respect.) We’ve all encountered or heard of people who admit it to 
be impossible for them to describe their reasons for loving the specific people they do (or, at any 
rate, to describe them any more clearly than Catherine or Montaigne did), but nevertheless insist 
that they do have such reasons. I imagine most of us philosophers have felt the temptation to 
quietly conclude that such sentiments, while romantic, betray a basic confusion about rationality. 
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But if I’m right, the romantics have been right all along about an important class of reasons that 
we, for the most part, have missed. 
*     *     * 
Interpersonal love differs from other forms of improvisational partnership because the ends lovers 
share constitute fundamental values with which each identifies. This makes the interest and 
responsiveness warranted by the similarity of their ends correspondingly more profound. To flesh 
out what these attitudes involve, let’s return once more to Catherine and Heathcliff. 
Catherine and Heathcliff love each other for their common wildness. When she tries to 
explain this to Ellen, Catherine recalls a dream of going to heaven but being miserable there. 
Ellen points out, reasonably enough, that of course she wouldn’t like it: heaven isn’t supposed to 
be the sort of thing sinners would like. “This is nothing,” Catherine retorts. 
“I was only going to say that heaven did not seem to be my home; and I broke my heart with 
weeping to come back to earth; and the angels were so angry that they flung me out, into the 
middle of the heath at the top of Wuthering Heights, where I woke sobbing for joy. That will do to 
explain my secret, as well as the other.” 
Wuthering Heights is a home to Catherine because of the free and vigorous way of life its 
rawness, beauty, and isolation enables her to lead there. Unlike anywhere else in her life, it 
provides opportunities for creative exploration and discovery, physically robust activity, and 
uninhibited emotional expression—all things to be approached in a very different spirit than the 
domesticated concerns in which she and Heathcliff are otherwise expected to participate. As 
improvisers, Catherine and Heathcliff are each engaged in a process of working out just what this 
wildness means to them: what precisely is to be appreciated in being in the wilderness, and 
how—and how the spirit of wildness each prizes is to be embodied in an overall approach to life. 
By sympathetically engaging with what the other sees, Catherine and Heathcliff offer 
each other focus and reinforcement. Catherine’s judgments and actions serve as a guide for 
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Heathcliff. If something seems worth doing to her, he’ll see, and feel, this as a hint about what he 
himself has reason to do, and respond accordingly. I’d imagine most of these instances of shared 
practical reasoning are small and subtle. They might concern things like what’s to be savored in 
an autumn wind, or what’s interesting about a certain bird, or how and why the curate is to be 
tormented today. In loving Catherine as a partner in deep improvisation, Heathcliff will be 
drawn to her approach to life. In viewing her judgments as warranting a presumption of 
normative authority, Heathcliff will experience them as attractive, as having a rightful power to 
shape his own sense of his values so as to accord with them. Similarly, in seeing what Catherine 
takes to be worthwhile as to be taken into account in his own normative explanations, Heathcliff 
will experience her personality as calling out for attention and understanding—that is, he’ll find it 
fascinating. Over time, these instances of sympathetic engagement and exchange add up. They 
enable the lovers to determine and act from more richly illustrated conceptions of value than 
otherwise would have been available to them. 
It is this mutual self-creation that explains the irreplaceability, openness, and constancy 
characteristic of interpersonal love. I’ll address these features in opposite order to that in which 
they were introduced. Conveniently, this turns out to be in ascending order of complexity. 
Constancy: That partners in deep improvisation have reason to continue to love each other 
through a wide range of developments in one another’s values, not necessarily capable of being 
anticipated in advance, should be obvious by this point. Someone who loves you as a partner in 
deep improvisation loves you, throughout your relationship together, for a specific set of values 
with which you identify. Because the content of these values is in the process of being 
determined, however, the reasons for love they constitute endure as their content is continually 
being reshaped and refined. Change is not the exception but the rule. 
 52 
Remember that even Sonnet 116—probably the single most quoted paean to constancy 
in English—begins by describing love as the marriage of true minds. This suggests two pertinent 
observations. First, the fact that reasons for love are constituted by a person’s values, rather than 
external characteristics like Linton’s attractions, itself means that love for a partner in deep 
improvisation can be expected to survive the sort of surface changes it really, obviously should. 
Second, constancy is important, but so is discernment. Of course it can be appropriate to cease to 
love a person, if one or the other of you undergoes a fundamental change in character or if the 
two of you do not turn out to share as much as you thought. 
Openness: Partners in deep improvisation are open to each other as they are in themselves 
because of the distinctive way the values they share are shaped by their particular interactions. As 
I explained above, that an improvisational partner takes some action to be appropriate is in and 
of itself a prima facie reason for you to do so as well, in virtue of the presumption of authority 
appropriate to a partner as such. And because the actions you thus take to be appropriate 
determine the content of your ends, the bare fact that your beloved responds to a particular case 
in a certain way can in and of itself make a difference to your values. Thus Velleman was right to 
stress that you don’t need any special reason for heightened sensitivity to whatever is significant 
to or about your beloved—in any given case, that you love the person is reason enough. 
Recall that both Frankfurt and Velleman took love for you as you are in yourself to 
necessarily not admit of selective criteria. Clearly, someone who loved you only because and 
insofar as you satisfied certain antecedently fixed criteria (“handsome, check; young, check; 
cheerful, check; rich, check!”) would not really be loving you for who you are. We can now see 
that while Frankfurt and Velleman correctly identified a problem with viewing love as rationally 
subject to selective criteria, they misidentified its source. It is fine for love to be subject to selective 
criteria—in fact, the inadequacies of Frankfurt’s and Velleman’s views have shown that it must 
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be. What is not fine is for it to be subject to antecedently fixed selective criteria. The improvisational 
model shows the difference between the two. When you love someone as a partner in deep 
improvisation, you love that person according to criteria that are not only in principle impossible 
for you to articulate in advance, but which depend on your beloved as much as on you. Love for 
people in their sheer particularity is not love that doesn’t admit of reasons; it is love that requires 
you to respond to beloveds in their sheer particularity to determine the reasons you have for it. 
Irreplaceability: The most basic reason why partners in deep improvisation are irreplaceable 
is simply that they are incomparable: the nature of the values in question makes the possibility of 
a replacement incoherent. Someone counts as a suitable replacement for an improvisational 
partner if that person enables you to realize the same value in the relevant activity that the 
original did. This may be possible in most forms of improvisation: if you’re ultimately in it for the 
money or the adulation, one bandmate may be just as good as another, even though you’d be 
expressing different things with each. But it is not possible in deep improvisation, since the value 
of the activities you share is itself something your partner plays an ongoing role in determining. 
So any standards by which putative replacements might be assessed are epistemically and 
ontologically posterior to continued engagement with the original. If you had a different partner, 
you’d have different standards: there’s no common basis of comparison. 
Now, anyone you take to share values with which you identify will be incomparably 
valuable to you in this way, even when the interest isn’t mutual. But when it is mutual, lovers 
become irreplaceably valuable to each other in a deeper sense. Catherine says of Heathcliff that 
he “comprehends in his own person my feelings to Edgar and myself.”31 Interpreted as an 
                                                 
31. Catherine’s statement occurs at the beginning of a speech that has rightly worried many critics. She goes on 
to proclaim that all her miseries in life have been for Heathcliff, that he is her great thought in living, that the world 
would be empty without him, and so forth. On my view, the selflessness Catherine expresses is incidental to love 
proper. Heathcliff is properly lovable to Catherine because he helps her live as more fully herself, not because he 
gives her something to live for. (It helps to remember here that she speaks as a moody and theatrical fifteen-year-old.) 
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improviser, she is referring to Heathcliff’s access to the values with which she identifies: as her 
lover, he can access them in ways that nobody else, in principle, can. He can interpret and 
develop them through the lens of his own history while still appreciating them as she does. 
Catherine works out who she is by improvising from an evaluative currency of things like 
interesting birds, invigorating autumn winds, and obnoxious curates. She takes these things to be 
significant in ways that are to help explain how it will be important to her to live going forward, 
and that are to be explained, in turn, by their relation to the overall way of life they help 
constitute. This makes her understanding of herself and her values essentially historical, and 
particular. The only way for anyone else to understand them from her perspective is to attribute 
the same practical significance to particular cases that she does—to see, in the same way that she 
does, those cases as contributing to, and helping to explain the nature and attractiveness of, the 
kind of life it is important to her to lead. But I have just argued that to be committed to 
attributing the same significance to particular cases that you do is precisely what it is to love you. 
So Catherine and Heathcliff understand each other the same way they understand themselves: 
through a joint history of particular interactions, constituting a common evaluative currency. 
But while any number of lovers might share your sense of your identity, just as any 
number of bandmates might share your musical idea, Heathcliff’s perspective toward Catherine’s 
values is all his own—as, crucially, is his role in enabling her to develop them. In loving 
Catherine as a partner, Heathcliff integrates what she has shared  with his own evaluative history; 
in acting according to the conception of his values he thereby forms, he may inspire Catherine, in 
turn, to develop her own values in new directions.32 (Recall Velleman’s discussion of his sons 
from §3.) But the contributions he has to offer would necessarily differ from those of a different 
                                                 
32. In stressing the essentially historical character of the roles lovers play in drawing one another out, I follow 
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, “The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes,” and Alexander Nehamas, “The Good of 
Friendship,” among others. 
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lover, with a different history. Even if Heathcliff disappeared from Catherine’s life, and she 
eventually fell in love with someone else, her new lover would not understand her in quite the 
same way as Heathcliff did, from quite the same point of view. So long as she continued to 
identify with the values she and Heathcliff worked out together, there would remain a side of her 
accessible to Heathcliff alone, things he alone could bring out of her. 
Why, then, might it be so important to us to share ourselves with our lovers? Let me finish 
by sketching the beginning of an answer. To begin with, the things our lovers bring out of us 
might not be things we’re capable of bringing out ourselves. This is underscored by the fact that 
the best lovers often seem like opposites: consider Elinor and Marianne, Holmes and Watson, 
Kirk and Spock. These people all share certain fundamental concerns with their partners—ones 
centered, respectively, around ideals of feminine autonomy and the enjoyment of everyday 
beauty, the pursuit of justice tinged with an attraction to danger and a curiosity about 
criminality, and boldly going where no one has gone before—but embody these concerns very 
differently from them. This unity within diversity enables the lovers to see how their own values 
might be realized in ways they probably wouldn’t have recognized on their own: moved by 
Marianne’s indignation, Elinor might find it important to stand up to an offense she would 
otherwise have passively endured; appreciative of Elinor’s considered response, Marianne might 
better understand why her indignation was warranted in the first place. It’s even possible that one 
might not see how one’s inchoate jumble of interests and concerns could ground a coherent 
identity until one sees them complemented in a lover, or that one’s sense of how to live might 
become so entwined with one’s lover’s as to make one lost without them. 
More deeply, but more obliquely, there’s just something wonderful about someone’s 
picking up on the value you see in your approach to life and your being immediately able to say: 
“Oh, so it’s not just me!” Elaborating on Heathcliff’s comprehension of her in his own person, 
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Catherine tells Ellen: “I cannot express it; but surely you and everybody have a notion that there 
is, or should be, an existence of yours beyond you. What were the use of my creation if I were 
entirely contained here?” I’m not sure I’m any more able to explain this idea than Catherine 
was. Still, there seems to be something deeply and intrinsically desirable about communicating to 
another person who you are and what, as such, is important to you. When you work out your 
values with a partner, they become more than just the terms of an isolated personal project. 
Rather, they become intersubjective standards for a way of life that can be lived in common. 
There’s a sense in which values seem more real—more stable and substantial—when they are 
recognized by another person, and can be examined and assessed from multiple points of view. It 
doesn’t matter to Catherine and Heathcliff that their values be ones that every reasonable person 
could be expected to share, or even tolerate; bracketing specifically moral considerations, I don’t 
see that it should. But it does, and should, matter to them that their personal values are not just 
personal—that their authority be intersubjective. 
This point will have to stay at the level of suggestion. Even if it’s right, it doesn’t yet make 
it explicit why it matters that the intersubjectivity thus secured have the historical and particular 
dimension I’ve claimed to be characteristic of love. To make it more explicit, let’s take it from the 
top. (Conveniently, taking it from the top will also let the discussion do for a conclusion.) If it’s 
true that it’s intrinsically desirable that your personal values be more than just personal, this helps 
explain why it’s reasonable to want to be loved selectively, since it would be reasonable to want 
the affirmation such love would constitute. Such love says, in effect, that you are worthy, at least 
to someone, of special interest and attention because you identify with the specific values you do—and if the 
person in question is someone you love back, you’re worthy not just to anyone, but to someone 
whose judgment really counts. Compare this, again, to Frankfurtian love, which (because 
arational) does not affirm you in this way; or Vellemanian love, which primarily affirms you, 
 57 
generically, as a valuer; or Kolodnyan love, which affirms you, also generically, as a parent, child, 
sibling, spouse, or friend. 
But the affirmation Catherine and Heathcliff want isn’t affirmation from a universal 
normative perspective. They’re too protective of their individuality for that. They want 
affirmation from a more deeply personal point of view, one that recognizes their values as 
fundamentally their own. Uniquely, someone who loves you as a partner in deep improvisation 
can provide this more personal kind of affirmation, in loving you for an identity that remains 
essentially up to you to freely and continually determine. Most of us, fortunately, aren’t 
protective of our individuality in so violent and absolute a sense as Catherine and Heathcliff are. 
But in wanting to be loved as distinctive individuals, I think we share the same basic concern. In 
wanting to be loved as distinctive, we want our lovers to see, and value us for, aspects of our 
characters that distinguish us from others. In wanting to be loved as individuals, we do not want to 
be valued merely, as Frankfurt put it, as exemplars of more general types, identifiable and 
evaluable in abstraction from our particular, concrete, ongoing histories. The improvisational 
model shows how it is possible to be loved in this way, as persons who are both knowable and 
endlessly interesting and surprising, with identities that escape determinate categorization but 
can nevertheless be responded to with fluency and delight. 
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3 
Properly proleptic blame 
1 Introduction 
In “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” Bernard Williams argued that blame involves 
a kind of “proleptic mechanism.”1 For those to whom, like me, this is all Greek, the Oxford English 
Dictionary reports that !!"#$%&' (prolepsis) meant “preconception, especially in Epicurean 
philosophy, (in rhetoric) anticipation, especially prefigurement, representation of future events, a 
figure in which objections or arguments are anticipated.” I’m going to argue that a central 
species of blame is proleptic in a very robust sense. It requires that it must sometimes be 
indeterminate whether you had most reason—internal to your values and commitments—to 
have performed the action you’re blamed for, and anticipates the reasons you may or may not 
turn out to have upon resolving this indeterminacy. In fact, it is warranted, in part, as part of the 
process of doing so. 
This result is important for two reasons. First, it helps us understand how blame isn’t just 
a bad thing. It plays a vital constructive role in helping people shape their values together. 
Second, it helps us understand the intimate connection, which many moral philosophers have 
stressed, between being an appropriate target of blame and traditional questions concerning free 
will. It’s often thought that in order to be appropriately blamed for doing something, you must 
                                                 
1. “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” pp. 41-43. 
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have been able to do otherwise. Recognizing the role of rational indeterminacy in blame lets us 
capture a more robust sense of this requirement than compatibilists have so far been able to do. 
Here is how the argument will go. In the next section, I’ll give some reasons to think that 
there’s an important species of blame with two, interdependent features. First, it is constituted by 
negative emotional responses in roughly the sense P. F. Strawson described in “Freedom and 
Resentment.” But while Strawson focused on guilt and indignation, in addition to resentment, I 
will focus on anger—and especially on what Marilyn Frye has called “righteous anger.”2 
(Following Susan Wolf, who likewise draws on Frye, we can call this kind of blame “angry 
blame.”3) I’ll then suggest that what makes angry blame distinctive is its expressive, 
communicative dimension. 
In §2, I’ll argue that angry blame’s communicative dimension makes it inappropriate to 
address to the sort of agents Williams termed “hard cases”—those with most internal reason to 
have performed the actions they’re blamed for. These agents are in no position to appreciate the 
concerns expressed in one’s blame. If the anger hard cases provoke can be appropriately 
addressed to anyone, it can only be to third parties; hard cases themselves can only be written off. 
In §4, I’ll use this result to challenge the view that it’s always determinate what, if 
anything, you have most reason to do. If that were true, then—since we’ll already have ruled out 
hard cases—it would follow that angry blame could only be appropriately addressed to agents 
who had as much or more reason to act better but didn’t. In §5, however, I’ll argue that this 
cannot be so. 
                                                 
2. “A Note on Anger.” 
 
3. “Blame, Italian Style.”  
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This means we need to reject the assumption that internal reasons are always determinate 
in order for angry blame to be intelligible. In the final sections, I’ll sketch a simple way to do this, 
and show how the resulting view of blame illuminates its nature and importance. 
2 What angry blame is and why it matters 
The idea that anger and similar emotions have a special connection to blame is a familiar and 
natural one. But it is far from obvious what that connection is. For one thing, many perfectly 
normal instances of blame don’t seem to essentially involve negative emotions at all. For instance, 
if I say you’re to blame for getting us lost, I might only mean that you played some especially 
salient role in causing us to get lost—you forgot the map, say. And I might make this judgment 
without any real opprobrium at all, especially if your lapse was innocent and understandable. If I 
feel bad about anything, it may just be mild disappointment at the overall state of affairs. (Note, 
however, that I might nevertheless be perfectly reasonable in expecting an apology from you—
and maybe some sort of compensation, too, if getting lost turned out to be really inconvenient.) 
It’s often thought that what distinguishes this kind of minimal blame for consequences 
from the kind that essentially involves emotions like anger, resentment, and indignation is that 
these emotions register attitudes of disrespect or disregard on the part of an offender.4 Thus, you 
wouldn’t provoke resentment if you got us lost due to an innocent mistake, but you would if you 
did so out of a malicious desire to amuse yourself at my resulting confusion and stress. However, 
I don’t think things are so simple. There are ways of registering someone’s disrespect or disregard 
for you that are plainly constitutive of at least one important kind of blame, but that do not 
essentially involve anger or resentment. 
                                                 
4. This may have been Strawson’s view; cf. “Freedom and Resentment,” p. 14. It is, at any rate, explicitly 
endorsed by (e.g.) Pamela Hieronymi, in “The Force and Fairness of Blame,” p. 135. 
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T. M. Scanlon’s recent theory of blame seems to me to establish this point decisively. For 
Scanlon, blame consists in the kind of revision of one’s attitudes toward other people that it is 
appropriate to make when those people display attitudes that impair the relationships one has or 
could have to them. To take Scanlon’s example, part of what it is to be friends with someone is to 
be committed to treating certain considerations as reasons for actions or attitudes toward your 
friend in ways that do not pertain to others—to judge yourself to have special reasons for being 
loyal and sympathetic, for instance. But you only have these reasons if the other person is, in fact, 
really your friend—that is, if the other person is committed to treating you in the same way. If 
your (putatively) close friend Joe makes fun of you behind your back at a party, he may thereby 
reveal himself to be no longer your friend, or at least to be less of a friend than you had thought. 
In such a case, you will not have (all) the reasons for special loyalty and sympathy toward Joe you 
thought you had. “To revise my intentions and expectations with regard to Joe in this way,” 
Scanlon writes, “is to blame him. I might also resent his behavior, or feel some other moral 
emotion. But this is not required for blame, in my view—I might just feel sad.”5 
Scanlon’s theory thus challenges those who follow Strawson in viewing anger or 
resentment as essential to (at least some important forms of) blame to clarify just what features of 
these emotions make them significant, and why. In answering this challenge, R. Jay Wallace and 
Susan Wolf have both emphasized the way angry blame seems to involve taking a more active, 
engaged, and vulnerable interest in an offense and the attitudes communicated through it than 
Scanlonian blame on its own would entail.6 
I think the most promising approach to understanding this feature of angry blame is in 
terms of its expressive, communicative dimension. As Margaret Urban Walker puts it, attitudes 
                                                 
5. Moral Dimensions, p. 136. 
 
6. See “Dispassionate Opprobrium” and “Blame, Italian Style,” respectively. 
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like anger and resentment “are expressive not only because they reveal something going on in the 
one who experiences them but also because they are a kind of communicative display that invites 
a kind of response.” Walker persuasively argues that these attitudes are best understood as 
implicitly addressed to others, and as calling out to those to whom they are addressed for “assurance 
of protection, defense, or membership under norms brought in question by the exciting injury or 
affront.”7 Importantly, resentment and anger, in this sense, can be addressed either to third 
parties or to offenders themselves. (For what it’s worth, “resentment” and “indignation” seem to 
me mainly to describe attitudes addressed to third parties, while “anger” proper seems mainly 
addressed at offenders themselves. But of course this is just verbal.) 
I won’t say much about anger or resentment addressed to third parties, except that this 
possibility may be worth remembering in what follows, especially for those afraid I might be 
arguing that you can’t appropriately get angry at really terrible people. I’m not. Everything I say 
below is compatible with the fact that it can make perfect sense to get angry at people like the 
Koch brothers or the BP oil executives, without presupposing these people to be at all inclined to 
acknowledge the injustices they advance or commit. I just don’t think anger is best understood as 
addressed to them, but rather to third parties. (I’m also willing to be very catholic about who the 
third parties could be—for all I care, they could be highly general (“the moral community”), 
merely notional (“the point of view of the universe”), putatively immanent (God), or even, 
perhaps, oneself alone.) It should be clear, though, that some anger is addressed to offenders—
and offenders qua offenders, not merely qua members of the universal moral community. 
To get a handle on what it means for anger to be addressed to an offender in this way, it 
will help to start with a prototypical example. The following one will be important throughout 
the paper, so I’ll present it in detail. It comes from a pivotal scene in Howards End. What makes 
                                                 
7. “Resentment and Assurance,” pp. 156-157, original emphasis. 
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this novel interesting in the present context is that its final act can strike one as partly about blame. 
Every major character blames someone at least once, all in different and characteristic ways. By 
the end the reader is left with a pretty comprehensive catalogue. Helen Schlegel is indignant at 
her brother-in-law’s injustice toward a penniless clerk, and angrily feels betrayed by what she sees 
as her sister Margaret’s complicity in it. Margaret’s husband, Henry Wilcox, a sensible man of 
business, duly revises his attitudes toward Helen in light of what he sees as the impairment to 
their relationship constituted by her entirely improper anger, combined with her still more 
improper dalliance with the clerk himself. Of course, Henry blames the clerk too—who for his 
part is torn apart by remorse—but that blame is old-fashioned retributivism: a man in his 
position, Henry judges, “must pay heavily for his misconduct, and be thrashed within an inch of 
his life.” Even the third Schlegel sibling, the icily donnish Tibby, faults himself at one point for 
not being properly reason-responsive: when he betrays his sister’s confidence under pressure, he 
is “deeply vexed, not only for the harm he had done Helen, but for the flaw he had discovered in 
his own equipment.” 
Margaret, however, is Forster’s heroine, and her blame befits her status. Henry refuses 
Margaret a small but very important request: to allow Helen to stay with her for her last night in 
England in his first wife’s beloved ancestral cottage. This is not only heartless but hypocritical: 
Henry had himself been unfaithful to the past Mrs. Wilcox (as it happens, with the woman who 
went on to marry Helen’s clerk). But when Margaret begins to raise that point, his first response 
is insultingly dismissive: 
“You have not been yourself all day,” said Henry, and rose from his seat with face unmoved. 
Margaret rushed at him and seized both his hands. She was transfigured. 
“Not any more of this!” she cried. “You shall see the connection if it kills you, Henry! You 
have had a mistress—I forgave you. My sister has a lover—you drive her from the house. Do you 
see the connection? Stupid, hypocritical, cruel—oh, contemptible!—a man who insults his wife 
when she’s alive and cants with her memory when she’s dead. A man who ruins a woman for 
pleasure, and casts her off to ruin other men. And gives bad financial advice, and then says he is 
not responsible. These men are you. You can’t recognize them, because you cannot connect. I’ve 
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had enough of your unweeded kindness. I’ve spoiled you long enough. All your life you have been 
spoiled. Mrs. Wilcox spoiled you. No one has ever told you what you are—muddled, criminally 
muddled. Men like you use repentance as a blind, so don’t repent. Only say to yourself: ‘What 
Helen has done, I’ve done.’” 
“The two cases are different,” Henry stammered. His real retort was not quite ready. His 
brain was still in a whirl, and he wanted a little longer. 
“In what way different? You have betrayed Mrs. Wilcox, Henry, Helen only herself. You 
remain in society, Helen can’t. You have had only pleasure; she may die. You have the insolence 
to talk to me of differences, Henry?” 
Oh, the uselessness of it! Henry’s retort came. 
“I perceive you are attempting blackmail. It is scarcely a pretty weapon for a wife to use 
against her husband. My rule through life has been never to pay the least attention to threats, and 
I can only repeat what I said before: I do not give you and your sister leave to sleep at Howards 
End.” 
Margaret loosed his hands. He went into the house, wiping first one and then the other on his 
handkerchief. For a little she stood looking at the Six Hills, tombs of warriors, breasts of the spring. 
Then she passed out into what was now the evening.8 
It is interesting to compare Margaret’s anger with Scanlonian blame. By the end of the exchange, 
Henry’s failure to “connect,” as Margaret puts it, has indeed become something Margaret cannot 
but treat as an impairment to her relationship with him. She lets go of his hands; when she next 
sees him it is to return his keys and announce her intention to leave him. His refusal has revealed 
attitudes of his, she has concluded, that make it impossible for her to continue to love him as a 
husband. 
But when Margaret comes to this conclusion, she has stopped being angry. She is angry only 
while it is an open question what Henry will go on to do, and what his initial refusal can mean for 
them. That her anger is addressed to him as someone who could still appreciate the rightness of 
her case is central to its expressive dimension: she wants him, as Wolf puts it, “to see [her] anger 
and to feel [her] pain.”9 When she regards him, finally, as decisively committed to his policy of 
high-handed indifference, she thereby ceases to regard him as an apt target of her vulnerable, 
attentive anger. Were Margaret less materially independent and self-assured, her resentment 
                                                 
8. For Emma Thompson’s and Anthony Hopkins’s enactment of the scene in the novel’s Merchant-Ivory 
adaptation, see youtube.com/watch?v=07Waj_tL6d4&t=3m. 
 
9. “Blame, Italian Style,” p. 338. 
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might still call out to others for protection or confirmation; as it stands, there is nothing for it but 
to withdraw. 
3 Why angry blame is inappropriately addressed to hard cases 
I now want to argue explicitly that Margaret stops being angry at Henry because she implicitly 
recognizes that he is (or at least has become) a hard case, and that her anger is as such no longer 
appropriately addressed to him. But first we need to get clear on the terminology. 
Here, I use “hard cases” as shorthand for agents who have most internal reason, all things 
considered, to perform the actions for which they’re blamed. A helpful way to understand what 
“internal” reasons are, in the present sense, is as reasons “internal” to an agent’s subjective values 
or commitments—they map to what you, personally, value, care about, or find important. (Your 
“external” reasons, by contrast, map to what you should value, care about, or find important, 
where the stress on “should” is meant to communicate an objective, mind-independent sense.) 
Your values, in this sense, are not necessarily identical to your motivations, but they are 
necessarily related to them. How your values call for you to act on a given occasion may differ 
from how you are motivated to act: you might be motivated to do something that, if better 
informed, you would recognize as a terrible idea (what you thought was a chocolate chip cookie 
is actually full of raisins), or not motivated to do something that, if you were more mindful and 
imaginative, you would recognize as marvelously worthwhile. But, as a necessary condition for 
your values to count in favor of (-ing, there must be certain non-trivial—if idealized—conditions 
under which engaging in practical reasoning from your existing motivations could lead you to the 
conclusion to (. Needless to say, just what these conditions are is an enormously complicated and 
voluminously discussed question that I won’t begin to answer here. What I’ll do instead is use 
Williams’s concept of a “sound deliberative route” as a placeholder for them. 
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Williams is emphatic that the concept of a sound deliberative route is meant to be very 
permissive and open-ended. It is meant to cover the wide varieties of ways through which one 
might come from one’s existing motivations to an authoritative conclusion about what one has 
reason to do. Thus, while sound deliberation presumably includes a correction of errors of matter 
of fact and reasoning, Williams insists that it’s not limited to that. For one thing—and this will be 
important later—it can also include exercises of imagination and critical reflection. For another, 
it might also include—as Williams tends to downplay but as other philosophers stress—effective 
regulation by some subset of one’s psychology with authority to represent one’s “real” or “deep” 
self. For now, though, we really don’t need anything beyond a vague idea of sound deliberation 
to go on. All we need to say here is that if you are a hard case, the conclusion that you ought not 
to have acted badly is not something you can be reasoned into—even under ideal conditions, it is 
not something to be attained through a rational deliberative process, on any plausible 
specification of the phrase. 
Now, the most basic reason to deny that Margaret’s angry blame is appropriately 
addressed to hard cases is simply that it has the distinctive communicative, expressive dimension 
we saw at the end of the last section. Like other forms of blame, it is a response to the attitudes of 
disrespect or disregard communicated through the action that provoked it. But Margaret’s anger 
differs from sadness, or even from anger or indignation addressed only to others, precisely in that 
it involves her thinking or feeling that Henry needs to be shown the wrongness or hurtfulness of 
his action. (This seems to me to go a long way in explaining how anger is directed outward in ways 
that other emotions are not.) But you can have reason to show something to others—or otherwise 
communicate something to them—only if you can reasonably hope or expect them to take what 
you show them into account in deliberation. Yet if Henry lacks a sound deliberative route to 
appreciating the rightness of Margaret’s sense of injury, she cannot reasonably hope or expect 
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him to properly take it into account. So why should her sense of injury strike her, as it does 
initially, as something Henry needs to be shown? 
This communicative dimension of anger is underscored by what R. Jay Wallace describes 
as its “element of emotional connection and vulnerability.” When “you experience indignation, 
resentment, or guilt,” he writes, “you are not merely left cold by the [offensive] attitudes that 
form the object of blame, but find that those attitudes engage your interest and attention.”10 
Now, Wallace attributes this emotional connection and vulnerability to a special concern for the 
values or norms against which blamed actions are supposed to transgress (and which he identifies 
principally with morality). But I think both the phenomenology and importance of anger is better 
captured by viewing it as reflecting a concern not so much for a set of values, but for the attitudes 
of the agents to whom it is addressed. Many people who have acted badly toward those they care 
about want those people to get angry at them. If you let someone you love down, an angry 
response can be positively reassuring. It can mean you’re worth the bother, that the person in 
question really expected more from you and finds your transgression confusing and hurtful. By 
contrast, when you expect anger and are met instead with detached disapproval, it can be natural 
to feel shut out or devalued—even, and perhaps especially, when the disapproval is mixed with 
considerable sympathy and understanding. 
But if this is right, it is hard to see how such emotional connection and vulnerability could 
be appropriate to someone known to be a hard case. The emotions such a person warrants are 
related to self-protection, rejection, and withdrawal, not openness. Why get wrapped up in a 
person who harbors disrespect or disregard for you or what you care about? Admittedly, most of 
us probably have addressed our anger to known hard cases at some point in our lives, with all the 
                                                 
10. “Dispassionate Opprobrium,” p. 368. I have substituted “offensive” for Wallace’s original “immoral,” since 
I see no reason to think that any of these emotions are essentially moralistic. 
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elements of emotional connection and vulnerability I’ve associated with it. Nursing some 
especially nasty insult, the persistent thought of the cruelty expressed can be a nagging pain—
something you just keep coming back to, generally with a complicated mix of feelings related to 
shock, frustration, and disbelief. Reactions like these are very human. But the blame they would 
constitute seems, at best, to be empty scorekeeping, expressive of a sort of sputtering self-
righteousness. I fail to see how it could have any ethical importance that is not as well or better 
represented by Scanlonian blame alone. 
4 Why angry blame is apparently paradoxical 
Let’s go back to the overall dialectic of the paper. I want to argue, from the existence and 
intelligibility of angry blame, that it is not always determinate what, if anything, you have most 
internal reason to do. Now that we have seen why angry blame is indeed inappropriately 
addressed to hard cases, it should be easy to see how this argument will go. For if angry blame is 
not appropriately addressed to people whose actions are in accord with their strongest internal 
reasons, it would be only natural to conclude at this point that angry blame is thus appropriately 
addressed only to agents whose actions are not in accord with them. But this looks dubious on its 
face. For such agents would seem to be acting out of ignorance, confusion, or weakness. Yet one 
might have thought that the cases in which we get angriest at people are those in which their 
offenses could be characteristic of them. So angry blame seems paradoxical. 
It’s now time to formulate the argument precisely. Suppose you ( and are angrily blamed 
for it. I assume that the only relevant possibilities are as follows:11 
(a) You have most internal reason to have (-ed. 
                                                 
11. Since it is obvious that changing your mind between acting badly and being blamed for it cannot make 
blaming you any more appropriate, we can assume that your attitudes with respect to -ing do not relevantly change 
over the interval. 
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(b) You have most internal reason not to have (-ed. 
(c) You have just as much internal reason to have (-ed as not to have (-ed. 
(d) It is indeterminate which of (-ing or not (-ing you have most internal reason to have 
done. 
To claim that it is always determinate what, if anything, you have most internal reason to do is to 
claim that the last of these possibilities never obtains. So assume it doesn’t. In the last section, I 
argued that angry blame is inappropriately addressed to you if (a) is true. It thus follows, given 
the assumptions, that angry blame could be appropriately addressed to you only if (b) or (c) is 
true. 
I think (c) can be safely set aside as irrelevant. Clearly, it does not pertain to many 
paradigmatic instances of angry blame, Margaret’s blame of Henry included. Henry does not 
view his choice as a matter of indifference; he sees himself as making a more or less reasoned 
choice under more or less normal deliberative conditions. If, therefore, it is not plausible that 
angry blame is appropriate only if (b) obtains, adding (c) will not help. Excluding (d), therefore, 
would entail that angry blame is appropriately addressed only to agents with most internal reason 
to have acted as they did. In the next section, I’ll argue that this is not so. 
5 Why angry blame can’t be limited to agents with more reason to act well 
It’s plausible that angry blame is indeed sometimes warranted in response to faulty or irresolute 
deliberation. But these can’t be the only cases. To begin with, this view of blame would seem to 
get its emphasis backwards. It suggests that the paradigm cases, when angry blame should be at 
its strongest and steadiest, are those in which it is clearest that someone’s action reflects bad 
deliberation rather than bad values. But normally the opposite obtains. Strawson suggests that 
the strength of resentment and indignation “is in general proportioned to what is felt to be the 
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magnitude of the injury and to the degree to which the agent’s will is identified with, or 
indifferent to, it.”12 Clearly, there’s something to this. If, for example, you break a significant 
(though not vital) promise to a friend because you are clearly not at your best (from being upset 
or exhausted, say), your offense may be relatively easy to write off. But if you do it deliberately, in 
a manner that really calls your commitment to the friendship into question, your friend’s blame 
would not, presumably, become correspondingly more tentative. Rather, these are the cases in 
which angry blame tends to be at its most pressing and insistent. 
At this point, other readers of Williams may be inclined to point out that I’ve left out a 
central class of cases: those in which blame’s proleptic mechanisms come into play. Many people, 
he notes, may simply “have a motivation to avoid the disapproval of other people—for instance, 
to avoid their blame.” Thus: 
When a motivation of this kind takes a deeper form than merely the desire to avoid hostility, it can 
be the ethically important disposition to be respected by people whom, in turn, one respects. […] 
In these circumstances, blame consists of, as it were, a proleptic invocation of a reason to do or not 
do a certain thing, which applies in virtue of a disposition to have the respect of other people. To 
blame someone in this way is, roughly, to tell him he had a reason to act otherwise, and in a direct 
sense this may not have been true. Yet in a way it has now become true, in virtue of his having a 
disposition to do things that people he respects expect of him, and in virtue of this recognition, 
which it is hoped that the blame will bring to him, of what those people expect.13 
Williams reminds us here that there are many perfectly normal reasons for not wanting to be 
blamed—and, more obviously, for not wanting to provoke the forms of hostile response that 
many people find naturally expressive of blame. It is typically unpleasant to face someone’s 
anger, and typically much more unpleasant to suffer someone’s revenge. Somewhat more subtly, 
many people simply value avoiding the disappointment or disapproval of others they respect. 
These are the sort of people Williams describes above. They will have prima facie reason to avoid 
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13. “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” p. 41-42. 
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doing anything those they respect would blame them, even if those others never express or act on 
that blame. 
The possibility of these desires explain how angry blame can be addressed to agents with 
most internal reason to act better while still representing the offender’s values as potentially 
defective. For people who value avoiding hostility or embarrassment may have most internal 
reason, all things considered, to avoid doing things you would blame them for—even if they 
would not have such reason but for your anger itself. So when you address such anger to offenders, 
you indeed implicitly make what Williams elsewhere calls an “optimistic internal reasons 
claim”14—you hope that, in virtue of your anger, the offenders will appreciate, retrospectively, 
that they ought not to have acted as they did. And while your anger registers a kind of 
deliberative mistake—you presuppose that the agent did not properly take into account the fact 
that you would get angry, or how undesirable your anger would actually be—it does not do so in 
a way that gets its emphasis backwards. On the contrary, the stronger someone’s independent 
reasons for acting badly were, the stronger the countervailing reasons constituted by your anger 
must be if the offender is to be reached. 
This point comes out most clearly in the case of anger that does not appeal to an 
offender’s reasons to retain your respect, but rather simply to avoid harm. A great deal of anger, 
I think, makes a proleptic invocation of these reasons in a way that precisely parallels the one 
Williams describes. (Recall, for instance, Henry’s judgment that Helen’s clerk should be thrashed 
for his impudence.) This is the kind of anger associated with a desire to show offenders who’s 
boss, or that nobody messes with you, or that they’ll rue the day they crossed you. It aims, just 
like the other forms of anger I’ve described, at showing offenders that they in fact had reason not 
to act badly. But it allows that whether or not this turns out to be the case may ultimately hang 
                                                 
14. “Internal and External Reasons,” p. 111. 
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simply on whether you manage to do things to offenders (or to any other things they care about) 
that are bad enough to make their offenses not worth it. The stronger their reasons for acting 
badly would otherwise have been, the worse these things will have to be. 
Recall that in the quotation above, Williams suggested that the desire to avoid hostility is 
less ethically important than the desire to be respected by others one respects. This is presumably 
so. But the forms of angry blame grounded in each of these desires are much more similar to one 
another than they are to Margaret’s blame, and much less ethically important than it. When you 
are angry at people, it often does not help when they respond to your expressions of blame by 
saying things like: “Well, if I knew it bothered you so much, I wouldn’t have done it.” What you 
want them to see isn’t that their actions bother you, but why they do—or, rather, why you are 
right in being bothered by them. The reasons you want them to recognize aren’t just any reasons 
not to have acted as they did, but the specific reasons that made their action offensive (their 
failure to recognize being what justified your blame in the first place). Margaret’s anger captures 
this thought in a way that the kind Williams describes cannot. (To distinguish the two, call the 
latter punitive and—again, following Marilyn Frye—the former righteous.) 
Thus, while righteous anger is indeed proleptic (or so I will argue), it is not proleptic in 
the simple sense that punitive anger is. It supposes the agents to whom it is addressed to be in a 
position to recognize that they ought not to have acted badly on the same grounds that justified your 
claim in the first place, not simply on the grounds that acting badly turned out to be embarrassing 
or imprudent. Righteous anger, in other words, does not aim at presenting offenders with a new 
set of considerations, but rather at making vivid existing considerations that they could be 
expected to appreciate on their own independent merits. For this reason, the features of punitive 
anger that explain how it can be a response to bad values, rather than (merely) bad deliberation, 
do not apply to righteous anger. 
 73 
Still, punitive anger has a more positive lesson to teach, which actually gives us further 
reason to think that righteous anger cannot plausibly be limited only to agents with more reason 
not to have acted offensively. As I explained above, punitive anger represents offenders as agents 
who really might have had most reason to act as they did but for your anger itself. This gives us a 
start at capturing the sense in which angry blame can represent actions as threatening. In general, a 
threat is something with the potential to harm or undermine something important to you, unless 
it is somehow met or resolved. Now, as both Strawson and Scanlon have stressed, it is perfectly 
reasonable for it to be (non-instrumentally) important to you to have a basic level of normative 
standing in relation to others—that is, that it be important to others to respect the claims you 
have against them. Actions that occasion angry blame have the potential to undermine this 
standing. They say, or at least suggest, that offenders did not find your claims against them 
important enough to respect under the circumstances—and, hence, that they did not find you, qua 
holder of these claim, important enough to respect either. Punitive anger recognizes this threat 
by representing offenders as agents who may lack sufficient independent reason to respect your 
claims—and aims to resolve it by introducing new considerations that are hoped to tip the scales. 
The feelings of tension and urgency that anger generally involves, and the experience of it as 
something to be forcefully expressed outward, thus underscore its distinctive role—as an attitude 
whose instantiation or expression is necessary to preserve your standing.  
The problem is that if righteous anger merely registered a deliberative failure, it would have 
nothing to do in this sense. It could not represents offenses as threats, for it would presuppose 
your claims to have been important to offenders all along, quite independently of your anger. 
This strongly reinforces the point about anger’s emphasis that began this section: the natural 
explanation of anger’s characteristic urgency and force that punitive anger supports would seem 
to be unavailable to its righteous cousin. Further, this gives us some positive reason to try to see 
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how righteous anger could be proleptic as well. Here, appreciating the importance of 
indeterminacy to blame will help. 
6 Internal reasons and indeterminacy 
Having ruled out all the options from §4, I’ve now shown that angry blame is intelligible only if 
it’s not always determinate what you have most internal reason to do. This leaves two questions. 
First, how could such indeterminacy obtain? Second, how could it help us achieve a positive 
understanding of what angry blame is like and why it matters? 
For a start on the first question, we can take a cue from the way many philosophers of 
language conceive of indeterminacy in their analyses of vague predicates, like “bald.”15 “Bald,” 
they argue, admits of multiple interpretations, or “sharpenings,” each entailing a precise set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for when a person is bald. When a claim is true on each 
sharpening—like “Jean-Luc Picard is bald”—we can say it’s determinately true, or “supertrue.” 
When a claim is false on each sharpening—like “James T. Kirk is bald”—we can say it’s 
determinately false, or “superfalse.” When it’s true on some and false on others—like “Joe Biden 
is bald”—we can say its truth value is indeterminate. 
I want to suggest that a close parallel might hold of the relation between motivations and 
internal reasons. Remember that for internal reasons theorists, your motivations are not identical 
to your internal reasons, but rather entail your internal reasons given certain idealizations, which 
I’ve called “sound deliberative routes.” Here we should keep in mind Williams’s insistence on the 
flexibility of the concept, and the corresponding point that there are all sorts of things we might 
want to build into it, above and beyond correction of errors of fact and reasoning—exercises of 
imagination, critical reflection, effective regulation by attitudes with authority to represent the 
                                                 
15. Cf. e.g. Kit Fine, “Vagueness, Truth, and Logic.” 
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agent’s real self, whatever. This is, again, no time to get into details. The point I want to make 
now is that whatever the details turn out to be, it’s perfectly conceivable that they could be such 
as to support multiple, mutually incompatible idealizations of an agent’s motivations at a given 
time, in precisely the same way that vague predicates might admit of multiple, mutually 
incompatible sharpenings. When this happens, what the agent has most internal reason to do will 
be indeterminate. 
Though it hasn’t gotten much attention from his many critics and commentators, 
Williams himself stresses the possibility and importance of rational indeterminacy, in both 
“Internal and Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame” and its more famous prequel: 
If someone is good at thinking about what to do, he or she needs not just knowledge and 
experience and intelligence, but imagination; and it is impossible that it should be fully 
determinate what imagination might contribute to deliberation. This is one reason why it may be 
indeterminate what exactly an agent has reason to do.16 
Williams’s appeal to imagination gives us a simple, concrete way of understanding the 
indeterminacy angry blame requires. As he explains in “Internal and External Reasons,” 
imaginative deliberation can itself influence the motivations from which one deliberates and 
chooses: 
[An agent] may think he has reason to promote some development because he has not exercised 
his imagination enough about what it would be like if it came about. In his unaided deliberative 
reason, or encouraged by the persuasions of others, he may come to have some more concrete 
sense of what would be involved, and lose his desire for it, just as, positively, the imagination can 
create new possibilities and new desires. (These are important possibilities for politics as well as for 
individual action.) […] We should not, then, think of S [that is, the agent’s subjective motivational 
set] as statically given.17 
Interestingly, David Lewis considers the same possibility in “Dispositional Theories of Value,” 
but—in telling contrast to Williams—claims that in “ideal” conditions of imaginative 
                                                 
16. “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” p. 38. 
 
17. “Internal and External Reasons,” pp. 104-105. 
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acquaintance, no such change in the agent’s motivations will occur.18 Whether or not such 
conditions are ideal, however, they obtain all the time. Suppose, for instance, you are deciding 
whether to spend an afternoon doing some much-needed work on your dissertation or helping 
your friend move. If you consider the dissertation first, you may imagine it in ways that make the 
considerations in favor of helping your friend more salient, weigh these considerations more 
heavily going forward, and so settle on helping your friend. Yet if you started with that option 
you would go mutatis mutandis for the dissertation. What do you have more internal reason to do? 
(The one you are disposed, right now, to consider last?) 
Note that there is no reason to think that anything about your psychology per se—much 
less whatever portion of it gets to count as your “subjective motivational set”—suffices to 
determine which deliberative route you will take. Presumably, which deliberative route you will 
take is sensitive to all sorts of totally incidental facts about your physiology and environment. 
However decisively you settle on helping the friend, it may yet be the case that had only your 
eyes not settled on your photocopy of “Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life,” with those 
nice passages about digging a ditch with a man whom one likes, you might have no less decisively 
settled on dissertating. So there is no single, univocal answer to the question of what you have 
most reason to do, because there is no single, univocal answer to the question of what conclusion 
you will reach from your existing motivations by a sound deliberative route. Relative to your 
motivations prior to deliberation, it is neither the case that you have most reason to help your friend, 
nor that you have most reason to dissertate, nor that you have equal reason to do each. What 
you have most reason to do is indeterminate. 
                                                 
18. “Dispositional Theories of Value,” pp. 121-126.  
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7 Properly proleptic blame 
To apply this result to blame, let’s go back to Howards End. At the beginning of her exchange with 
Henry, Margaret implicitly saw him as someone whose relevant internal reasons either were, or 
may well have been, indeterminate—that is, as “muddled, criminally muddled,” to use her now-
strikingly apt phrase. Margaret does not love him foolishly—he is, in many ways, a thoughtful 
and humane person—but he also has what Forster calls his “fortress”—a perspective defined 
roughly in terms of values related to dominance, self-sufficiency, and, at best, a vaguely 
patriarchal sense of honor. Depending on how these sides of his personality came into play, he 
may well have had sound deliberative routes from his initial motivations both to the conclusion to 
allow Margaret and Helen to stay at Howards End and to the conclusion he actually reached. 
Had things only been different, in ways incidental to his motivations proper, Margaret may well 
have reached him. 
By the end of the exchange, however, it is no longer plausible that this is so. Henry has 
firmly resolved to treat his wife’s request as an attempt at blackmail, and he is emphatically not 
the sort of person who would willingly abandon such a resolution having made it. His stance has 
hardened and his attitudes have shifted. If, in letting go of his hands, Margaret implicitly 
concluded that there is no longer a sound deliberative route from these attitudes to the 
recognition of her demand as just, she would have been eminently reasonable in doing so. 
Between these two points, Henry is engaged in an ongoing deliberative process. He is 
trying to formulate a principled justification for his refusal, in a form he can articulate to 
Margaret. In trying to decisively settle on this justification, and thereby commit himself 
motivationally to it, Henry is literally in the process of making determinate where he stands with 
respect to Margaret’s request. Margaret’s blame implicitly registers this fact in aiming to 
influence the process. It reflects the thought that if Margaret could just make vivid enough to 
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Henry how she sees his refusal, he might—by properly taking what her anger shows him into 
account—turn out to have most reason not to have made it. 
This allows us to explain how righteous anger can be proleptic in a way that neatly 
parallels its more primitive cousin. Like punitive anger, it is a kind of optimistic internal reasons 
claim. It addresses offenders—optimistically—as agents who may indeed have most internal 
reason to act better, but also as ones who might not have had such reason but for your anger itself. 
The “but for your anger itself” clause, however, means something very different for righteous 
anger than it did for the punitive kind. The latter, as we’ve seen, allows that the agent may 
(determinately) lack independent reason to act well, and so is proleptic only in the sense of 
introducing considerations of its own (i.e., that the offense will turn out to be embarrassing or 
imprudent) that are hoped to tip the scales. Righteous anger, by contrast, does not aim at 
introducing new considerations, but rather at playing a (causal) role in the agent’s process of 
resolving the indeterminate status of existing ones by making their force clearer and more vivid to 
the agent.  
In fact, Williams put his finger on this kind of proleptic mechanism, too. He writes: 
Our thought may rather be this: if [the offender] were to deliberate again and take into 
consideration all the reasons that might now come more vividly before him, we hope that he 
would come to a different conclusion; and it is important that the reasons that might now come 
more vividly before him include this very blame and the concerns expressed in it. This kind of 
thought helps us to understand a sense in which focussed blame asks for acknowledgment. 
A rather similar structure can apply to advice…[f]or even when we are advising in the ‘if I 
were you’ mode, our claim that the agent has most reason to ( does not necessarily mean that 
simply given his S as it is, it already determines that (-ing has priority over anything else. We are 
saying that the conclusion to (, rather than to do something else, can be reached from his S by a 
sound deliberative route, and that is something that involves such things as the exercise of his 
imagination and the effective direction of his attention. But among the things that will affect his 
imagination and his attention, we hope, is our advice itself and how it represents things.19 
There is one important difference between righteous anger and advice, however, that Williams 
does not discuss. The possibility that it might be rejected (as Margaret’s of course was) has a very 
                                                 
19. “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” p. 42. 
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different significance for the former than the latter. In angrily blaming Henry, Margaret regards 
him as someone who might be reached, but also as someone who might not. The force of her 
anger registers what is for her the very real possibility that Henry’s offense could turn out to be 
characteristic of him. Thus, Margaret’s anger is two-faced in that it regards Henry as occupying a 
kind of unstable, liminal position, halfway between that of a hard case and someone who merely 
made a deliberative mistake. Perhaps uniquely, it represents its object as warranting both rational 
appeal—that is, as someone potentially still in a position to acknowledge the rightness of your 
demand—and defensiveness or hostility—that is, as someone potentially beyond the reach of 
reason, and who can only be opposed. Margaret wants, very badly, for Henry to turn out to be 
someone whose action appears, retrospectively, as a deliberative mistake. As such she still 
presents reasons to him, albeit as forcefully and vividly as she can. But the fact that he might 
resolve his indeterminacy the other way gives her anger its edge. He could turn out to be 
someone to whom she cannot reach out, but whom she must rather forcefully reject, and it is 
important that her anger be something that could be part of doing either one of these things. To 
this end it says, in effect: “This is what your action means to me. Will you acknowledge it? If so, 
good. If not, you’ve been warned. The ball’s in your court.” 
8 Conclusion 
I want to finish by flagging a pair of what strike me as noteworthy implications of my view of 
blame. First, viewing righteously angry blame as proleptic appealingly highlights its constructive 
role. It does not just provide a way for people to enforce against each other the terms on which it 
is important to them to interact, but enables them to jointly shape and refine just what those 
terms are. That is, suppose it is true—as seems at least prima facie plausible—that many of the 
details concerning how it is important to people to live, and the terms on which it is important to 
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interact with those connected to them in various ways, are indeed indeterminate at any given 
point. When you get angry at someone for violating the terms of a relationship as you understand 
them, there may be no fact of the matter whether the person you are angry at valued your 
relationship on quite those terms, or saw the action as inappropriate on quite the same grounds 
that you did, or to quite the same extent. Your blame calls on the person to fill in those details. In 
this, it provides a way of achieving common ground that neither simply reminds people of shared 
values or commitments they had all along, nor goads them into adhering to norms whose 
authority they could not appreciate through deliberating from their existing motivations. 
As a bonus, this feature of angry blame helps explain how it can make sense to get angry 
at people whom you’re sure really did have most reason to have acted better. These cases can, 
and often do, at least raise the question whether the person you’re angry appreciates the reasons 
in favor of acting better in the same way that you do. Anger between close family members, 
friends, or co-workers offers a lot of examples here. Suppose you commit some venial negligence: 
you over-water, and kill, a plant you promised to tend for a friend. Clearly, your action does not 
raise any question whether you in fact had most reason to take good care of the plant—of course 
you did. But it can raise questions about the specific respects in which promises of that kind—or 
plants, for that matter—are important to you in that context. These are the kind of questions that 
a great deal of angry blame helps settle, by communicating just what such actions mean to the 
people who suffer them, and calling on offenders to affirm or deny the concerns their blame 
expresses. 
Second, and more speculatively, the indeterminacy involved in blame suggests a 
promising analysis of its evidently deep but obscure connection to freedom. Incompatibilists have 
long insisted that blame requires a power for opposites—that you can appropriately be blamed 
for acting badly only if you could have done otherwise. Compatibilists have long responded by 
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offering analyses of the power for opposites that show it to be compatible with determinism—
surely, they suggest, it simply concerns some perfectly reasonable requirement of self-control 
(such that one could have done otherwise had one wanted to), or of some adequate opportunity 
to avoid (such that one could reasonably be expected to have done otherwise, as one couldn’t, for 
instance, if coerced). And incompatibilists have long replied, in turn, that these analyses are 
missing the point: the requisite power for opposites must be more robust than that. What blame 
requires, they standardly insist, is that it must have been possible for the agent to do otherwise—
and to do so intentionally and attributably—given all the facts about the world and the laws of 
nature up to the bad action or the decision to perform it. 
My view of blame does not entail anything quite so robust. But it does entail something 
strikingly close. It holds that for angry blame to be fully intelligible, there must be cases in which 
it would have been possible for the agent to do otherwise—again, intentionally and 
attributably—given all the facts about the agent’s motivations up to the bad action (and, for that 
matter, for some time afterwards). I don’t think this is a coincidence. I rather think that one of 
the major reasons the phenomenology of blame can make incompatibilism seem intuitive is that 
angry blame really does represent it as having been open to the agent, in a very deep sense, to 
have acted better. This is what gives blame its drama, its sense of uncertainty and tension. I’ve 
offered a way to capture this drama in terms of blame’s relation to emotions, relationships, and 
practical rationality—“to recover it from the facts as we know them,” as Strawson put it, 
“without recourse to the obscure and panicky metaphysics of libertarianism.”20 
                                                 
20. “Freedom and Resentment,” pp. 23 and 25. 
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4 
Two concepts of self-creation 
1 The elusive appeal of self-creation 
In discussions of free will in analytic philosophy, the following dialectic seems to me common. 
The incompatibilist produces an argument, like Peter van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument or 
Derk Pereboom’s manipulation arguments, that purports to show that determinism is intuitively 
incompatible with some prima facie significant feature of agents—such as the ability of agents to do 
other than what they do, in van Inwagen’s case, or the ability to be morally responsible for what 
they do, in Pereboom’s—where the feature in question is considered prior to substantive 
analysis.1 The compatibilist responds by actually producing a substantive analysis of the feature 
in question—as (for instance) David Lewis and Hilary Bok have done with respect to the ability 
to do otherwise, and John Martin Fischer, R. Jay Wallace, and T. M. Scanlon have done with 
respect to moral responsibility—that either explains away the incompatibilist’s intuition or 
challenges its credibility.2 Retrenching, the incompatibilist then either makes the negative 
argument more elaborate, or insists, through a basic appeal to intuition, that the compatibilist’s 
substantive analysis is superficial. 
I will not engage this dialectic in this chapter. Even if (as I in fact believe) existing 
compatibilist accounts of the ability to do otherwise and of moral responsibility are at least 
                                                 
1. See, respectively, “An Argument for Incompatibilism” and Living Without Free Will. 
 
2. See, respectively, “Are We Free to Break the Laws?” and “Freedom and Practical Reason,” concerning to the 
ability to do otherwise, and Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (coauthored with Mark Ravizza), 
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, and “The Significance of Choice,” concerning moral responsibility. 
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approximately correct, it seems to me that they have left unaddressed what may be the deepest, 
most profound, and most elusive source of the sense that determinism threatens something vital 
about human agency. Thus, Robert Nozick writes:  
Philosophers often treat the topic of free will as a problem about punishment and responsibility: 
how can we punish someone or hold him responsible for an action if his doing it was causally 
determined, eventually by factors originating before his birth, and hence outside his control? 
However, my interest in the question of free will does not stem from wanting to be able 
legitimately to punish others, to hold them responsible, or even to be held responsible myself. 
Without free will, we seem diminished, merely the playthings of external forces. How, then, 
can we maintain an exalted view of ourselves? Determinism seems to undercut human dignity, it 
seems to undermine our value.3 
For Nozick, like many others, what determinism seems above all to threaten is the 
valuable status of being the “originators of our acts” and of the value we realize in acting. If it 
were not fundamentally up to us what to do, and ultimately who to be, our importance as 
individuals would somehow be undermined. “Free will has been traditionally conceived as a kind 
of creativity,” Robert Kane writes, “akin to artistic creativity, but in which the work of art 
created is one’s own self. As ultimate creators of some of our own ends and purposes, we are the 
designers of our own lives, self-governing, self-legislating—masters, to some degree, of our own 
moral destinies.” It is plausible, Kane argues, “that underived origination or sole authorship is 
necessary for a number of other things that humans generally desire and are worth wanting.” 
These things include, in part, creativity, autonomy, desert, moral responsibility “in an ultimate 
sense,” dignity or self-worth, “a true sense of individuality or uniqueness as a person,” “life-hopes 
regarding an open future,” and love and friendship.4 
But the trouble with self-creation is that it has stubbornly resisted analysis. Attempts to 
spell out the idea of self-creation can result, all too easily, in something that is either unintelligible 
or inadequate to its pretheoretic importance. Compatibilists and hard determinists alike have 
                                                 
3. Philosophical Explanations, p. 291. 
 
4. The Significance of Free Will, pp. 81-89. 
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long argued that this result is inevitable. “The logical goal of [the] ambitions” intrinsic to the 
intuitive idea of autonomy, Thomas Nagel argues, “is incoherent, for to be really free we would 
have to act from a standpoint completely outside ourselves, choosing everything about ourselves, 
including all our principles of choice—creating ourselves from nothing, so to speak. This is self-
contradictory: in order to do anything we must already be something.”5 While hard determinists 
stolidly conclude that we are indeed condemned to want something impossible, compatibilists are 
somewhat more optimistic. They argue that the concern for self-creation was misguided from the 
start, and we should just get over it. Harry Frankfurt’s discussion of the matter is paradigmatic, 
and warrants extended quotation: 
A person’s will is real only if its character is not absolutely up to him. It cannot be unconditionally 
within his power to determine what his will is to be, as it is within the unconstrained power of an 
author of fiction to render determinate—in whatever way he likes—the volitional characteristics of 
the people in his stories. […] Remember Hotspur’s reply when Owen Glendower boasted, “I can 
call spirits from the vasty deep.” He said: “Why, so can I, or so can any man; but will they come 
when you do call for them?” The same goes for us. We do not control, by our voluntary 
command, the spirits within our own vasty deeps. We cannot have, simply for the asking, whatever 
will we want. 
We are not fictitious characters, who have sovereign authors; nor are we gods, who can be 
authors of more than fiction. Therefore, we cannot be authors of ourselves. Reducing our own 
volitional indeterminacy, and becoming truly wholehearted, is not a matter of telling stories about 
our lives. Nor, unless we wish to be as foolish as Owen Glendower, can we propose to shape our 
wills by stipulating peremptorily at some moment that we are now no longer divided but have 
become solidly resolute. We can only be what nature and life make us, and that is not so readily up 
to us. 
This may appear to conflict with the notion that our wills are ultimately free. A natural and 
useful way of understanding it is that a person’s will is free to the extent that he has whatever will 
he wants. Now if this means that his will is free only if it under his entirely unmediated voluntary 
control, then a free will can have no genuine reality; for reality entails resistance to such control. 
Must we, then, regard our wills either as unfree or as unreal? 
This dilemma can be avoided if we construe the freedom of someone’s will as requiring, not 
that he control or originate what he wills, but that he be wholehearted in it. If there is no division 
within a person’s will, it follows that the will he has is the will he wants. His wholeheartedness 
means exactly that there is in him no endogenous desire to be volitionally different than he is. 
Although he may be unable to create in himself a will other than the one he has, his will is free at 
least in the sense that he himself does not oppose or impede it.6 
                                                 
5. The View from Nowhere, p. 118. 
 
6. “The Faintest Passion,” p. 101-102. While Frankfurt argues that the requisite attitudes of higher-order 
endorsement are a species of desire, Michael Bratman has developed an important alternative hierarchical model, in 
which the attitudes in question are “self-governing policies,” which for Bratman are species of plans, rather than 
desires. (See e.g. his Structures of Agency, esp. chs. 2, 4, 7, and 8.) 
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Frankfurt is not being dismissive here. A unifying theme of his writing on free will, very much in 
play in this passage, is that “classical” compatibilists like Ayer, who argue that free will worth the 
name could only amount to the freedom to do what you want, really are missing something vital. 
There is something deeply right about the thought that freedom is not just free exercise of the will, 
as the classical compatibilists thought, but freedom to have the will you want. The mistake, 
Frankfurt argued, is in the thought that in order to have the will you want, you must have created 
your will. Instead, your will is free if it is, in fact, the will you endorse at a higher level, and if you 
are unambivalent about this endorsement (in the sense that there is nothing you would see as a 
reason to oppose it). 
However, it has often been argued that “hierarchical” theories like Frankfurt’s still miss 
something vital. For instance, if the requisite higher-order endorsement comes about in the 
wrong way, or involves the wrong attitudes, it can reasonably seem to an outsider that its 
presence is insufficient to really mark out the agent as free. As Susan Wolf has argued, for 
instance, people like dictators and reactionary fanatics can plausibly be described as trapped in 
worldviews to which they are nevertheless reflectively and wholeheartedly devoted, in a way that 
adequate theories of free agency should be able to account for. Compatibilists have developed 
this point in two directions, both ways of arguing, as Frankfurt did, that what might have seemed 
like a reason to insist that you must create yourself to truly be free actually isn’t one. John Martin 
Fischer, for instance, has argued that hierarchical conditions need to be supplemented with a 
further historical condition: while it is not necessary to have exercised ultimate control over the 
process through which you come to have the will you do, it must be a process you can “take 
responsibility” for, as you could not if your will results from manipulation or other morally 
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suspect means.7 Wolf herself holds that freedom requires a capacity for self-correction, rather than 
self-creation, constituted by a standing commitment to revise your higher-order motivations 
through the exercise of a “minimally sufficient ability cognitively and normatively to recognize 
and appreciate the world for what it is.”8 
The implications of such a self-correction condition are not limited to the conditions 
under which someone may be recognized as free by a third party. They also extend, importantly, 
to what agents presuppose about their own practical reasoning when they regard themselves as 
acting freely: namely, that they aim to track what is in some way objectively valuable. This in 
itself marks a striking change from Frankfurt: to have free will is no longer just to have the will you 
want, but for your will to be responsive to independent standards for what it should be. Philip 
Pettit and Michael Smith usefully name this kind of freedom orthonomy, as opposed to autonomy—
right rule, as opposed to self-rule—and argue on its basis that freedom of the will is essentially 
similar to freedom of thought. To think and will freely is for your beliefs and desires to be 
determined by objective standards of theoretical and practical rationality, rather than by 
arbitrary external causes.9 This is hardly a new thought: versions of it have been defended by 
Plato, Kant, and probably above all Spinoza.10 Nagel himself proposes one, as a sort of “next 
                                                 
7. See John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, 
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8. “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility,” p. 381. Many philosophers follow Wolf in the view that some 
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Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, “Freedom in Belief and Desire.” 
 
9. See their “Freedom in Belief and Desire.” It is probably fair to say that the orthonomy view is the default 
position in philosophical discussions of agency. See e.g. Gary Watson, “Free Agency,” Angela Smith, “Responsibility 
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10. In “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality,” Bernard Williams touches on the 
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best thing” to origination. Even though we cannot create ourselves, he offers, we can at least 
aspire to transcend our contingent preferences and predispositions by choosing according to 
objective evaluative standards (which inevitably turn out to include, if not be identical to, the 
standards of morality). While you may still be determined by these preferences and 
predispositions, you need not feel trapped by them, since you may at least hope to be acting on 
grounds that would rationally command endorsement from anyone, regardless of whether they 
had the preferences or not. Or at least, more realistically, you may hope to be acting on grounds 
that would not be rejected. And even in “these kinds of cases,” Nagel notes, “I do not feel trapped 
or impotent when I consider my situation objectively, because I do not aspire to more control 
than I have if my choice is dictated by my immediate inclinations. I am content with the freedom 
of a cat choosing which armchair to curl up in. External assessment can add nothing to this, nor 
does it detract.”11 
I do think the hierarchical view misses something vital, but I also think the orthonomy 
view fails to appreciate the extent of the problem. The considerable differences between these 
views belie a shared allegiance to a very general picture of freedom as a kind of receptivity. On this 
picture, freedom is a matter of bringing the will into conformity with rational standards 
independent of it. The two views differ only with respect to the sources of these standards. On 
                                                 
Spinozist formulation of the view, as expounded by Stuart Hampshire, before voicing dissatisfaction with it on 
intriguing and characteristic grounds: “I am not sure that the Spinozist consideration which Hampshire advances 
even gives a very satisfactory sense to the activity of the mind. It leaves out … the driving power which is needed to 
sustain one even in the most narrowly rational thought. It is still further remote from any notion of creativity, since 
that, even within a theoretical context, and certainly in an artistic one, precisely implies the origination of ideas 
which are not fully predictable in terms of the content of existing ones. But even if it could yield one sense for 
‘activity’, it would still offer very little, despite Spinoza’s heroic defense of the notion, for freedom. Or—to put it 
another way—even if it offered something for freedom of the intellect, it offers nothing for freedom of the individual. 
For when freedom is initially understood as the absence of ‘outside’ determination, and in particular understood in 
those terms as an unquestionable value, my freedom is reasonably not taken to include freedom from my past, my 
character, and my desires. To suppose that those are, in the relevant sense, ‘outside’ determinations, is merely to beg 
the vital question about the boundaries of the self, and not to prove from premises acceptable to any clear-headed 
man who desires freedom that the boundaries of the self should be drawn around the intellect.” (p. 97) 
 
11. The View from Nowhere, p. 131. 
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hierarchical views, the sources are psychological states necessarily resistant to the agent’s direct 
voluntary control; on orthonomy views, they are objective normative facts. Both views 
unapologetically affirm what William James derided as a “a soft determinism which abhors harsh 
words, and repudiating fatality, necessity, and even predetermination, says that its real name is 
freedom; for freedom is only necessity understood, and bondage to the highest is identical to true 
freedom.” 
In this, both hierarchical and orthonomy views dismiss as misguided, if not unintelligible, 
what might have seemed to be one of the most basic and compelling incompatibilist intuitions: 
that freedom of the individual essentially requires that it be ultimately up to you to determine who 
you really, fundamentally are. On hierarchical views, who you are is no more up to you to 
determine than it was up to Owen Glendower whether the spirits from the vasty deep come 
when he calls them. On orthonomy views, who you are is up to you to determine to precisely the 
same extent that what to believe is. And while this is not nothing—freedom of thought is a more 
than legitimate object of aspiration—I find it incredible that anyone could seriously suppose 
epistemic freedom to be the same kind of freedom yearned for in what Kane describes as the 
desire to be self-governing, self-legislating designers of our own lives. (If the idea of being the 
designer of my own epistemic life makes sense at all, it’s certainly not anything I want. I am more 
than happy to cede that prerogative to the world.) It may turn out, at the end of the day, that 
Kane’s desire is not actually for anything worth wanting, but it can’t be so obviously misplaced. 
I will argue that the only way to get a grip on the nature and importance of Kane’s sort of 
self-creation is to take seriously the idea that free agents create themselves in a radical sense. 
When compatibilists argue that what might have looked like a reason to value self-creation is 
actually just a reason to value something else, like reflective endorsement or orthonomy, they 
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really are to be faulted for changing the subject. But I will also argue that what is indeed a reason 
to value self-creation may not yet be a reason to value something incompatible with determinism. 
I’ll begin by focusing on the basic idea that free agents are the originators of their actions, 
in roughly the sense Thomas Nagel describes as the intuitive idea of autonomy. Nagel presents 
powerful reasons to think that if autonomy indeed requires origination, it must also require a 
radical form of self-creation. For autonomous actions must not only originate with you, but also 
be attributable to you, in the sense of being intelligible as things you do, rather than ones you 
randomly find yourself doing. But an action can both originate with you and be attributable to 
you only if you somehow create the “self” to which it is to be attributed through making it. As 
we’ve seen, Nagel thinks this is impossible. But I will argue that it is only impossible given a 
certain substantive, broadly causal conception of the self as the source of agency. But this is not 
the only conception according to which we might interpret the intuitive idea of autonomy. By 
reinterpreting the idea in normative terms, we can see how it might require a form of self-
creation that is both intelligible and intelligibly important—and also compatible with 
determinism. 
2 The intuitive idea of autonomy 
Many of the ideas investigated in philosophy are straightforwardly derivable from 
pretheoretically compelling commonplaces, or from the presuppositions of prominent attitudes 
and practices. That a vital form of autonomy essentially involves self-creation or something like it 
is not one of them. This is much of what makes it so difficult to get a grip on it. The closest thing 
to a starting point, it seems to me, is an inchoate sense that it is somehow important that what 
you do is somehow ultimately up to you—that your choices about what to do and how to live are 
yours, and only yours, to make. Call this vital capacity to make choices that are yours and only 
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yours autonomy. (Given the prevalence of the word in many domains of ethical and political 
discourse, it should probably be stressed just in case that I do not mean to give a general theory 
of autonomy. I take the autonomy putatively threatened by determinism to be one of may species 
of it, and not necessarily the most basic or important one.) 
Because disputants in philosophical discussions of free will are so often accused of 
changing the subject, I think it is important to begin by recognizing that autonomy really is 
awfully vague. What we know starting out is that we sometimes seem to be capable of making 
choices that are in some robust sense ours and only ours to make, that this capacity seems 
somehow deeply important, and that something about this capacity can easily seem to be 
threatened by determinism. If we built anything more into autonomy than this, we risk 
unselfconsciously distorting it and making our job impossible before we start. All this is a 
consequence of the fundamental feature of the free will problem: namely, that it is a problem, not 
just an idle intellectual puzzle. It keeps people up at night, throws profound thinkers into years of 
distress, and drives anxious adolescents into philosophy classrooms. It arises because determinism 
seems to threaten something vital, and no philosophical analysis of autonomy can constitute an 
adequate response to the free will problem unless the features of agency putatively constitutive of 
it really are recognizable as vital, and vital in the right way. But what counts as “vital in the right 
way” is, to put it mildly, anything but obvious. 
This brings us to Nagel. Nagel’s discussion of autonomy offers a good point of departure 
because Nagel is characteristically sensitive to the subtlety and importance of the issue, and the 
dangers of forcing it into an artificially narrow mold. When he describes “what [he] take[s] to be 
our ordinary conception of autonomy,” he does so in explicit acknowledgment of the 
contestability of his interpretation. I think he comes as close as anyone to getting at the heart the 
matter. But I also think that even he specifies too much too soon. Nagel writes: 
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[Our ordinary conception of autonomy] presents itself initially as the belief that antecedent 
circumstances, including the condition of the agent, leave some of the things we do undetermined: 
they are determined only by our choices, which are motivationally explicable but not themselves 
causally determined. Although many of the external and internal conditions of choice are 
inevitably fixed by the world and not under my control, some range of open possibilities is 
generally presented to me on an occasion for action—and when by acting I make one of those 
possibilities actual, the final explanation of this (once the background which defines the possibilities 
has been taken into account) is given by the intentional explanation of my action, which is 
comprehensible only through my point of view. My reason for doing it is the whole reason why it 
happened, and no further explanation is either necessary or possible.12 
What I think is right in Nagel’s description is that it captures, relatively simply and directly, the 
two essential elements of autonomy. I’ll call these origination and attributability: a choice or action is 
autonomous (that is, it manifests autonomy) only if it both originates with you and is attributable to 
you. As a first pass, a choice originates with you if all of the facts about your circumstances and 
yourself—antecedent to and independent of the choice itself—leave it open to you whether or 
not to make it; an action originates with you just in case the choice to perform it does. When you 
are the originator of your actions, then, what you do depends on what you choose to do, and the 
antecedent conditions do not determine the choice you will make. Similarly, when we try to 
explain an action that originates with you, that you here and now chose to do it for the reasons you 
did constitutes an ineliminable part of the explanation. (This is the “up to only you” part.) 
If autonomy only required origination, it might be contingently impossible, but it would 
not be conceptually problematic. Notoriously, what makes autonomy conceptually problematic is 
that origination in this basic sense is clearly not enough for it. As Nozick puts it, “if an uncaused 
action is a random happening, then this no more comports with human value than does 
determinism. Random acts and caused acts alike seem to leave us not as the valuable originators 
of action but as an arena, a place where things happen, whether through earlier causes or 
spontaneously.”13 That is, there must be a difference between what you freely do and what you 
                                                 
12. The View from Nowhere, pp. 114-115. 
 
13. Philosophical Explanations, p. 292. 
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randomly happen to do, but origination in the basic sense above does not mark this. Call this 
difference, whatever it turns out to be, “attributability.” Nagel takes attributability to be a matter 
of the kind of explanation of which autonomous actions admit. This is plausible, because an 
action must be explicable in one way or another for it to be intelligible why you are doing it, and 
to the extent that it is unintelligible to you why you are doing something, what you doing does 
not seem to be under your control. (Mutatis mutandis for choices.) This point is especially vivid in 
the context of one’s experience of one’s own activity. If I unaccountably got up from my chair 
and began walking down the hall, I would not experience this as a meaningful exercise of 
autonomy, regardless of whether my doing so was underdetermined by antecedent conditions. It 
would be as though a bizarre force had taken control of me. The addition of a brute desire to do 
so (“must...walk…thusly…”) would not help. (This is the “up to you” part.) 
All of these features of origination and attributability, I will argue, are indeed essential to 
the vital form of autonomy that determinism seems to threaten, and that hierarchical and 
orthonomy views neglect. But Nagel’s description goes a step further, and here things get 
complicated. Nagel distinguishes between two kinds of explanation of action: causal explanations 
and what he calls “intentional” explanations, which are “in terms of justifying reasons and 
purposes.”14  On his view, autonomous actions necessarily admit of “intentional” explanations 
but not causal explanations, or at least not complete causal explanations. I do not think this is 
quite right—at any rate, not as an initial formulation of autonomy—although I do think there is 
an element of truth to it, and that Nagel’s distinction between kinds of explanation is absolutely 
critical. For, as I will now explain, we can distinguish two senses in which an action or attitude 
                                                 
14. The View from Nowhere, p. 115. “Intentional” is in scare-quotes because Nagel’s terminology is infelicitous. 
Plausibly, an action can be explicable in the sense required for it to count as intentional without necessarily being 
explicable in the sense required for it to count as a meaningful exercise of autonomy. (In fact, Nagel’s own argument 
depends on this.) In later sections, I will use the phrase “justifying explanation” instead. 
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can be understood as attributable to an agent, each prominent in theorizing about agency and 
freedom, and each requiring the possibility of different kinds of explanations as constitutive of 
attributability. These senses of attributability are best understood as part of larger conceptions of 
the self as a source of agency. One conception is (broadly speaking) causal; it holds that something 
is attributable to you if it is caused by you in the right way. The other is normative; it holds that 
something is attributable to you if it is embodies (what we can call) your normative self-
conception. 
A fruitful way to approach the difference between these conceptions of attributability is in 
terms of the different kinds of questions about relationships between agents and their actions they 
purport to answer. Each kind of attributability is important, but each kind is important in very 
different contexts from the other, and for very different reasons. What’s striking, however, is that 
questions about each kind of attributability can introduce questions that motivate a corresponding 
kind of origination. To take the parallel even further, each of these kinds of origination are 
subject to structurally similar challenges, each ultimately pointing toward self-creation. 
Nevertheless, the nature and potential significance of the self-creation in question differ 
completely between the cases. I think Nagel’s argument against the possibility of autonomy 
actually runs these strands together, and that disentangling them will make it easier to see what 
autonomy could be and why it might be so compelling. So that is what I will do in the next two 
sections, starting with the causal case, which is the simpler of the two. 
3 The causal conception 
Billy throws a rock; it hits the window; the window breaks. Interested in whether and to what 
extent to hold him accountable for this event, we might naturally want to know the degree of 
control he had over its occurrence, and whether it resulted in states or dispositions stable or 
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ingrained enough for us to reasonably expect that Billy might do similar things in different 
situations. The answers to these questions depend on the causal explanation of how the breaking 
of the window came about, and specifically on Billy’s position in it. We can ask: was the event of 
the window’s breaking an intended or foreseeable consequence of something Billy did 
intentionally? (Maybe he was throwing the rock in a completely different direction, as part of a 
game, and was redirected towards the window in the air through Suzy’s masterfully-placed 
throw.) If it was, we can ask: did Billy have a normal degree of control over what he did? (Maybe 
Suzy’s neuroscientist father, Black, put a device in his brain.) And if he did, we can still ask: did 
he have a normal degree of control over his motivations for doing what he did? (Maybe Black had 
been forcing him to consume a lot of anarchist propaganda, in a kind of reverse Clockwork Orange 
scenario.) 
The first of these questions concerns Billy’s relation to an event; the second, to an action 
(as opposed to an event only contingently related to an action, as in the prior case); the third, to a 
set of attitudes. It is possible, and in some contexts proper, to approach all of them in the same 
way, as admitting of the same kind of answer. We can say that the event of the window’s 
breaking is relevantly attributable to Billy to the extent that he had some appropriate degree of 
control over it. Here we can assume that to have control over something is to have causal power 
over it, and to have causal power over something is for its existence or nature be causally 
explained by factors relevantly associated with the agent. (What counts as “relevantly associated 
here” here can get complicated, particularly with regard to Billy’s control over his motives.15 But 
bracket this for now.) Extending the analysis, we can say that the events of his intentionally 
                                                 
15. To anticipate the next section, it may be thought that in asking whether Billy had the normal degree of 
control over his motives, we are asking really asking whether Billy’s breaking of the window was attributable to him 
in a normative sense, as embodying his normative self-conception. But this is not necessarily so. Such is evident, for 
instance, in the law, wherein the question whether Billy’s process of indoctrination had exculpating features 
(arguably) can and should be kept distinct from the question whether his motives were authoritatively representative 
of him. (If all this seems a bit much for rock-throwing, suppose the offense were more serious.)  
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breaking the window, or having certain motivations, are likewise attributable to him to the extent 
that they are likewise subject to his causal power, again in virtue of admitting of the right kind of 
causal explanations. 
For something to be attributable to you in this sense is for you to have the right kind of 
causal power over it. As Billy’s case suggests, such attributability is plausibly as a kind of quasi-
juridical accountability. It is somewhat common to identify moral responsibility with such 
accountability, and very common to identify free agency with the capacity to be morally 
responsible. This makes it unsurprising that many influential writers on free will accept a causal 
view of the attributability that distinguishes free actions from merely random ones. Hume clearly 
does, for instance, when he argues that “where [actions] proceed not from some cause in the 
characters and dispositions of the person who performed them, they infix not themselves upon 
him, and can neither redound to his honor, if good, nor infamy, if evil.”16 So does Roderick 
Chisholm, when he asserts that “if the cause [of an action] was in some state or event for which 
the man himself was not responsible, then he was not responsible for what we have mistakenly 
been calling his act.”17 Hume and Chisholm disagree only with respect to the potential causal 
explanantia of free actions: Hume limits them to the agent’s internal states and dispositions—
paradigmatically, beliefs and desires—while Chisholm argues that actions can be caused by 
agents conceived as enduring substances, rather than as complexes of states or events. 
Now, there is a familiar line of thought leading to incompatibilism from a causal 
conception of attributability. If Billy’s throw breaks the window because Suzy knocked his rock 
into it, we deny that the breaking of the window is attributable to him because it results from 
factors outside of his causal power, and so beyond his control. Similarly, if he chose to break the 
                                                 
16. A Treatise of Human Nature, §2.3.2. 
 
17. “Human Freedom and the Self,” p. 27, my emphasis. 
 96 
window because of Black’s remote neural manipulation, we likewise deny that his choice was 
attributable to him because it was, similarly, determined by factors beyond his control. And if he 
was motivated to break the window because of Black’s anarchist indoctrination, we might once 
more deny that his motives were attributable to him because they were, yet again, determined by 
factors beyond his control. Convinced that what makes the difference in all three cases is 
determination by factors beyond one’s control, we might see no principled basis for changing our 
answer if the factors outside the agent’s control are simply those of history unfolding in its normal 
way, in accordance with deterministic laws of nature.18 So in order for Billy’s breaking of the 
window to really be up to him, it must be undetermined not only by any of the familiar sorts of 
exculpating factors above, but also by anything else. 
But if the line of thought leading from a causal conception of attributability to 
incompatibilism is familiar, so is the one leading from incompatibilism to a causal conception of 
self-creation. It was once common to argue that an action could be attributable to you only if it 
was causally determined by the relevant factors. This argument is not itself the problem. Even if 
antecedent conditions do not causally determine which of a range of choices you will make, it is 
plausible that in some cases, any of the choices open to you could have the right kind of causal 
etiology to count as under your control. The problem is that it may yet not be under your control 
which of these possible choices you actually end up making. 
While versions of this challenge have actually been developed in detail in the recent 
literature, we can get at the basic idea by adapting Nagel’s core argument against the possibility 
of autonomy.19 While Nagel’s argument is explicitly targeted against normative conceptions 
                                                 
18. Derk Pereboom defends the canonical contemporary version of this argument (which proceeds very 
similarly to the one sketched above) in “Determinism al Dente,” along with many variations and elaborations of it in 
later work. 
 
19. But see, e.g. the critical responses to Robert Kane’s defense of libertarianism in “Responsibility, Luck, and 
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attributability, extending it to the present case will help bring out the important structural 
similarities of the cases. Nagel writes: 
The intuitive idea of autonomy includes conflicting elements, which imply that it both is and is not 
a way of explaining why an action was done. […] When someone makes an autonomous choice 
such as whether to accept a job, and there are reasons on both sides of the issue, we are supposed 
to be able to explain what he did by pointing to his reasons for accepting it. But we could equally 
have explained his refusing the job, if he had refused, by referring to the reasons on the other 
side—and he could have refused for those other reasons: that is the essential claim of autonomy. It 
applies even if one choice is significantly more reasonable than the other. Bad reasons are reasons 
too. 
Intentional explanation, if there is such a thing, can explain either choice in terms of the 
appropriate reasons, since either choice would be intelligible if it occurred. But for this very reason 
it cannot explain why the person accepted the job for the reasons in favor rather than refusing it 
for the reasons against.20 
Again, bracket—for now—Nagel’s focus on the idea of “intentional explanation” and imagine 
the case concretely. Suppose that on the one hand, you are tired of living in your parents’ 
basement, and accepting the job would enable you to get a place of your own. On the other, you 
are spiteful toward your parents, and refusing the job would enable you to vex them. Now 
suppose that your process of weighing these reasons in deliberation is causally undetermined in 
such a way that, prior to coming to a conclusion in favor of one or the other of these options, it is 
perfectly possible that you will make either choice. That is, whichever choice you make, you’ll 
experience it as a perfectly normal outcome of deliberation; your accepting or rejecting the job 
will be intelligible to you or anyone else as a perfectly normal intentional action, manifesting a 
perfectly normal degree of control. What’s so incoherent about that? 
Well, nothing, yet. The problem is that what you don’t as yet have control over is whether 
the nondeterministic causal factors that undergird your deliberation—working “under the hood,” 
so to speak—operate in such a way that you come to one conclusion rather than the other. In 
fact, it’s hard to see how what your having control over them would even involve, since it’s 
                                                 
Chance,” which argue along similar lines that Kane’s form of libertarianism cannot secure a form of control not also 
available to compatibilists. 
 
20. The View from Nowhere, pp. 115-116. 
 98 
presumably possible to deliberate without even knowing they’re there. This point can easily be 
put in terms of causal explanation. Plausibly, the choice you make (whichever one it turns out to 
be) is indeed attributable to you because it has the right kind of causal explanation—in terms of 
the way your motives shape your deliberation, say. But what is not attributable to you is the fact 
that your motives shaped your deliberation such that it had the outcome it did. For that there 
may be no explanation at all. 
Whether this is in fact a problem depends on what the point of origination is supposed to 
be. But according to the line of thought I’ve sketched above, the point of origination is supposed 
to be responsibility: if something was determined by factors outside your control, you are not 
responsible for it. Now, admittedly, it’s true with regard to the job case that the fact that your 
deliberation went the way it did was not determined by factors outside your control. But it 
certainly wasn’t determined by factors within your control, either, for the obvious reason that it 
wasn’t determined by any factors at all. Notoriously, this forces the question: if you are not 
responsible for anything if it is determined by factors beyond your control, what condition on 
responsibility has gone unmet? Is it the negative condition of the absence of external 
determination, or a positive condition of control? It is hard to see how the former of these could 
make a difference.21 
But if a mere absence of external determination indeed isn’t enough for autonomy, we’re 
in trouble. In this case, autonomy would require you to have causal power not only over your 
choices, but also over the inner causes of those choices. Again, I have been assuming in this 
section that to have causal power over something is for it to have the right kind of causal 
                                                 
21. Much of the discussion of this point in the free will literature has been in relation to thought experiments 
(starting with one proposed by Harry Frankfurt) purporting to specify conditions under which an agent clearly lacked 
the ability to do otherwise (for reasons that having nothing to do with determinism) but was nevertheless clearly 
morally responsible for some misdeed. (For a recent critical summary in support of the same conclusion I draw, see 
John Martin Fischer, “The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories.”) 
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explanation, in terms of certain factors relevantly associated with the agent. So the operation of 
the inner causes of those choices must themselves have a causal explanation of the right kind, in 
terms of still other relevant agential factors. (In order to avoid an infinite multiplication of 
motivational states, it will be easier to imagine the “relevant agential factors” as more like acts of 
will, along traditional incompatibilist lines.) Now, unless we want to run into the same problem at 
a higher level, these other factors—whatever they are—can’t just operate non-deterministically: 
rather, their operation must be under your causal power too. Which means they too must have a 
causal explanation of the right kind, which means there must be yet more relevant agential 
factors, which means more things that must be under your causal power and more causal 
explanations of the right kind, and so on to infinity. To avoid the regress we can have two 
options. We might try to formulate a notion of control that still consists in the exercise of a causal 
power but does not imply the availability of a causal explanation. (I take something along these 
lines to be Chisholm’s motivation for positing agent-causation.) But, as Nagel put it, this seems to 
be giving a name to a mystery. The only other option is to claim that some of the relevant 
agential factors are causally explained by one another—to posit a finite loop, instead of an 
infinite line. But, since nothing can causally explain another without causing it, this would 
amount to claiming that some causes causally depend on their effects. Presumably this is 
metaphysically impossible. Even if it isn’t, it’s at least as mysterious as the other option. 
Let’s review. Autonomy in the causal sense consists in the capacity to make choices that 
ate attributable to you in that they are under your control, but originate with you in that they are 
not determined by any causes outside of your control. But if autonomy in the causal sense is 
important, it is evidently not so because it is important to choose in the mere absence of 
determining causes, but because it is important to have ultimate control over whatever causes 
your choices do have. But in order to actually exercise such control as a finite agent, you would 
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have to be capable of creating yourself, in the sense of being an agent-cause or a causa sui. 
Whether self-creation in either form is intelligible is dubious at best. 
It’s worth reiterating that nothing I’ve said in this section is meant to be at all original: all 
I’ve done is rehearse arguments that anyone who has read anything about free will is likely to 
have seen before. I’ve rehearsed them here because I wanted to make explicit that both much of 
the appeal of the causal conception of origination, and much dialectical pressure leading from 
that conception to an evidently impossible requirement of self-creation, come from the same 
place: the causal, quasi-juridical conception of attributability. If this were the only conception of 
attributability in our repertoire, and if the concern for autonomy was just a concern for ultimate 
control, then it seems to me that the idea of autonomy really would be hopeless. But this isn’t the 
only conception of attributability in our repertoire. As I now want to argue, we’ll be better able to 
make sense of what might be so compelling about autonomy in the first place by interpreting it in 
terms of a different one.  
4 The normative conception 
Attributability in the causal, quasi-juridical sense is grounded in attitudes that could equally 
intelligibly be taken toward someone else’s action as toward one’s own. But, as many recent 
philosophers have stressed, sometimes we care about attributability in a different, essentially first-
personal sense, grounded in attitudes agents take toward their own actions in practical reasoning. 
To get a basic sense of the difference between these approaches, take Martin Luther at the Diet 
of Worms, refusing to recant—“here I stand, I can do no other.” This case is often deployed in 
the free will literature as evidence in favor of compatibilism, by showing that experiencing an 
action as necessary is compatible with experiencing it as something you do freely. But Luther’s 
experience of the necessity of his action is not, primarily, a matter of causal necessity. “When 
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Luther says he can do nothing else,” Nagel observes, “he is referring to the normative 
irresistibility of his reasons, not their causal power.”22 He is not predicting how he is likely to 
behave, given the condition of his internal states and dispositions. 
In fact, causally speaking it may indeed be possible for Luther to do something else. 
Suppose (as some libertarians have proposed) that in some stressful situations, the effects of 
quantum indeterminacy in the brain are magnified so as to make macro-level processes of 
decision-making nondeterministic.23 And suppose this is just what happens to Luther. 
Understandably troubled by the threat of being branded an outlaw and heretic, Luther may be 
terrified, tired, and wish on a kind of raw animal level that he could just go home. But suppose he 
knows that these emotions do not register anything that actually matters about the case, or, 
really, what matters to him; he is in absolutely no doubt about either. So he gives no weight to his 
feelings in practical reasoning. But they are there all the same, and there so strongly that, up to 
the moment of his decision, the objective chance of his breaking down and recanting precisely 
matches that of his sticking to his principles. 
But this would not falsify his declaration. Again, “I can do no other” is a decision, not a 
prediction. It expresses a conclusion reached in practical reasoning, on the basis of the evaluative 
judgment that the reasons in favor of refusing trump the reasons in recanting. Luther would 
experience refusing as something he is actively doing, and the recanting as something he is failing to 
resist doing. That is, it is conceivable that he may break down and fail to act on this conclusion, 
but if he does he will experience his action as independent of his practical evaluations and, hence, 
against his will. When Luther says he can do no other, that is, he is referring to himself under a 
                                                 
22. The View from Nowhere, p. 117n3. To be clear, I aim not claiming the example generalizes to all cases of 
practical necessity. In other cases, the recognition that one is indeed psychologically incapable (in a largely but not 
exclusively causal sense) of a certain type of action can play the important role of mooting deliberative questions that 
may otherwise have been very fraught. 
 
23. Cf. e.g. Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will, pp. 128-130. 
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very specific description—as an agent essentially identified with certain normative commitments. 
He may, as an empirical matter, fail to adhere to these commitments, but if he did he would ipso 
facto fail to act as himself, in the deepest sense. 
So Luther is referring to himself in a normative sense, not a causal one. More generally, a 
choice is attributable to you in a normative sense just in case it is chosen according to the norms 
to which you hold yourself fundamentally answerable in practical reasoning. Naturally, defenders 
of different versions of the normative conception will understand what it means for a choice to be 
“made according to the norms with which you hold fundamentally answerable in practical 
reasoning” in different ways.24 But what is common to any version of the normative conception is 
that it is at most a necessary condition of a choice’s being attributable to you that it admit of the 
right kind of causal explanation. That is, while Luther’s refusal must have been made it in light of 
an evaluation that it was, indeed, appropriate with respect to these norms, it could only count as 
attributable to him in a normative sense if the evaluation was correct.25 So attributability is still a 
matter of explanation, but in the normative case there must be a justifying explanation, above and 
beyond a causal one. This explanation does not purport to explain how Luther’s action was 
produced, given his constitution and environment. It rather purports to show how it was intelligible, 
                                                 
24. For important defenses of the normative conception of character, see e.g. Bernard Williams, “Persons, 
Character, and Morality,” Harry Frankfurt, “Identification and Wholeheartedness,” Gary Watson, “Free Agency,” 
Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, ch. 3; Michael Bratman, Structures of Agency (esp. chs. 2, 4, 7, and 8); 
and Charles Taylor, “What is Human Agency?” In §63 of A Theory of Justice, Rawls presents an abstract but 
prototypical version of a normative conception of character, in which the norms in question constitute the agent’s 
“plan of life,” and traces the normative conception in general to early twentieth-century idealists and pragmatists, 
like Bradley, Royce, Dewey, and Perry. Rawls writes: “Here I adapt Royce’s thought that a person may be regarded 
as a human life lived according to a plan. For Royce an individual says who he is by describing his purposes and 
causes, what he intends to do in his life.” Rawls argues that it is only in virtue of the content of these plans—and 
then only insofar as the plans are rational—that persons can be intelligibly such that things can be good for them. In 
a footnote, he makes the constitutive role of these norms even more explicit, adding that “Royce uses the notion of a 
plan to characterize the coherent, systematic purposes of the individual, what makes him a conscious, unified moral 
person.” (A Theory of Justice, p. 358) 
 
25. Here it is important to keep in mind that we can be very permissive about what counts as an evaluation that 
some action is appropriate with respect to a norm. Huck Finn’s failure to turn Jim in may be attributable to him in 
the normative sense even if his inability to tell the truth when asked reflects the implicit awareness that to do so 
would be to grossly betray a friend—even if he only interprets his attitudes as such in retrospect. 
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as part of a life embodying a certain set of values. As such, its explanatia are facts about the content 
of Luther’s values, not facts about his internal states or dispositional one.26 Asked why Luther 
refused to recant given the physical, social, and psychological costs, one might give a causal, 
psychological explanation, citing his relevant motives and features of his constitution in virtue of 
which those motives effectively moved him to action. But someone might reasonably reply: “Yes, 
yes, I know all that, but who cares? What I want to know is why it made sense for him to recant.” 
Here one might begin with the obvious “well, you know he could do no other, right?”—and then 
explain why he could do no other by citing the considerations that justified his choice from his 
perspective (“I am bound by the Scriptures I have quoted and my conscience is captive to the 
Word of God,” and so on), perhaps relating them to his larger system of values so as to show 
how, relative to that system, those considerations weighed so heavily. . This explanation does not 
purport to explain how Luther’s action was produced, given his constitution and environment. It 
rather purports to show how it was intelligible, as part of a life embodying a certain set of values. 
As such, its explanatia are facts about the content of Luther’s values. It appeals on facts about his 
internal states or dispositions at most indirectly, insofar as these facts determine the content his 
values have. 
The distinction between causal and normative conceptions of attributability is familiar. 
But what may be less familiar is that we can draw the same distinction with respect to 
origination. In fact, Luther’s “I can do no other” might plausibly be taken to imply that he didn’t 
think of himself as the originator of his choice in a normative sense. Even if the antecedent didn’t 
determine Luther’s empirical behavior, they still determined what Luther qua normative self-
conception would choose, so to speak. Recall that when I first described origination, in §2, I 
                                                 
26. As I noted in fn. 14, my use the term “justifying” here should not be taken to mean that an attributable 
choice must necessarily justifiable to anyone other than yourself. 
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offered that a “a choice originates with you if all of the facts about your circumstances and 
yourself—antecedent to and independent of the choice itself—leave it open to you whether or 
not to make it.” This should have read like a pretty direct, basic statement of the kind of 
origination incompatibilists defend. But we can now see that “you” admits of multiple 
interpretations here: it could refer to “you” qua locus of empirical causes, but it could also refer to 
“you” qua normative self-conception. What we’ve seen in the Luther case is that the former kind 
of origination doesn’t entail the latter, and it should be pretty clear from the last three chapters 
that there’s no entailment in the other direction, either. To go back to the first chapter: even if 
it’s causally determined that Sartre’s pupil will leave his mother to fight, there may be no fact of 
the matter—relative to everything in principle accessible to him in deliberation—whether this is 
in fact the choice the norms constitutive of his self-conception call for. 
As we saw in the last section, being the causal originator of your choices can seem 
important to many people because it can seem important to have ultimate control over their 
causes. Without such control, one might understandably think, what to do would not really be up 
to you. It would rather be up to external causes, or to chance. Extending the analogy suggests that 
if it important to be the normative originator of your choices, it is because it is important to have 
ultimate authority over their standards. Without such authority, one might no less understandably 
think, what to do would not really be up to you, either. It would rather be up to external 
normative requirements, or to nothing at all. 
Some people find the idea of ultimate control obviously important and do not need to be 
argued into it. Others find it confused, if not embarrassing or worse, and are equally sure of their 
convictions. I suspect something comparable is true of ultimate authority. Luther certainly had 
no interest in it. It is doubtful that the possibility of ultimate first-personal normative authority 
would even be intelligible in his moral framework; it certainly wouldn’t be worth wanting. For 
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him all authority rested with God. Needless to say, more or less secular analogues are common in 
philosophy: Plato and Spinoza are the prime examples, along with the many contemporary 
defenders of orthonomy. But if I have been right in the two previous chapters, about love and 
blame, then denying the intelligibility or importance of ultimate first-personal normative 
authority really would render unintelligible much of the interest we take in ourselves and others 
as particular individuals. (Whether it would similarly render unintelligible the attitudes of 
notoriously intense ancient, late medieval, or early modern mystics is another question. They 
may simply have seen the world and our place in it differently.) 
Of course, the discussion of love—and less directly the one of blame—did not so much 
appeal to ultimate first-personal normative authority as such, but rather to a specific account of 
the relation between the content of norms to which an agent is committed and the choices the 
agent takes to be appropriate with respect to them. This suggests a respect in which the analogy 
between the causal and normative cases breaks down. In the causal case, it is possible to get a 
more or less intuitive grasp on why ultimate control is supposed to matter prior to formulating a 
reasonably systematic account of how such control might actually be realized in human agency. 
Rather, all we need to get the more or less intuitive grasp is a version of the quasi-juridical 
conception of attributability and a sense of how the conditions under which such attributability is 
undermined might constitute a slippery slope. I think the normative case runs in the opposite 
direction. (This is yet another reason why the appeal of autonomy can be so elusive.) The best 
way to appreciate the importance of ultimate first-personal normative authority is to think 
through what we would have to be like to have it, and explore the implications that our being this 
way would have for our attitudes towards ourselves and others. Origination in the normative 
sense is compelling because of the kind of agency necessary to adequately realize it, not despite it. 
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So before I survey, as a kind of summing-up of the dissertation as a whole, why the 
normative sense of origination might have been the one that mattered all along, it’s first 
necessary to finish drawing the analogy and trace the normative version of the dialectic from 
origination to self-creation. This is just a recapitulation of the argument of the first chapter, 
which aimed to reconstruct and defend a version of Sartre’s claim that his pupil’s choice could be 
rationally undetermined without being arbitrary. Start by imagining Sartre’s pupil in terms that 
precisely parallel the person Nagel described as faced with a choice whether to accept or reject a 
job. Here, too, there are reasons on both sides, and we can assume that Sartre’s pupil would be 
more or less intelligible in choosing either of the alternatives on the table. 
We saw in the causal case that stopping here would give us a very simple way of 
accounting for origination. This was the “leeway incompatibilist” route: to claim that the 
origination relevant to autonomy simply consists in the presence of indeterminism in normal 
deliberative processes, of the sort otherwise identical to those defended by compatibilists. The 
leeway incompatibilist answer has the benefit of being unproblematically coherent, but the 
drawback of being inadequate to the intuitive importance of autonomy in a way that Nagel’s 
objection captured. Nagel’s objection was that either of a pair of possible choices might both be 
explicable as done for reasons, and so attributable in a basic sense, but if they were, there could 
not also be an explanation why one chose to act on the reasons one did, given the availability of 
the other set. By interpreting these explanations as the kind of causal explanations characteristic 
of something’s being under an agent’s control, we saw how naturally the argument applies to the 
causal case: there may be two causal processes left upon by antecedent conditions, each 
constitutive of your exercising your control in a certain way, without it being under your control 
which of these processes actually takes place. But it is hard to see how origination that lacked such 
higher-order control is supposed to matter. 
 107 
On the normative level, precisely parallel accounts are common. We might say that 
norms to which the pupil is committed leave both staying with his mother and leaving to fight 
“rationally eligible,” but do not specify weighing principles or other standards for comparative 
evaluation; in deciding which set of reasons to act on, all the pupil can do is plump.27 So 
antecedent conditions fail to determine what the pupil will do qua normative self-conception, just 
as in the previous case they failed to determine what he would do qua locus of empirical causes. 
So here, too, the pupil’s choice might technically count as originating with him, but only in a 
very shallow sense. The problem continues to be the one Nagel identified, just transposed to a 
different kind of explanation. Each choice may admit of a basic kind of justifying explanation, in 
terms of the reasons that render it rationally eligible. But this basic kind of justifying explanation 
necessarily cannot be a justifying explanation of why the pupil chose to act on the reasons he did. 
And just as people worried that determinism might prevent them from being more than 
superficially accountable for their choices might understandably balk at not having control over 
which undetermined possibility occurred, so might a Sartrean, concerned to live in authentic 
recognition of one’s own role in defining oneself, likewise object to the denial that he could not 
intelligibly take responsibility for his choice as putatively expressive of what matters most to him. 
Now, if it is still to be open to the pupil to choose either option, it must be possible both that 
there could be an all-things-considered explanation why he ought to have stayed with his mother, 
in the event of his making that choice, and an all-things-considered explanation why he ought to 
have left to fight, in the event of his making that one. Since it is presumably impossible that a 
single possible world should include all-things-considered explanations, of precisely the same 
kind, of both the truth of a proposition and the truth of its negation, the only way for a choice to 
both meaningfully originate with you and be meaningfully attributable to you is for its 
                                                 
27. Cf. Joseph Raz, “Incommensurability and Agency.” 
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explanation to partly depend on the very fact that it is made. This applies no less for causal 
explanations than normative ones; it reflects the basic interdependence between the ideas of 
origination, attributability, and self-creation, conceived at a high level of generality. But while in 
the causal case the requisite self-creation is, again, metaphysically impossible—causal explanantia 
cause their explananda, and causes cannot depend on their effects—in the normative case, as I 
argued in the first chapter, it isn’t. 
I won’t repeat these arguments here, but it’s worth recalling the concrete picture of 
Sartre’s pupil they imply. To begin with, the pupil may safely be imagined as anguished. It’s not 
only that there are reasons on both sides: it’s that there are pressing reasons on both sides, to the 
point that each alternative is such that choosing against it would be a proper occasion for 
remorse and a deep sense of loss. This feature of the case has led some philosophers to interpret it 
as a dilemma. But I do not think Sartre meant the pupil’s anguish to be understood as the same 
kind of thing as the truly paralyzing sense of inner conflict characteristic of truly tragic dilemmas, 
like Sophie’s or arguably Agamemnon’s. In a truly tragic dilemma, it’s obvious what the weights 
of the relevant considerations are: they’re categorical on both sides, and the problem is that it’s 
therefore impossible choose correctly. The pupil’s case is the opposite: the problem is that it is 
possible to choose correctly (even though doing so will be painful), but it’s anything but obvious 
what the weights of the relevant considerations are. What makes his choice an occasion for 
anguish is that he will regret it terribly if he chooses incorrectly, and that he is forced to choose in 
the absence of anything like a principled, rational basis for identifying the correct choice in 
advance.  He needs to choose, but the most he could possibly have to go on is a primitive, 
inchoate feeling that one course of action somehow embodies how he aims to live in a way that 
the other doesn’t. This feeling is explanatorily impotent on its own: he will only be in a position 
to explain or justify its authority after he has lived with his choice long enough, and coherently 
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(or “authentically”) enough, to work out a more developed sense of self in its wake. Had he felt 
and chosen otherwise, and lived with that choice, it, too, might have turned out to correct (with 
“might” being the operative word here). 
Now, suppose the pupil decides to leave his mother to fight, and further suppose, 
optimistically, that that through doing so he comes to both live as an adventurer and patriot and 
understand himself as one. From the evaluative point of view that he thereby comes to inhabit, it 
will be perfectly possible for him to provide a justifying explanation of his decision to leave his 
mother rather than stay with her. Admittedly, that explanation was not accessible to him in 
advance, and couldn’t have been in principle. But who said it had to be? To intelligibly regard his 
choice as free, the pupil will have to regard it as attributable to him in the sense of being 
(contrastively) explained by who he is. So the explanation of the pupil’s choice must be accessible 
to him in advance only if he must regard who he is—his self or character—as itself something 
whose nature must be somehow be fully accessible or extant in advance of his actions. But, again, 
why must he regard himself as such? On a causal view, of course, we would have a perfectly good 
argument here: he would have to regard his attributable actions as caused by himself or his 
internal characteristics, and causes must precede their effects. But we have just seen that it is 
precisely from the pupil’s first-person perspective in practical reasoning that he need not conceive 
himself in such a way, and so from this perspective the requirement that the pupil’s character be 
accessible or extant in advance is unmotivated. On the contrary, it’s perfectly natural to say that 
from a first-person perspective, the pupil necessarily doesn’t view who he is as accessible to him in 
advance, precisely because he views who he is as something he’s in an ongoing process of 
determining. This shows how the origination and attributability conditions can be satisfied 
together: the pupil lacks a prior justifying explanation of his action not because there is no such 
explanation, but rather because the features of himself that support it themselves depend on a 
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sequence of judgments and actions that include (but go beyond) the very action he is about to 
choose. Relative to the antecedent state of his character, the pupil could have freely and 
attributably done otherwise. 
Let’s return to Nagel’s assessment of the “logical goal of [the] ambitions [implicit in our 
ordinary idea of autonomy]”— “to be really free we would have to act from a standpoint 
completely outside ourselves, choosing everything about ourselves, including all our principles of 
choice—creating ourselves from nothing, so to speak.” We can now see that on the normative 
conception of self-creation, this is partly true and partly false. The freedom of Sartre’s pupil does, 
in a sense, require him to choose at least many of the most fundamental things about himself, 
including his principles of choice—at any rate, it requires him to reason and act according to 
norms whose content it is fundamentally up to him to determine through antecedently 
undetermined choices. But it does not require him to act from a standpoint completely outside 
himself—although I suppose it would if he had to create himself all at once, which really would be 
impossible. It just requires him to act from a standpoint that is never fully complete or 
determinate, because it’s the standpoint of someone always in the process of becoming who he is. 
5 The importance of self-creation 
One of the things the case of Sartre’s pupil brings home is how far the ideals of ultimate control 
and ultimate authority can come apart. While it is indeed up to him and only him to define who 
he is through his choices, he doesn’t actually have all that much control over who he is, because he 
doesn’t have all that much control which choices actually he ends up making. And note that he 
lacks this control for reasons that have very little to do with the metaphysics of agency. Give him 
the most metaphysically extravagant form of libertarian freedom you can think of: so long as it 
falls short of turning him into a god, his external occasions for choice will still be largely out of his 
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control, and these play just as much of a role in setting the boundaries of who he can make 
himself into as the internal causes of his choices. 
We should therefore expect the appeal of normative autonomy to come from a very 
different direction than that of its causal counterpart. In fact, normative autonomy offers no 
comfort to people whose unease over determinism stem from a concern for quasi-juridical 
accountability. But it is nevertheless essential to other phenomena equally prominently associated 
with free will. It follows from the two previous chapters that attributability and origination, in 
their normative forms, are required for two of the richest and most important Strawsonian 
reactive attitudes: angry blame and interpersonal love. This in itself both vindicates and defuses 
the traditionally incompatibilist conviction that a central form of human freedom indeed requires 
a much stronger form of self-creation than either hierarchical or orthonomy compatibilist views 
would imply. In insisting on the importance of self-creation, Kane and incompatibilists like him 
were right all along. 
Taken together, the arguments of these chapters have a broader lesson to teach, about 
the nature of individuality and freedom of the individual. In order to respond to someone as a 
particular individual, it is necessary to take an interest in that person as having a specific 
personality and character, constituted by a set of fundamental values or commitments—and not 
ones that would necessarily be affirmed or even tolerated from an objective or impersonal 
standpoint. But it is also necessary to implicitly regard those commitments as ones that 
necessarily cannot be individuated in abstraction from the individual’s ongoing sequence of 
particular judgments and actions. If people did not act from characters they were in the process 
of freely creating—if it were in principle possible to pin people down, to definitively specify their 
essential commitments in abstraction from their particular histories, as fixed things—it would not 
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be possible to fully regard them as individuals, in a way that would undermine the intelligibility of 
many of our central attitudes and practices. 
Explaining the discomfort many people seem to feel with the possibility of being 
predictable according to deterministic laws of nature, Kane suggests that “most people want to 
ascribe a uniqueness to themselves that would make it impossible for others to treat them as 
types, subsuming all their behavior under general laws.” 
They want to say, “Don’t type me. Pay attention to me and not to your physiological, 
psychological, or social formulae, because I will surprise you, no matter how comprehensive your 
knowledge is. To deal with me as a person, you must wait to see what I will do and react 
accordingly.”28 
One might reasonably wonder how causal origination or self-creation is supposed to help. Are 
you treating someone less as an instance of a type, and more as an individual, if the physiological, 
psychological, and social formulae are probabilistic instead of deterministic? (Does recognition of 
individuality increase as ideal credences in outcomes approach .5?) But if the worry Kane 
describes is interpreted as a concern for normative self-creation, it is both understandable and 
apt. 
We can see its importance most vividly with respect to love. If it is important to be valued 
as a unique individual anywhere, it is important to be valued as such by a lover. In the second 
chapter, we saw how Frankfurt’s attempt to explain how beloveds could be valued as unique 
individuals was inadequate because he denied that there were reasons for love, and more 
specifically because he denied that love was a appreciative response to the beloved’s essential 
character. Catherine could not love Heathcliff for what his soul was made of. In this chapter, we 
saw how Frankfurt’s hierarchical view of freedom can provoke intuitive dissatisfaction in part 
because it conceives an agent’s essential character as constituted by a given complex of 
psychological states, something one does not create for oneself but comes to have in virtue of 
                                                 
28. The Significance of Free Will, p. 86. 
 113 
“nature and the world.” Viewing these aspects of Frankfurt’s thought side by side, we can see 
how his account of love could only be what it is. For Frankfurt, to be loved for your character 
would be to be loved for something that would make you too replaceable: an arrangement of 
psychological states that could be equivalently instantiated, and equivalently lovable, in someone 
else. Velleman thought he could avoid this problem by construing the beloved’s essential 
character as something that transcended their empirical psychological properties, arguing that 
interpersonal love was a response to the value of the beloved’s bare Kantian personhood. But 
that response, I argued, goes too far in the opposite direction. Catherine’s love for Heathcliff is 
not an indiscriminate openness to what makes him a person; it is a discriminating and insistent 
attraction to what makes him specifically Heathcliff. 
In order to avoid these extremes, we need a conception of character as something that 
transcends a person’s existing characteristics while remaining specific to that person. We need the 
same kind of intermediate conception, I argued, for an adequate account of blame. The uneasy 
combination of emotional vulnerability and defensiveness distinctive to righteous anger requires 
that there be a real question whether an offense was characteristic of the agent who performed it, 
but also that the question be in principle unanswerable prior to the expression of anger and its 
acceptance or rejection by the agent. The improvisational model, distinctively, supports just such 
a conception. 
Once we recognize the need for this intermediate conception, we can see how appeals to 
orthonomy are responsive to a source of deep intuitive dissatisfaction with hierarchical 
compatibilist theories but misaddress it. C. A. Campbell writes, for instance: 
What [the experience of free agency] implies—and it seems to me to be an implication of cardinal 
importance for any theory of the self that aims at being more than superficial—is that the nature of 
the self is for itself something more than just its character as so far formed. The ‘nature’ of the self 
and what we commonly call the ‘character’ of the self are by no means the same thing, and it is 
utterly vital that they should not be confused. The ‘nature’ of the self comprehends, but is not 
without remainder reducible to, its ‘character’; it must, if we are to be true to the testimony of our 
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experience of it, be taken as including also the authentic creative power of fashioning and re-
fashioning ‘character’.29 
Part of what it is to regard yourself as free from the perspective of practical reasoning, Campbell 
claims, is to regard yourself as free of your existing motivations. What “reflective human beings 
want,” Nagel writes in a similar spirit, is “to be able to stand back from the motives and reasons 
and values that influence their choices, and submit to them only if they are acceptable.” (127) As 
I noted in §1, Frankfurt’s hierarchical view is motivated by the need to account for such reflective 
distance. As I also noted in that section, however, it is controversial whether Frankfurt succeeds 
in this. It no less possible to reflectively distance yourself from your higher-order motives as from 
your first-order ones. As many of Frankfurt’s critics have argued, avoiding an infinite justificatory 
regress requires, ultimately, endorsing your will as appropriate with respect to standards that do 
not depend on it. And note that such a conclusion, and the motivation behind it, is not unique to 
compatibilists. Campbell himself turns out to argue that the only occasions for free choice are 
choices between what you most strongly desire (where this is strictly a function of your “character 
as so far formed”) and what you morally ought to do (which Campbell tends to call, rather 
quaintly, your “duty”). Thus, the “authentic creative power of fashioning and re-fashioning 
character” turns out to be the power to fit your character into the moral mold (which makes one 
wonder whether “creative” was really the right word). 
And so we are led to orthonomy. When Nagel endorses orthonomy as a partial 
reconciliation of our intuitive idea of freedom with an objective view of ourselves, he does so in 
self-conscious debt to Kant. There is, Kant famously argued, only one way to reconcile our 
freedom from our existing motivations with the possibility of our acting for reasons, and that is to 
conceive of ourselves as free only when acting for reasons that any agent acting “under the idea of 
                                                 
29. On Selfhood and Godhood, p. 177. 
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freedom” would act for, regardless of whatever contingent motivations such an agent might 
happen to have. But we can now see how Nagel’s Kantian account of freedom goes too far in 
precisely the same way that Velleman’s Kantian account of love does. The phenomenon of 
reflective distance indeed requires fundamentally identifying yourself in practical reasoning with 
norms whose content necessarily depends on more than your present motivations alone. But one 
might think, as Bernard Williams has argued throughout his work, that this cannot mean 
fundamentally identifying yourself with the essentially impersonal norms of morality, on pain of 
ceasing to regard yourself as a particular individual, with a distinct personality and character of 
your own. The question of whether Williams is right here is obviously beyond the scope of this 
chapter. But if he is, it follows that the conception of individuality in the Kantian view of freedom 
is just as superficial as the one in the Kantian view of love, and for precisely the same reasons. In 
that case, both the hierarchical and orthonomy views fail as accounts of freedom of the 
individual. The nature of the self needs to be for itself more than just its character as so far 
formed, but it can’t be characterless. We need a middle ground, and to get it, we need origination, 
and ultimately self-creation, just like the incompatibilists thought. 
6 Conclusion 
I began the chapter by noting the conviction many people have that the capacity to be the 
originator of your acts is vital to the nature and importance of free agency, and the failure on the 
part of compatibilists to adequately address this conviction. I have argued that compatibilists 
should offer a compromise. They should accept that origination is indeed vital to the nature and 
importance of free agency, in a way they have thus far denied. But they should ask, in return, 
that their counterparts reconsider whether the capacity at issue is really as metaphysically 
tendentious as they thought. 
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To this end, I have traced how the basic, intuitive idea of autonomy as origination admits 
of two natural interpretations, corresponding to two different conceptions of the self as a source 
of agency, and each yielding structurally similar but substantively different conceptions of 
autonomy as self-creation. Both of these conceptions are responsive to old and powerful sources 
of attraction to the idea of self-creation, but they differ strikingly with respect to the natures of 
their respective attractions. The causal conception reflects an ideal of autonomy as ultimate control, 
grounded in the value of a robust form of accountability. The normative conception, on the 
other hand, reflects an ideal of autonomy as ultimate first-personal normative authority, grounded in the 
value of a robust form of individuality. 
Whether or not I have succeeded in actually motivating a compromise, therefore, I at 
least hope to have forced attention to the question: what is it about self-creation that makes it 
vital to the nature and importance of free agency? Is it a matter of control and accountability, or 
first-personal authority and individuality? Those who prefer the second answer will have reason 
to accept the compromise on offer; those who prefer the first won’t. Naturally there is no reason 
to expect consensus: I suspect this is one of those issues that mark basic divisions among 
philosophical temperaments. But I think our understanding of the free will problem will be 
advanced if we recognize it as turning, fundamentally, on this broadly ethical question, to as 
much or greater an extent as on questions about the metaphysics of agency. 
I want to finish, in this spirit, by gesturing at some reasons for thinking that the divide 
between the ideals of ultimate control and ultimate authority is very deep indeed. In the 
question-and-answer session following Existentialism is a Humanism, the writer Pierre Naville 
pressed Sartre with a long and challenging series of objections. These include the following, 
which could be repeated verbatim against the view I have proposed: 
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It is not true that man has freedom of choice in the sense that such choice allows him to endow his 
actions with a meaning that they would not have had without it. It is not enough to say that men 
can fight for freedom without knowing they are doing so; or then, if we were to attribute such 
recognition in its full meaning, that would mean that men can commit themselves to, and fight for, 
a cause that dominates them, which is to say an act within a context that is beyond them, and not 
only in their own terms. For in the end, if a man fights for freedom without knowing or expressly 
formulating for himself in what way, and for what purpose, he is fighting, that means his actions 
will bring about a series of consequences that would insinuate themselves into a causal web, all the 
facets of which he would not totally grasp, but which would nonetheless delimit his actions and 
give them a meaning in terms of other people’s actions—not only those of other men, but of the 
natural environment in which such men act.30 
For the most part I have presented my view as broadly descriptive—as an analytical 
reconstruction of ethical attitudes and practices when conceived in terms that would answer to 
their evident importance. But the implication that Naville ascribes to Sartre, and which my view 
shares, is undeniably revisionary—if not to the ethical attitudes and practices themselves (which 
may be silent on the matter), at least to the low-level, informal theorizing that occurs at the level 
of abstraction immediately above them. It is certainly completely at odds with what many 
philosophers—and above all most incompatibilists—view as the essence of autonomous agency. 
Even compatibilists frequently insist that while you may not have complete control over whether 
your projects work out the way you want them to, insofar as you are capable of acting and 
reasoning autonomously, you are at least capable of guaranteeing that your choices about how to 
pursue those projects are always appropriate by the standards to which you can reasonably hold 
yourself. My view that even this internal control is not guaranteed. No matter how 
conscientiously Sartre’s pupil might go about making his choice, whether he turns out to be 
justified by his own standards in making it depends on the choices that the world, and other 
people, enable him to make down the line. 
Nevertheless, I do not regard this consequence as much of a problem. Essential 
dependence on contingency is just the price of ultimate first-personal authority. As we saw in the 
first chapter, and as Frankfurt reinforced in the quotation at the beginning of this one, the idea of 
                                                 
30. Existentialism is a Humanism, p. 64. 
 118 
ultimate first-personal authority would be unintelligible if it amounted to defining who you were 
by sheer, unconstrained stipulation: “A person’s will is real only if its character is not absolutely 
up to him.” The only way I can even begin to see of reconciling the possibility of such constraint 
with the possibility of one’s commitments ultimately depending on one’s choices is the one I’ve 
defended here. But if self-creation is only intelligible as a process that essentially extends before 
and after a choice, contingency inevitably creeps in. 
But this is just to give a reading of a famous passage that already constitutes the best and 
deepest reply to Naville, though it wasn’t written by Sartre. It wasn’t even addressed to Naville, 
although it reads like it could have been: 
To insist on such a conception of rationality, moreover, would, apart from other kinds of 
absurdity, suggest a large falsehood: that we might, if we conducted ourselves clear-headedly 
enough, entirely detach ourselves from the unintentional aspects of our actions, relegating their 
costs to, so to speak, the insurance fund, and yet still retain our identity and character as agents. 
One’s history as an agent is a web in which anything that is the product of the will is surrounded 
and held up and partly formed by things that are not, in such a way that reflection can only go in 
one of two directions: either in the direction of saying that responsible agency is a fairly superficial 
concept, which has a limited use in harmonizing what happens, or that it is not a superficial 
concept, but that it cannot ultimately be purified—if one attaches importance to the sense of what 
one has done and what in the world one is responsible for, one must accept much of what makes 
its claim on that sense solely in virtue of being actual.31 
                                                 
31. “Moral Luck,” pp. 29-30. 
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CAST OF CHARACTERS 
(in order of appearance) 
 
Sartre’s student, an occupied Parisian 
Lalitha, a conservationist 
Keith Richards, a rock star 
Paul Gauguin, a painter 
Catherine Earnshaw, a young gentlewoman 
Ellen Dean, her governess 
Edgar Linton, her fiancé 
Heathcliff, her lover 
Minerva McGonagall, a professor of Transfiguration 
Neville and Hermione, her students 
Alexei Karenin, a civil servant 
Anna Karenina, his wife 
Joe, a fair-weather friend 
Margaret Wilcox (née Schlegel), a young lady 
Henry Wilcox, her husband 
Billy and Suzy, wayward children 
Black, a wicked neuroscientist 
Martin Luther, a priest 
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